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PREFACE
This paper examines the various bases f o r  the present Federal 
Income Tax P o l ic y  toward farm cooperat ives ,  and suggests changes in 
p o l ic y  which would be in accord with basic standards o f  tax a t io n  eq u i ty .  
The above examination and p o l ic y  proposals involve two goals. F i r s t ,  
the several conceptual frameworks: rebate or  cost adjustment theory ,  
agency theory ,  and d epar tm en ta l iza t ion  theory -  upon which the present  
ta x  p o l ic y  is based -  are  examined. Second, these conceptual bases 
f o r  the present tax p o l ic y  are measured aga ins t  the fo l lo w in g  p r in c ip le s  
o f  ta xat ion :
1. Like e n te rpr ises  must be t re a te d  a l i k e .
2. Unl ike  e n te rpr ises  must receive  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  treatment  
which is consis tent  with  optimum a l lo c a t i o n  o f  resources.
The rebate and agency theor ies  have been s t ro ng ly  challenged by 
many economists outs ide the f i e l d  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  economics and these  
challenges have been inserted in th is  paper in a m in im al ly  a l t e r e d  form. 
No cla im to o r i g i n a l i t y  is intended with  respect to those arguments.
Since the recent re je c t io n  o f  the rebate or  cost adjustment argument by 
the U. S. Treasury, the depar tm en ta l iza t io n  concept has taken on new 
importance. The burden o f  support f o r  the present tax p o l ic y  toward 
farm cooperatives has s h i f t e d  from the legal profession to the economist. 
However, to  the a u th o r 's  knowledge, no serious case has been made aga ins t  
the depar tm en ta l iza t io n  argument. Some non-farm economists have sug­
gested tha t  there is g reat  enough separat ion  o f  control and ownership in 
farm cooperatives to make the de p a r tm e n ta l iza t io n  p o s i t io n  untenable.  
However th is  appears to have l i t t l e  fo rce  since many w r i t e r s  including
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the author be l ie ve  tha t  cooperat ives ,  l i k e  unions, are  not p u re ly  eco­
nomic in s t i t u t io n s  and tha t  in d u s t r ia l  democracy is found in a g re a te r  
degree here than in large p r o p r ie ta r y  e n te rp r is e s .  Since the separa­
t io n  counter-argument has l i t t l e  a - p r i o r i  va lue ,  the d epar tm en ta l iza ­
t io n  argument appears to stand undaunted. Yet i t  is in reference to  
th is  conceptual support o f  present tax p o l ic y  th a t  the economist is 
working in his a p prop r ia te  ro le .  This thes is  attempts to f i l l  th is  void  
by cha l lenging the major prop of  the depar tm en ta l iza t ion  argument; tha t  
a department o r  f i rm  can be defined on the basis o f  s t a t i c  goals. Co­
op goals do change and to the extent  tha t  these changes a l lo w  such 
organ izat ions  to operate from the standpoint of  f i rm s ,  they should bear  
a l i k e  tax burden. Under an economic system considered to be in s t a t i c  
e q u i l ib r iu m  such a p o l ic y  o f  ta x a t io n  a l lows fo r  optimum a l lo c a t i o n  o f  
resources and e q u i ty  in ta x a t io n .  However i t  can be v a l i d l y  argued th a t  
in the more r e a l i s t i c  case o f  an economic system undergoing dynamic 
change, l i k e  businesses, from the standpoint o f  immediate goals ,  should 
not nec e ss a r i ly  receive  l i k e  tax treatment. Only through a d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t e d  tax pa t te rn  w i l l  optimum a l lo c a t i o n  of  resources be brought about.  
Here again the present tax treatment toward farm cooperatives cannot be 
j u s t i f i e d .  There are  strong a - p r i o r  reasons based upon observed p a r a ­
meter s h i f t s  th a t  co-ops should be taxed more h e a v i ly  than other  f irms  
in the present farm economic environment. Such taxa t ion  would increase  
the ra te  o f  adjustment toward com pet i t ive  general e q u i l ib r iu m .  In sum­
mary, the d e p a r tm en ta l iza t io n  p o s i t io n  does not j u s t i f y  the present  fe d ­
e ra l  tax treatment o f  income from farm -cooperat ive  e n te rp r is e .  Since  
the o th e r  conceptual frameworks used in support of  the present tax  t r e a t ­
ment o f  fa rm -cooperat ive  earnings are found lack ing ,  the conclusion is
i i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
th a t  the present p o l ic y  works toward a sub-optimal a l lo c a t i o n  o f  re­
sources, Appropriate  p o l ic y  proposals are  suggested.
I 1 t
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CHAPTER I
THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE: ITS ROLE AND ECONOMIC NATURE
The S e t t in g
H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  cooperatives have been no n-en te rp r ise  associa t ions  
created to b e n e f i t  from economies o f  scale . In the United Sta tes  the  
associated e n t i t i e s  are  predominantly  e n te r p r is e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  farm 
e n te rp r is es .  These en te rp r is es  b e n e f i t  from cooperat ive  a s so c ia t ion  in 
the fo l low ing  ways:
1. They provide services o f  a kind and q u a l i t y  th e re to fo re  
unava i l a b le .
2. They lower costs o f  serv ices p re v io u s ly  a v a i la b le ,
3. They in f luence the pr ices  received f o r  the p a r t i c ip a n t s '
• output.
The Associated Press and Railway Express Agency are  examples o f  the  
f i r s t  case. C i t rus  cooperatives were formed p r i m a r i l y  to in f luence  
p r ic e s ,  while  gra in  cooperatives were formed p r i m a r i l y  to lower costs.  
However with farm cooperatives the b e n e f i ts  were g e n e ra l ly  mixed.
American farming has never matched o th e r  in dus tr ies  in purchas­
ing and marketing e f f i c i e n c y .  As Davis s t a te d ; '
Although the small farm is e f f i c i e n t  in the production of  
crop and l iv e s to c k  products, i t  is a t  a grea t  disadvantage  
when i t  comes to buying farm s upp l ies ,  marketing farm pro­
ducts and prov id ing  services re la te d  to farming which opera­
t ions  can normally  be performed more advantageously on a
' john H. Davis ,  An Economic Analysis  o f  the Tax Status o f  Farmer 
Coopérât ives (Washington: American Inst i tu te  o f  Cooperation 1950), p. 4
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large scale.
The reasons fo r  the dichotomy are  geographical and h i s t o r i c a l .  In any 
given lo c a le ,  land g e n e ra l ly  has mixed c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .  A pasture and 
crop mix is t y p ic a l .  Where land approaches homogeneity, crop r o ta t io n  
is necessary f o r  m ainta in ing f e r t i l i t y .  The farm -type  o f  e n te rp r is e  
was e a s i l y  adapted to fa m i ly  o rg a n iza t io n .  Consequently a discount was 
placed upon s p e c ia l i z a t i o n .  As a re in fo rc in g  f a c to r  the epic o f  s e t t l e ­
ment in th is  country was simultaneously  one o f  subsistence farming.  The 
Homestead Acts are p o l i t i c a l  homage to th is  f a c t .  Some p r a c t ic a l  know­
ledge and a strong back o f ten  earned t h e i r  h ighest  returns in farming.  
With land r e l a t i v e l y  cheap and a v a i l a b l e ,  f a m i l ie s  w i th  l i t t l e  c a p i ta l  
created what we know today as the fa m i ly  farm. Out of  the fa m i ly  farm's  
in e f f i c i e n c ie s  in marketing and purchasing,  coupled w i th  monopsony and 
monopoly powers which i t  faced, the a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ive  movement 
was born .2 The fo l lo w in g  quotat ion is entered as an a p p l ic a b le  e x h i b i t . 3
Grain cooperatives began in the l8 8 0 's .  Laws had been passed 
char ter in g  the gra in  exchanges, and farmers came to the con­
clusion th a t  as these exchanges grew s tronger  the farm er 's  
bargaining power was weakened. They f e l t  th a t  p r ices  f o r  
t h e i r  grain  were being set wi thout  t h e i r  having a voice in 
the m atter ,  o f ten  by a small group o f  t raders  w i th  no real  
in te r e s t  in the economic w e l fa r e  o f  farmers.
Perhaps one of the most eloquent statements regarding the h i s t o r i c a l
ro le  o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperat ives was made in House Report No. 188, 79th
2 por e x c e l le n t  h i s t o r i c a l  m a te r ia l  on the a g r ic u l tu r a l  coopera­
t i v e  movement see: James H. S h id e le r ,  Farm C r is is  1919-1923 (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: U n iv e r s i ty  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  Press,  1957) and: Theodore
Saloutos and John Hicks, A g r ic u l t u r a l  D iscontent  in the Middlewest 
1900-1939 (Madison: U n iv e r s i ty  of Wisconsin Press, 1950)
■a
U. s.  Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings,  
Revenue Revisions o f  1951. 82nd Cong., 1st S e s s . , p. 1273
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Congress 2nd Session.^
The hearings before the committee did develop one p o s i t i v e  and 
i r r e f u t a b l e  conclusion. That conclusion was pred icated  upon 
evidence submitted p e rs o n a l ly  by many farmers who had been 
instrumental in the o r ig in a l  formation o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  coopera­
t iv e s .  I t  was d e f i n i t e l y  apparent , a f t e r  l i s t e n i n g  to these 
witnesses tha t  condit ions in the e a r l y  days were such tha t  
these p a r t i c u l a r  farmers were forced to the c re a t io n  o f  cooper­
a t iv e s  to c o r re c t  the e v i l s  in the marketing o f  t h e i r  products  
and to improve t h e i r  own a g r i c u l t u r a l  industry  g e n e ra l ly .
Farmers h i s t o r i c a l l y  were forced to s e l l  the products o f  t h e i r  
labor a t  a p r ic e  the market was w i l l i n g  to pay and to buy the 
goods required fo r  the production o f  these products a t  p r ices  
estab l ished by the s e l l e r .  Operating as an In d iv id ua l  the 
farmer had no bargaining power and was always subjec t  to the  
whims and fancies  o f  the market specula tor .
There can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t  the h i s t o r i c a l  ro le  o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l
cooperatives was to counterva i l  imperfections in the fa rm -sector  o f  the
economy. A g r ic u l tu r a l  cooperatives were formed to e l im in a te  monopsony
and monopoly p r o f i t s ,  thus turn ing  these revenues back to those people
from which they had been e x t ra c te d ;  namely the farm producers.
In te g ra t io n
A l l  cooperatives are  formed e i t h e r  to maximize consumer s a t i s ­
fa c t io n  or  producer returns.  A g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperatives are formed by 
producers. They can maximize returns from production in the fo l low ing  
three ways:
1. They can lower production costs.
2. They can lower marketing costs.
3. They can increase p r ic e s .
Through increased scale  r e s u l t in g  from a s s o c ia t io n ,  the cost of
U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Small Business. The Compe­
t i t i o n  o f  Cooperatives w i th  Other Forms o f  Business E n te r p r is e , Report 
No. 1888, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. , 1946, p. 12
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fac to rs  o f  production decrease, w h i le  the e f f i c i e n c y  in combining such 
fac to rs  increases, thereby lowering production costs. Mere s iz e ,  ignor­
ing monopsony p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  enables the farm producer to e f f i c i e n t l y  
u t i l i z e  s p e c ia l ize d  marketing equipment and personnel.  The unassociated  
farm producer g e n e ra l ly  is denied such b e n e f i ts .  S ize  a ls o  increases  
the communication between the farm producer and the producer o f  indus­
t r i a l  services and goods used in a g r ic u l tu r e .  Thus the cost o f  an in e f ­
f i c i e n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  system is reduced. These cost reductions are  a v a i l ­
able  without  resor t ing  to monopsony s t ra te g y .  However many cooperatives  
do u t i l i z e  monopsony power, which resu l ts  in a d d i t io n a l  savings.
S im i la r  advantages accrue to farm marketing associa t ions .  In 
graphical terms the advantage o f  a marketing a s so c ia t ion  is a lowered 
Average Marketing Cost Curve (amc) of  a r e l a t i v e l y  constant cost na ture ,^  
A s ing le  farm f i rm  operat ing  on a non-co-op basis would bu i ld  in to  a 
processing p la n t  a c e r t a in  degree o f  f l e x i b i l i t y .  Hence the producer  
could process fo r  the same u n i t  cost s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  amounts o f  farm 
production. However f l e x i b i l i t y  ra ises minimum costs and through asso­
c ia t io n  th is  cost can be lowered. By a s s o c ia t in g ,  p re v ious ly  indepen­
dent farm producers can process products a t  a lower u n i t  cost (no i n t e r ­
nal accomodation f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  is made) re ly ing  upon many coordinated  
le a s t -c o s t  p lan ts  fo r  f l e x i b i l i t y .  Unpredictable  changes in farm output  
can be d is t r ib u te d  e q u a l ly  among the coordinated p lan ts  once t h e i r  re­
spect ive  le a s t  cost po ints  are reached. Such a p o l ic y  resu lts  in a 
s l i g h t l y  r is in g  amc curve. However i f  many p lan ts  are operated, which
Ç
Werner Zvi H irsch ,  "The Economics o f  In te g ra t io n  in A g r ic u l ­
tu r a l  Marketing" (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  Dept, of  Economics 
U n iv e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a ,  Berkeley ,  1950).
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îs the ty p ic a l  case, the r is e  w i l l  be so i n s i g n i f i c a n t  th a t  the amc 
curve r e f l e c t s  approximate constant costs. I f  production f a l l s  below 
the number o f  un its  necessary to operate  a l l  p lan ts  a t  le a s t  cost capa­
c i t y ,  the excess p lan ts  can be closed down. Since f ix e d  costs fo r  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  p la n t  are  n e g l ig i b le  the c o o p era t iv e 's  amc curve w i l l  slope  
downward only  s l i g h t l y ,  u n t i l  optimum c apac i ty  is reached. The r e s u l t  
o f  such coordinated operations is an approximate constant cost long-run  
and s h o r t - ru n ,  marginal and average marketing cost funct ions .  A l l  of  
which w i l l  be lower than those a v a i l a b le  to the unassociated farmer.  
Th ere fo re ,  w i th in  broad l i m i t s ,  whenever the cooperat ive  maximizes pro­
f i t s  i t  a lso  is minimizing average costs. Like the purchasing coopera­
t i v e ,  I f  monopsony power is considered,  u n i t  costs are  f u r t h e r  reduced.
Cooperatives a ls o  increase returns by ra is in g  farm pr ic e s .  Such 
outward s h i f t s  in the a g r i c u l t u r a l  in d u s try 's  demand funct ion  are  brought  
about by the fo l low ing  fa c to rs .
1. Increased m u l t ip le  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  farm products.
2. C ounterva i l ing  monopsony power.
The f i r s t  fa c to r  is o f te n  overlooked. P r i o r  to  cooperation many farm 
products were "underemployed." This  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  the case f o r  per ­
ishable products. Middlemen were in te re s ted  in s hor t - te rm  investments 
and specu la t ive  gains. Both intereste worked a ga ins t  the farm producer.  
Grading was haphazard, storage and t r a n s p o r ta t io n  arrangements of  a 
s i m i l a r  q u a l i t y .  As a r e s u l t  the customers in the eastern markets pur­
chased day by day v a s t l y  d i f f e r e n t  q u a l i t i e s  of  various pe r is ha b le  goods. 
Obviously the t o t a l  demand f o r  such products was small.  Proper grading,  
s t o r in g ,  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  and b e t t e r  market in formation could push the 
industry  demand curve to the r ig h t ,  re s u l t in g  in h igher  p r ices .  This
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the cooperatives did. Pr ice  f lu c tu a t io n s  were ironed out through the 
u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a more expensive but more p r o f i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  system. 
Higher and more s t a b i l i z e d  farm p r o f i t s  resu lted .  In a d d i t io n  as the 
improved farm products reached the m etropo l i tan  markets, t h e i r  increased  
u n i fo rm i ty  w i th in  classes and increased a v a i l a b i l i t y  unleased dormant 
consumer demand. P r o f i t s  were increased again.
The above p r ic e  e f fe c ts  resulted from a super ior  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  
marketing fa c to rs  than had th e re to fo re  been developed. The problems of  
the per ishable -p roduct  producers was p a r t i a l l y  unavoidable.  New indus­
t r i e s  o f te n  go through an i n i t i a l  adjustment per iod .  To a degree even 
the most progressive middleman would have f a i l e d  to p a c i fy  the s p e c ia l -  
ized-product- farm producers. A new set o f  problems had to be solved and 
time was needed. I t  is not unprecedented th a t  producers take the i n i ­
t i a t i v e  in such circumstances. Producers before and since have of ten  
i n i t i a t e d  solu t ions to t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  problems. However 
i t  is equal ly  f a i r  to s ta te  th a t  many farm-connected en te rp r is es  made 
an in heren t ly  t r y in g  problem, ne a r ly  incapable o f  s o lu t io n .  Few new 
problems were faced in the marketing of s ta p le s ,  yet  these producers 
a ls o  complained of  low and unstable p r ic e s .  Here monopsony power was 
the hear t  of  the problem. Consequently producers o f  s taples  a ls o  organ­
ized cooperat ives. L ike unions, such cooperat ives found strength in 
large bargain ing u n i ts .  Locals a f f i l i a t e d  with d i s t r i c t s  and d i s t r i c t s  
with  c en tra l  exchanges. As a r e s u l t  the commission houses found repre­
s e n ta t iv e s  o f  cooperatives s i t t i n g  on p re v io u s ly  producerless boards o f  
t rade .  A simple case o f  cause and e f f e c t  was a l t e r e d ;  farm pr ices  in ­
creased and monopsony p r o f i t s  decreased.
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A1though co-op in te g ra t io n  b e nef i ted  the farm s e c to r ,  i t  is essen­
t i a l l y  an i n f e r i o r  type of  in te g ra t io n .  I n f e r i o r  o r  super ior  in te g ra t io n  
re fe rs  not to the ex ten t  th a t  d i f f e r e n t  processes o f  production and d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  are combined, but ra th e r  to the ease o f  coord inat ion  of  those 
processes by the in te g ra to rs .  In many cases farm producers have gone 
j u s t  as f a r  as o ther  producers regarding the ex ten t  of  combined proces­
s e s .& Superior  non-farm in te g ra t io n  has f o r  the most p a r t  come about 
through expansion, merger and cons o l ida t io n .  These methods o f  i n t e g r a t ­
ing have created new independent f i rm s or expanded old ones. Production  
and marketing decisions are s t i l l  made in tandem. Such methods have 
g e n e ra l ly  not been a v a i la b le  to  farm e n te r p r is e .  The volume necessary 
to  achieve economies o f  scale  in marketing or  purchasing can seldom be 
achieved through farm mergers. Ownership is too w id e ly  spread. Lack of  
c a p i t a l  has stymied expansion to an economical volume. In b r i e f ,  the 
economies to  be found in expansion, merger and conso l ida t ion  are  in s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  in the farm sector .
The weakness o f  farm In te g ra t io n  through cooperat ive  associa t ion  
is the l in e  drawn between production and marketing decis ions.  The f o l ­
lowing quotation in reference to the Challenge Cream and Butte r  Associ­
a t io n  o f  Los Angeles a p t l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  th is  p o i n t ; 7
What may appear to be a h ig h ly  in tegra ted  f i rm  in r e a l i t y  
suf fe rs  from some handicaps which are  ty p ic a l  to  many coop-  
e r a t i v e s i  Although each local asso c ia t io n  is bound by con­
t r a c t  to d e l i v e r  i t s  commodities to Challenge, which is the 
lo c a ls '  sales agent and has no in f luence  on the production  
plans of the lo c a ls ,  each local decides on i ts  own what, how
^H, G. Hamilton, " I n t e g r a t i o n  of  Marketing and Production  
Services by F lo r id a  A sso c ia t ions ,"  Journal o f  Perm Economics. 
XXIX (May, 19^7), 495-497.
7Hirsch
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much and when t o  p roduce, Thss leaves t o  th e  c o o p e r a t i v e ' s  
h eadqua r te rs  the f u n c t i o n  o f  m a x im iz ing  n e t  r e tu r n s  t o  mem­
bers  under g ive n  p r o d u c t i o n  p o l i c i e s .
Non-farm f i r m s  as a r u le  o p en ly  a s s o c ia te  o n l y  t o  p r o v id e  i n f o r m a t io n a l  
s e r v i c e s .  Such an a s s o c ia t i o n  does no t  d i l u t e  th e  d e c i s i o n  making fu n c ­
t i o n  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m s .  The f i r m s  remain independen t ,  making s i ­
multaneous m a rk e t in g  and p r o d u c t i o n  decis ions.  Only  c a r t e l s  o r  i n d u s t r y  
p o l i c i e s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t a c i t  c o l l u s i o n  s t r u c t u r a l l y  resemble a coop­
e r a t i v e  a s s o c ia t i o n .  Even here  i f  the  arrangement  has long been e s ta b ­
l i s h e d ,  p r o d u c t i o n  and m a rke t in g  d e c i s i o n s  w i l l  n o t  be sepa ra te d ,  in  
such a case the f i r m s  fo rm a m u l t i l a t e r a l  monopoly. However, the  t y p i ­
ca l  c a r t e l  is  p ro b a b ly  n o t  w e l l  I n t e g r a te d  s in c e  p a r t i e  opiating f i r m s  
can d i s a s s o c i a t e  in  an i n s t a n t .  On th e  o t h e r  hand th e  a s s o c ia te d  e n t e r ­
p r i s e  members o f  a fa rm c o o p e r a t i v e  a re  c o n t r a c t u a l l y  bound t o  one 
a n o th e r .  F a i l u r e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  terms o f  the  m u l t i l a t e r a l  c o n t r a c t  run­
n in g  among the p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  le g a l  en fo rcement  e i t h e r  by 
l i q u i d a t e d  damages o r  s p e c i f i c  per fo rmance .®
In summa r y , th e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  I n t e g r a t i o n  in  th e  n o n - fa  ttm s e c t o r  
is f a r  S u p e r io r  t o  i t s  c o u n t e r p a r t  in  th e  fa rm s e c t o r .  The i n e f f i c i e n t  
c a r t e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  must be re s o r te d  t o  a t  the  I n i t i a l  le v e l  o f  i n t e g r a ­
t i o n  by a s s o c ia t i n g  c o o p e r a to r s ,  w h i l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  in  o th e r  i n d u s t r i e s  
need never  by suppo r ted  by t h i s  mechar.Ism. This  b r in g s  us t o  th e  ques- 
t  i on 3 what k ind  o f  a bus Ines s un 11 is  the  a g r i c u l t u r a l  coop e r a t : v e ?  1f  
c o o p e r a t i v e  a s s o c ia t i o n s  a re  t o  r e c e iv e  e q u i t a b l e  ta x  t r e a tm e n t  one must 
know what k in d  o f  bus iness  u n i t s  th e y  c o n s t i t u t e .  Departments o f  f i r m s
o
^Edwin GrIswC'ld Nourse, The Legal S ta tu s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e !  
C o o p e ra t io n  (New York :  M acm i l lan  C o . ,  192?),  pp. 196-205
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are  not taxed, s ub s id ia r ie s  ( 8 0  percent owned by the parent)  have a two 
percent tax levied on t h e i r  "earnings" before they appear on the c o n s o l i ­
dated income statement,  and n o n - p r o f i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  pay no tax a t  
S t r u c t u r a l l y  where does the farm cooperat ive  f i t  an?
Economic Nature o f  A g r ic u l tu r a l  Cooperatives  
In determining the tax l i a b i l i t y  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperatives  
much e f f o r t  has been spent d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between the economic nature  
o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperatives and th a t  o f  f i rm s.  Many a g r ic u l t u r a l  econ­
omists concur tha t  farm cooperatives a re  j o i n t l y  operated departments 
o f  independent fa rm - f i rm  patrons,  E m e l ie n o f f , Robotka, Nourse and 
P h i l l i p s  are  the major sponsors o f  th is  p o s i t io n .  The fo l low ing  quo­
ta t io n s  po in t  up t h e i r  pos i t ions ,^®
Emeli enoff
The cooperative represents the associated economic units  
In t h e i r  func t ion in g  and not t h e i r  asso c ia t ion  as a separ­
a te  economic e n t i t y ;  an a s so c ia t ion  or  aggregate is func­
t io n in g  only  as a branch or  p a r t  o f  associated econotrjic 
u n i ts ,  In th a t  respect i t  is p e r f e c t l y  id e n t ic a l  with the 
special departments or  branches of  s in g le  economic un i ts .
9 p re n t  ice  H a l l  Tax S e r i e s ,  V o l .  3! 5,  1962, p. 17, 105,
^^ ivan  V. E m e l i e n o f f , Economic Theory  o f  C o o p é ra t i o n . (Ann A rb o r ;  
Edwards B ro th e rs  I n c . ,  1948) pp. 249,  105 S- 22.
Richard P h i l l i p s ,  "Economic Theory  o f  C o o p e ra t ive  O p e ra t ion  a t  
C o s t , "  American C o o p e r a t i o n . 1952, 305“ 306, c i t e d  by L om e  D. Cook,
"An Econari ic A n a ly s i s  o f  the  Federa l  T a x a t io n  o f  Income from Coopera­
t i v e  E n t e r p r i s e "  (u n p u b l is h e d  Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  Dept,  o f  Economics, 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M ic h ig a n ,  Ann A r b o r ,  1954) , p. 197.
Frank  Robotka, "A  Theory  o f  C o o p e r a t i o n , "  Jo u rna l  o f  Farm Eco­
n o m ics . XXIX (F e b . ,  1947 ) ,  94-114.
Nourse, The Legal S ta tu s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  C o o p e ra t i o n . 81.
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The conception of  an aggregate o f  economic un i ts  Is a 
strange ly  d i f f i c u l t  concept. I t  cannot be comprehended 
p r e c is e ly  unless i t  is c l e a r l y  understood th a t  an aggre­
gate o f  economic un i ts  is not an independent economic u n i t  
but the group of  func t ion in g  economic uni t s - — acqu is i  t i v e  
(e n te rp r is e s )  o r  spending (households) and th e re fo re  a l l  
the funct ions of  the aggregate are u l t i m a t e l y  the funct ions  
o f  the aggregated economic un i ts  and not o f  the aggregate  
Î t s e l f .
The aggregate consists o f  a technica l  u n i t  (establ ishment)  
but not an economic u n i t  e n te r p r is e .
Robotka
a c o o p e ra t iv e . , ,  i s . . . a  fe d e ra t io n  o f  autonomous econo­
mic units  whose avowed purpose i t  is to func t ion  in t h e i r  
ind iv idua l  c a p a c i t ie s  but in a co -o rd in a te  manner with  
respect to s p e c i f ic  a c t i v i t i e s  i n t e g r a l l y  re la te d  and com­
mon to t h e i r  ind iv idua l  economic p u rs u i ts .
P h i l l i p s
The j o i n t l y  conducted a c t i v i t y  of  the cooperat ive  associa­
t io n  is not a corporate  f i r m  which shares earnings over  
and above costs with those who p a t ro n iz e  i t .  i t  is instead 
a j o i n t l y  operated economic p l a n t ,  set  up and conducted as 
an in tegra l  p a r t  o f  the in d iv id ua l  business a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
the economic f i  rms.. .which p a r t i c i p a t e  in i t .  The p a r t i c i ­
pa t ing  firms funct ion  c o o rd in a te !y in th a t  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  
t o ta l  business a c t i v i t y  which they conduct through t h e i r  
common p la n t .  P a r t i c ip a t io n  in the j o i n t  a c t i v i t i e s  in­
volves more than p a t ro n iz in g  i t .  I t  involves a ls o  ( 1) a l l o ­
c a t ing  resources to the j o i n t  a c t i v i t y ;  ( 2 ) assuming the 
entrepren eu r ia l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  of  the residual u n c e r ta in ty  
bearing and u l t im a te  decis ion making f o r  the j o i n t  a c t i v i t y ;  
(3) bearing o f  a l l  costs ,  including costs o f  r is k s ,  in the 
j o i n t  p la n t ;  and (4) rece iv ing  the economic b e n e f i t s ,  i f  any. 
o f  the j o i n t  p l a n t . . . A l l  net opera t ing  proceeds from the 
j o i n t  p la n t  accrue to  the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f i r m  which own and 
operate i t . . .
Nourse
The phrase not conducted f o r  p r o f i t  is one th a t  has been 
misunderstood.. . I t  does not mean th a t  the members o f  a 
cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion  do not expect to receive economic 
b e n e f i ts  from i t s  o p e r a t i o n s . . . i t  does mean th a t  these 
b e n e f i t s ,  even though measurable in pecuniary terms, shal l  
accrue to p a r t i c i p a t i n g  members to enhance the returns  
from t h e i r  own operat ions as producers, ra th e r  than going
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as p r o f i t s  to those persons who fu rn is h  c a p i ta l  to  the  
j o i n t  e n te rp r is e .
The above statements, although d i f f e r i n g  in p a r t i c u l a r s  are  compatible  
In p r i n c i p l e .  A l l  o f  the authors d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  
and dependent economic u n i ts .  Trade a s s o c ia t io n s ,  c a r t e l s ,  departments,  
plants  and cooperat ive associa t ions  a l l  f i t  in to  the dependent category.  
In recognit ion o f  the dependent charac te r  o f  the cooperat ive a s s o c ia t io n ,  
Emelienoff  c a l l s  the cooperat ive  an aggregate o r  technica l  u n î t .  Robotka 
speaks o f  coordinated funct ion ing  wi th  respect to common ind iv idua l  eco­
nomic p u rs u i ts ,  wh i le  Nourse re fe rs  to enhancing the returns o f  the asso­
c ia  to rs* ovjn operations as producers, P h i l l i p s  gives the b r i e f e s t  d e f i n i ­
t i o n ,  c a l l i n g  the cooperat ive asso c ia t ion  a j o i n t l y  c^erated p la n t .  In 
the infancy per iod o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperation there  would be no argu­
ment with  these common p o s i t io n s ,  which w i l l  henceforth be re fe r red  to  
as the depar tm en ta l iza t ion  p o s i t io n .  However i t  must be remembered th a t  
a cooperative has economic s ig n i f ic a n c e  only  as i t  is re la ted  to the 
associa tors '  in ten t .  There is no reason why a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperatives  
cannot use the same economic and legal r e la t io n s h ip s  a t  one po in t  in 
time to operate a j o i n t - p l a n t  o f  indépendant farm f irms and a t  another  
t ime,  to operate a f i rm .  This is the a l l - i m p o r t a n t  f a c t  th a t  has o f te n  
been overlooked. In order  to show th is  e v o lu t io n a ry  p o s s i b i l i t y  we w i l l  
f i r s t  de f in e  a f i r m ,  and then compare the evolv ing economic nature o f  
a g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperat ive  associa t ions  to i t .  In d e f in in g  the economic 
nature o f  a f i rm  the fo l lo w in g  three premises w i l l  be used.
Premise 1: Households maximize s a t i s f a c t i o n  over t h e i r
p lanning per iods by equating the marginal  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  from present  consumption, id le  
balances, and working balances.
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This re la t io n s h ip  is based on the assumption th a t  the end goal o f  a l l  
economic a c t i v i t y  is want f u l f i l l m e n t .  Households, in maximizing s a t i s ­
f a c t io n ,  weigh the s a t i s f a c t io n  from present consumption aga ins t  the 
a n t ic ip a te d  s a t is f a c t io n  obtained from a poss ib le  la r g e r  fu tu re  consump­
t io n  and lower present consumption.
Premise i 1 : Present working balances are  a l lo c a te d  among
various en te rp r is es  according to  a n t ic ip a te d  
adjusted re tu rns ,  subject  to  a maximum-risk 
cons t r a  in t .
Adjusted returns rates are  monetary returns from which a d i f f e r e n t i a l  
r i s k  has been deducted. Several e n te rp r is e s  may o f f e r  the same gross 
returns,  ye t  a l l  may have d i f f e r i n g  r isks  associated w i th  an id e n t ic a l  
earning p o t e n t i a l .  T h e i r  adjusted returns would, th e r e fo re ,  d i f f e r .
The household w i l l  a l lo c a t e  i t s  working c a p i ta l  to  those en terpr ises  
tha t  w i l l  g ive i t  the la rg e s t  adjusted ra te  o f  re turn  subject  to i ts  
maximum-risk c o n s t ra in t .  This  l a t t e r  c o n s t r a in t  simply means tha t  some 
investments are unacceptable, whatever the re tu rn ,  because the r is k  
associated with them is in excess o f  some acceptable  l i m i t .
Premise 111: P o r t f o l i o  a l lo c a t i o n  of  present working
balances may be esse n t ia l  to minimize  
un c e r ta in ty .
The householder is not merely in te re s ted  in maximizing his  ra te  of  return ,  
he is a lso  in teres ted  in minimiz ing u n ce r ta in ty .  Hence investments w i l l  
be d is t r ib u te d  among several e n te r p r is e s ,  so as to  maximize the mathema­
t i c a l  expectat ion of  the returns a v a i l a b le  in an uncer ta in  world. This  
u n c e r ta in ty  m in imizat ion or  p o r t f o l i o  a l lo c a t i o n  o f  working balances is 
the r a t io n a le  used by mutual funds and o th e r  investment operat ions In 
"assur ing"  c l i e n t s  a given adjusted ra te  o f  re turn .
The m inimizat ion o f  u n c e r ta in ty  and the maximization o f  adjusted
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returns create  a specia l r e la t io n s h ip  between entrepreneurs and e n te r ­
p r is e s .  The goal o f  constrained maximization o f  returns tends to gather  
in to  any going concern investors having common expectat ions o f  adjusted  
returns rates. P e r fe c t  homogeneity o f  returns expectat ions may never be 
reached, but such homogeneity w i l l  serve as an e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t io n .
Since the des ire  o f  an investor  to minimize u n c e r ta in ty  through p o r t ­
f o l i o  a l lo c a t i o n  requires th a t  the r isks  and returns o f  a l l  his  in ves t ­
ments be approached on an aggregate bas is ,  another basic re la t io n s h ip  
between ente rpr ises  and entrepreneurs e x is ts .  This  i s ,  the entrepreneur  
is in teres ted  in maximizing p r o f i t s  on ly  w i th in  his  r i s k  l i m i t a t i o n .
This is understandable since any major change in a concern's p o l i c ie s  
w i l l  re q u ire ,  w ith  only  acc identa l  except ions,  a complete r e a l lo c a t io n  
of  the in v e s to r 's  working c a p i t a l .  Hence the fo l lo w in g  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a 
f i rm  can be formed,
A f i rm  is an aggregation of  investors whose r i s k - r e t u r n  
expectations tend to  be homogeneous w i th  respect to inves t ­
ment in an e n te r p r is e  whose given goal is to maximize pro­
f i t s  subject  to  some maximum pe rm is s ib le  r is k .
I t  is now possib le  to  analyze the economic nature o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  
cooperatives. Since i t  has a l re ad y  been es tab l ished th a t  cooperat ive  
associa t ions  are  dependent economic u n i ts ,  three  conclusions a re  poss ib le  
regarding t h e i r  present  economic nature .
1. Contemporary a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives are operated as 
farmer-owned f i rm s.
2. Contemporary a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives are  operated as 
departments o f  farm f i rm s ,
3. Contemporary a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives are  operated  
simultaneously  as f i rms and as departments.
The t h i r d  p o s s i b i l i t y  is re la te d  to  the d ispers ion  o f  equal ized adjusted
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returns points  among an a s s o c ia t io n 's  patrons. Where a l l  patrons receive  
adjusted returns no g r e a te r  than those a v a i l a b le  in a pre-monopoly-monop- 
sony environment, henceforth re fe r red  to as the p r e - e n t r y  p e r iod ,  the 
cooperat ive funct ions as a dependent econanic u n i t . O n  the o ther  hand 
i f  a coopera t ive 's  members increase t h e i r  returns beyond the p r e -e n t r y  
l e v e l ,  the associa t ion  is s t r u c t u r a l l y  analogous to  a f i rm .  However, 
since patrons probably did not have common adjusted returns in t h e i r  
independent operat ions during the p re -a s s o c ia t io n  per iod the coopera­
t i v e ' s  economic s t ru c tu re  must be def ined in view o f  the ind iv idua l  p a t ­
ron's re la t io n s h ip  to his  a sso c ia t ion .  By ana lyz ing  i t s  economic s t ru c ­
ture  in th is  manner, one f inds the cooperat ive  func t ion in g  as a depart ­
ment f o r  some members and as a f i rm  f o r  o th e r  members. The c ru c ia l  po in t
is th a t  a farm coop era t ive 's  s t ru c tu re  and ro le  cannot be proper ly  d e te r ­
mined on an aggregate basis . An aggregate ana lys is  o f  a coopera t ive 's
economic s t ru c tu re  is s t a t i c  in nature and leads to gross misconceptions.
In order to determine which o f  the three  poss ib le  conclusions is v a l i d ,  
one must trace the e vo lu t ion  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives.  By comparing 
over t ime the basic c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  farm cooperatives with our d e f i ­
n i t io n  o f  a f i r m ,  the changing economic nature o f  farm cooperatives w i l l  
become exp 1 i c i t .
The f i r s t  stage w i l l  be named the o rg a n iza t io n a l  stage. As noted 
above, farmers organized cooperat ives to e l im in a te  monopoly and monopsony
The p r e -e n t r y  per iod re fe rs  to th a t  h i s t o r i c a l  t ime when large  
aggregations o f  non-farm c a p i ta l  were not operat ing in force  In 
the farm sector  o f  the economy. For example the large farm im­
plement manufacturers, commission houses and r a i l ro a d s .  That is, 
the economy was more p ro p e r ly  def ined as a p e r fe c t  com pet i t ive  
s t ru c tu re  ra th e r  than a workable com pet i t ive  s t ru c tu re .
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p r o f i t s .  By e l im in a t in g  these p r o f i t s  they obtained h igher  and more 
s ta b le  incomes. The means f o r  accomplishing t h is  goal was r is k  s u b s t i ­
tu t io n .  The asso c ia t ing  farm entrepreneurs s u b s t i tu te d  the new r is k  
o f  uncoordinated a c t io n  f o r  the old r i s k  involved in s e l l i n g  to  and buy­
ing from ou ts iders .  By accepting the new r is k  t h e i r  incomes became 
higher and more s ta b le  provided the cooperat ive  was e f f i c i e n t l y  operated.  
Each p a r t i c i p a t i n g  farm entrepreneur  became engaged in a community e f f o r t  
to  e l im in a te  monopsony and monopoly p r o f i t s ,  and to  turn these p r o f i t s  
back to himself  and f e l lo w  fanners to whom they would have accrued in a 
more competi t ive  economy. The a s so c ia t ion  may decide to  market the pro­
ducts and purchase supplies f o r  ou ts iders  s ince u n i t  marketing and pur­
chasing costs w i l l  be lowered. Assuming th a t  these a d d i t io n a l  r isks  
s t i l l  leaves the in d iv id ua l  farm en trepren eu r 's  adjusted returns no higher  
than the p r e -e n t ry  re tu rn s ,  the a s s o c ia t io n ,  a lthough maximizing net  
revenue, is operated as a department. The a s so c ia t ion  maximizes p r o f i t s ,  
y e t  i t s  operations are conducted to maximize the returns from farm pro­
duction and not from farm-owned marketing and purchasing f i rm s .  T h is ,  
as Cook impl ies ,  is the type o f  economic environment P h i l l i p s  uses to  
construct  his  theory o f  c o o p era t io n .^ 3 "Dr. P h i l l i p s  does not deny the  
existence o f  the e n tre p re n e u r ia l  func t ion  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  bear ing ,  but
Frank Robotka, Journal of  Farm Economics. XXIX (Feb.-May 1947),  
p. 103* The r is k  o f  uncoordinated a c t io n  re fe rs  to  scabbing which took 
place  during the inception per iod o f  farm cooperat ion. P la n t  f a c i l i t i e s  
were b u i l t  to  meet the needs o f  a 11 member patrons.  C ost ly  excess capa­
c i t y  resulted when members withdrew t h e i r  support to c a p i t a l i z e  on the 
p r ic e -w a r  returns o f fe re d  by non-co-op e n te r p r is e .
t^Lorne D. Cook, "An Economic Analys is  o f  the Federal Taxat ion  
of  Income from Cooperative E n te rpr is e "  (unpubl ished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  
Dept, o f  Economics, U n iv e r s i ty  o f  Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1954) , p. 199»
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he in s is ts  th a t  entrepreneurship is l im i te d  to  the farm,"
The second stage w i l l  be c a l le d  the growth stage. Since pre ­
associa t ion  adjusted returns d i f f e r e d  among the a s so c ia t ing  farmers,  
post -assoc ia t ion  returns w i l l  a lso  d i f f e r .  P re -as s o c ia t io n  returns  
d i f f e r e d  because, as a ru le  o f  thumb, la r g e r  and/or  b e t t e r  farmers  
received the best p r ic e s  from ou ts iders .  Hence the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
obta in ing  a normal p r e -e n t ry  p r o f i t  in the p re -a s s o c ia t io n  per iod was 
sm al lest  f o r  the sm al ler  and/or  i n e f f i c i e n t  farmer. With the associ­
ated r isks and returns shared in propor t ion  to  use, adjusted returns  
are  heterogeneous. As the associa t ion  continues to  add departments 
( v e r t i c a l  in te g ra t io n )  and to s o l i c i t  business w i th  non-members ( h o r i ­
zontal in te g ra t io n )  the p o in t  w i l l  be e v e n tu a l ly  reached where f o r  some 
farmer p r e -e n t ry  and post-associa ted  adjusted returns are  equal ized,  
i f  one more un i t  o f  business is performed f o r  non-members, or i f  one 
more step toward v e r t i c a l  in te g ra t io n  is taken the cooperat ive  has 
become a f i rm  f o r  the mentioned farm entrepreneur.  From th a t  po in t  on 
he is in terested  in p r o f i t s  from marketing and supply a c t i v i t i e s  and 
not in p r o f i t s  from farm production. In th is  case the asso c ia t ion  oper­
ates as a f i rm  f o r  a p o r t io n  of  the members and as a department f o r  
others. Since the la r g e r  farm producers upon which the continued success 
o f  the cooperat ive  may depend w i l l  g e n e ra l ly  be the f i r s t  to obtain  
equal ized re tu rns ,  the co-op may i n t e n t i o n a l l y  become a f i rm .  That is .  
In con tras t  to the wishes o f  the less important members, the co-op may 
expand i t s  operat ions in to  r i s k i e r  f i e l d s .  Risks w i l l  be taken which 
are  incompatable w i th  the maximum r is k  des ires  o f  the sm al ler  farmers.  
Consequently intra-cooperative s t r i f e  may develop, one group p r e f e r r in g
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to take on a d d i t io n a l  r is k s ,  the o ther  p r e f e r r in g  a slower pace o f  
growth and a la r g e r  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  resources to the farm f i rm  ra th e r  than 
to the associa t ion .  The volume and type o f  business a t  which the in ten t  
to operate as a f i rm  becomes e f f e c t i v e  w i l l  depend upon such fa c to rs  as 
the vot ing rules (proport iona l  and/or  one vote per  member) and the 
adjusted returns composition o f  the members. T h ere fo re ,  some very  
large cooperatives may In t e n t i o n a l l y  operate as departments w h i le  some 
very small associat ions may i n t e n t i o n a l l y  operate as f i rms.
The th i rd  and f i n a l  stage is the maturat ion stage. In th is  stage,  
a l l  member-farm entrepreneurs have returns equal to or  g re a te r  than 
t h e i r  respect ive  p r e -e n t r y  returns.  Every member-patron is now enjoy­
ing a t  le a s t  as high an adjusted re tu rn  as was a v a i l a b le  from his  p a r ­
t i c u l a r  farming operations before monopoly and monopsony elements 
entered the farm economy. The p o l ic in g  a b i l i t y  o f  the cooperat ive  is 
operat ing a t  maximum strength .  Monopsony and monopoly p r o f i t s  o f  the 
non-farm firms have been e l im in a te d .  Assuming no s h i f t s  In o th e r  eco­
nomic parameters normal-farm returns have been re in s ta te d .  Now the 
cooperat ive is increasing a l l  members' r isks and d i s t r i b u t i n g  the con­
sequent monopoly p r o f i t s  not from farm production but from marketing  
farm products and purchasing farm suppl ies .  The cooperat ive  has become 
a bonafide f i rm .  Since i t  is now poss ib le  f o r  farmers to scab whi le  
rece iv ing  normal re tu rn s ,  co-op members have common adjusted return  
a n t ic ip a t io n s  or  they w i l l  invest  t h e i r  funds in o ther  e n te rp r is e s .  The 
only  economic d i f fe r e n c e  between the mature cooperat ive  and the non-farm 
f i r m  is a p r o f i t - s h a r i n g  r e la t io n s h ip .  Returns from marketing and pur­
chasing operations are  d i s t r ib u t e d  on the basis  o f  member patronage and
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the co incident  c a p i ta l  c o n t r ib u t io n  ra th er  than to " u n id e n t i f i e d  c a p i ­
t a l . "  In sum, a p r o f i t  re la t io n s h ip  has been created which increases  
entrepreneur ia l  p r o f i t s  In r e la t io n  to the entrepreneurs '  output in 
another e n te r p r is e ,  farm production. One farmer-member does not gain  
a t  the expense o f  another farmer-member, but a l l  gain a t  the expanse of  
non-farm f i rm s.  Thus the mature farm -cooperat ive  economy has s i g n i f i ­
cant p o l ic y  im p l ic a t io n s ,  to  which we now turn .
P o l ic y  Împ11ca1 1ons 
The confusion surrounding the cooperat ive  tax  controversy is due 
to the f a i l u r e  to recognize the changing economic nature o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  
coq^erat lves.  Rat ional government p o l ic y  toward a g r ic u l t u r a l  coopera­
t iv e s  in one per iod may be i r r a t i o n a l  p o l ic y  in another per iod.  This  
f a c t  was recognized In House Report 1888:*^
In order to i n t e l l i g e n t l y  appraise the tax p o s i t io n  of  the 
a g r ic u l tu r a l  cooperat ives .  I t  was f i r s t  necessary fo r  the 
committee to review the economic background which resulted  
in the formation o f  these cooperat ives.  The Congressional  
treatment o r i g i n a l l y  a f fo rded  a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperatives must 
n a t u r a l l y  have been pred ica ted  upon the economic condit ions  
then e x is t in g .  i t  Is conceivable  th a t  the premise upon which 
th is  o r ig in a l  ac t ion  was taken may have been wrong, or  th a t  
e vo lu t ionary  changes in the economic s t ru c tu re  o f  our nat ion  
may have erased the necess i ty  f o r  s i m i l a r  considerat ion  today.
The divergent  po s i t io n s  taken by spokesmen in the controversy r e f l e c t  
two d i f f e r e n t  economic periods.  These periods approximately  correspond 
to the organ iza t iona l  and mature stages o f  the a g r ic u l t u r a l  c o o p e ra t iv e ‘ s 
development. The cooperat ive  In te r e s ts  argue from the economic environ­
ment o f  the Twenties w h i le  the tax  proponets argue from our contemporary 
economic environment. Obviously the l a t t e r  group is c lo s e r  to r e a l i t y .
^^House Report 1888, 11.
Note: Under l in ing  is the w r i t e r ' s .
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The eonomîc arguments used by cooperat ives to j u s t i f y  t h e i r  pre ­
sent tax status we have prev ious ly  termed the depar tm en ta l iza t io n  po s i ­
t io n .  The argument is as fo l lows;
Premise 1. Departments o f  f irms a re  not taxed.
Premise 2. Cooperative associa t ions  are  j o i n t l y  operated
departments o f  associated farm production un i ts .
Conclusion: i f  a g r ic u l tu r a l  cooperat ives are  taxed d is c r im i ­
nat ion w i 11 r e s u l t .
There is a major f a l l a c y  in th is  sy llogism. There is good reason to  
suspect tha t  contemporary cooperatives do not operate as departments.  
T h e i r  success and the great  increase o f  governmental regu la t ion  since  
t h e i r  inception have changed the economic ro le  and nature of  farm coop­
e r a t i v e s .  Farm cooperatives no longer depend fo r  success upon t h e i r  
e f f i c i e n c y  In p o l ic in g  monopoly and monopsony p r o f i t s .  In f a c t ,  in  some 
cases they have developed the very c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  th a t  they i n i t i a l l y  
attempted to e l im in a te .  The contemporary farm cooperat ive  serves to 
maximize farm-connected ra ther  than farm-preduction returns. Contrary  
to  P h i l l i p ' s  po s i t ion  the cooperat ives '  entrepreneurship has l e f t  the 
farm. Contemporary farm cooperatives are  merely a specia l type o f  f i rm .  
The patron invests his products as we l l  as h is  working balances in the 
cooperat ive e n te rp r is e .  Beyond th is  moot d i f fe r e n c e  farm cooperatives  
are  s t r u c t u r a l l y  analogous to f i rms.
To rafqse to levy a corpora t ion  income tax upon cooperatives  
because they are s u p e r f i c i a l l y  re la te d  to the operations o f  unincor­
porated farm f irms is economic nonsense. In con tras t  to the departmental  
re la t io n s h ip  found in c lo s e ly  held s u b s id ia r ie s  which are  not taxed, the 
f u l l  b e n e f i ts  o f  incorporat ion are received by incorporated cooperat ives.
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Close ly  held s u b s id ia r ie s  are dependent economic u n i ts  whose operat ions  
have no meaning outs ide o f  the p a re n t 's  economic goals. Since the par ­
ent is  incorporated, the value o f  incorporat ion  o f  the s ubs id ia ry  is 
n e g l ig ib le .  The same economies o f  sca le  could be achieved by opera t ing  
unincorporated d i v i s io n s ,  as General Motors does.
Modern farm cooperat ives on the o th e r  hand could not funct ion  
successfu l ly  without  being incorporated. The p r i v i l e g e s  o f  a r t i f i c i a l  
e x is ten c e ,  l im i ted  l i a b i l i t y  and ease o f  a t t r a c t i n g  c a p i ta l  a re  real  
advantages to them, in f a c t  these advantages e s p e c ia l ly  when they are  
not paid f o r  c o n s t i tu te  the l i f e  l i n e  o f  the present  success o f  farm 
cooperat ives. In b r i e f ,  since contemporary cooperat ives are tn c j r p o r -  
ated f i rm s ,  optimal a l lo c a t i o n  o f  resources under a general com pet i t ive  
e q u i l ib r iu m ,  requires th a t  they bear a corporate income tax.
Some co-op spokesmen cla im th a t  the important f a c t  in determining  
whether farm cooperatives should be taxed depends upon whether ' r  not 
fanners are rece iv ing p a r i t y  o f  income. This  p o s i t io n  is held by past  
A ss is ta n t  Secretary  o f  A g r ic u l t u r e ,  Charles F, Brannan, in the fo l low ing  
statement:
I t  has long been p u b l ic  p o l i c y  in th is  country  to encourage 
fanr-ers to help themselves through coopera t ives ,  thus solv ing  
complex econocTiic problems on a group basis . By lowering pro­
duction costs ,  increasing marketing e f f i c i e n c i e s ,  and p ro v id ­
ing a means through which farm fa m i l ie s  can supply themselves 
w ith  goods and serv ices  not otherwise adequate o r  a v a i l a b l e ,  
cooperatives can be an important a id  in br ing ing  to rural  
areas p a r i t y  o f  income and p a r i t y  o f  f a c i l i t i e s .
Since th is  thesis  assumes th a t  farm cooperat ives have more than succeeded
in p o l ic in g  monopoly and monopsony p r o f i t s ,  below normal returns can be
Revenue Revisions of  1947-48 . Hearings, before House Ways and 
Means Committee. 80th Cong., 1st Sess. P a r t  4 ,  p. 2125.
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created only  by other  parameter s h i f t s .  The major parameter s h i f t  
e f f e c t i n g  the farm populat ion in the la s t  f i f t y  years has been th a t  
change in farm technology commonly re fe r red  to as the a g r ic u l t u r a l  
revo lu t ion .  As a consequence o f  th is  worthy change in technology a 
sm al ler  percent o f  our n a t io n 's  popula t ion is needed to meet the demand 
fo r  food and f i b e r .  I f  th is  is the parameter change which has decreased 
the farmers' percentage o f  nat ional  income, i t  cannot support the p re ­
sent tax po s i t ion  of  farm cooperat ives. The surplus o f  labor in the 
farm sector  could be employed to b e t t e r  advantage elsewhere in the eco­
nomy. Rational tax p o l ic y  in such a case requires th a t  cooperatives  
which serve to decrease the m o b i l i t y  o f  a p a r t  o f  our labor fo rc e ,  
should bear a higher tax burden than o ther  incorporated f i rms.  This  
p o l ic y  would speed up the adjustment to a new e q u i l ib r iu m  p o s i t io n .  !n 
conclusion there is no economic basis which supports the present tax  
p o l ic y  toward farm cooperat ives.
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CHAPTER I I  
OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION 
In troduct ion
In chapter one, the fo l lo w in g  propos it ions  were developed:
1. A g r ic u l tu ra l  cooperatives were organized to e l im in a te
monopoly and monopsony p r o f i t s .
2. Associated farmers change from farm entrepreneurs to  
marketing entrepreneurs as monopoly and monopsony 
p r o f i t s  decrease.
3. The socia l  u t i l i t y  from subs id iz in g  a g r ic u l t u r a l  coop­
e r a t iv e s  is re la ted  to the degree in which monopoly and 
monopsony p r o f i t s  are  e l im ina ted .
The t h i r d  proposit ion must be the u l t im a te  standard in c re a t in g  e q u i t ­
ab le  tax p o l ic y .  However, as s ha l l  be seen in chapter  fo u r ,  the v a r i ­
ous tax proposals center  around the fo l lo w in g  questions:
1. Do a g r ic u l tu r a l  cooperat ives make p r o f i ts ?
2. I f  cooperat ive  p r o f i t s  e x i s t ,  what is the measure o f  
these p r o f i ts ?
In order to answer the above questions a knowledge of  cooperat ive  
operat ions and s t ru c tu re s  is e s s e n t ia l .
In the l i t e r a t u r e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperation i t  is ev ident  th a t  
from one po int  o f  view a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives are  not s truc tured  or  
operated as p r o f i t  making e n te rp r is e s .  From t h e i r  incept ion ,  a g r i c u l ­
tu ra l  cooperatives have cons ta n t ly  changed t h e i r  s t ru c tu re  and operat ing  
methods in order to maintain  a n o n - p r o f i t  s ta tu s .  Methods o f  f in a n c in g ,  
set t lem ent  opera t ions,  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l ,  on the whole exem-
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p l i f y  a dominating de s ire  to operate on a n o n - p r o f i t  basis . However, 
the c ru c ia l  question is: What is meant by n o n -p r o f i t  operation? Does
n o n -p r o f i t  operat ion preclude farm entrepreneurs from rece iv ing  non­
farm p r o f i t s  from cooperat ive operat ions;  o r  does i t  mean th a t  a coop­
e r a t i v e  is a m u l t i - f i r m  p la n t  serving to maximize p r o f i t s  fo r  I t s  e n te r ­
p r is e  patrons, but an economic u n i t  which does not e x is t  to maximize 
p r o f i t s  in i t s  own o p e r a t i o n s ? T h e r e  can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  the 
l a t t e r  Is what cooperators c a l l  n o n -p r o f i t  operat ion .  Any p r o f i t s  
accruing to the associa t ion  as such are  merely in c identa l  to the p r i ­
mary n o n -p ro f i t  goal.
P h i l l i p s  gives the most complete exp lanat ion  o f  the n o n -p r o f i t  
r e la t io n s h ip .  He recognizes the cooperat ive  as a dependent economic 
u n i t .  The associa t ion  is composed o f  f i rms in teres ted  in ehhancing 
returns from t h e i r  independent operat ions.  These f irms agree to j o i n t l y  
operate a p la n t  in order  to reduce market imperfect ions. This reduction  
leads to lower u n i t  costs and higher s t a b i l i z e d  p r o f i t s  f o r  the associ­
ated farmers as the fo l low ing  l i s t  ind ica tes .
1. By reducing the number o f  re levan t  markets fac ing the  
p a r t i c ip a n t s ,  v e r t i c a l  in te g ra t io n  s t a b i l i z e s  p r o f i t s .
2. Departm enta l iza t ion  o f  j o i n t l y  operated p lan ts  tends 
to s t a b i l i z e  p r o f i t s .
3. P r o f i t s  may be s t a b i l i z e d  by pooling u n c e r ta in t ie s  
in tertemporal ly  and in terdepartmental  ly .
4. Coordination o f  in tegrated  processes makes p a r t i c i p a t i n g
^ ^ h e  co-op 's  raison d ' e t r e  is not to maximize returns on 
funds a l lo c a te d  to the asso c ia t ion  but ra th e r  to maximize returns  
on the p a t ron 's  farm investment.
'^Richard P h i l l i p s ,  "Economic Nature o f  Cooperat ives,"  
Journal o f  Farm Economics, XXXIV (F e b . ,  1953),  p. 8 5 .
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f irms more adaptable  to changing economic and technical  
condit ions.  This tends to lower costs and s t a b i l i z e  
p r o f i t s .
Each associa t ing  f i rm  r e la te s  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the cooperat ive  to I t s  
own independent opera t ions,  in a r r i v i n g  a t  production e q u i l ib r iu m .  The 
percentage of  the t o t a l  p la n t  considered a p a r t  o f  any p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
f i rm  is defined by the r e l a t i v e  s iz e  o f  tha t  f i rm .  This  method of  shar­
ing r e f l e c t s  the de s ire  of  cooperators to j o i n t l y  operate the f a c i l i t i e s  
on a n o n -p r o f i t  basis. In absence o f  p ropor t iona l  shar ing,  some f i rm  
or f irms would p r o f i t  f rœi o ther  associa tes .  Or in the words o f  P h i l -  
1 ips:
In order to achieve a s t a t i c  optimum a l lo c a t i o n  o f  resources 
among the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f i rm s ,  the e n t re p ren eu r ia l  decis ions,  
the bearing o f  u n c e r ta in t ie s ,  the f in a n c i a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  
the economic use -  the costs and the economic b e n e f i ts  in 
connection with  the j o i n t  a c t i v i t y  must be shared on the basis  
of  th is  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y .
Dropping the assumptions o f  p e r f e c t  knowledge and c e r t a i n t y ,  pro­
p o r t i o n a l i t y  s t i l l  determines the sharing o f  economic funct ions in the 
j o i n t  a c t i v i t y .  However i t  is now planned p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  ra th er  than 
actual p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  which governs. 3n a d d i t io n ,  under the a l t e r e d  
assumptions i t  may be economic to share operat ions which are s p e c i f ic  
to a given department or  t ime p e r io d ,  in te rd e p a r tm en ta l ly  or  in ter tem­
poral ly ;  as the fo l low ing  comment suggests.
Given (1) the production plan which maximizes the discounted 
value o f  the expected stream o f  p r o f i t s ,  and (2) the produc­
t ion  plan which minimizes the expected d ispers ion around the 
most probable p r o f i t s  over t i m e . . . t h e  task is resolved in to  
the s e le c t io n  o f  the best compromise p o s i t io n  between the two.
l G | b i d . . p. 77. 
i 9 | b i d . . p. 83.
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Accepting the above explanat ion o f  cooperat ive  a c t i v i t y ,  which is 
v a l id  a t  leas t  fo r  the o rg a n iza t io n a l  p e r io d ,  one should be wary o f  c a te ­
go r iz in g  cooperatives as p r o f i t  maximizing f irms simply because t h e i r  
operations and s t ru c tu res  are  more complex than is allowed by a simple 
agency re la t io n s h ip .  The f a c t  th a t  some farm cooperatives pool expenses 
and revenues is not alone j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  tax ing in te r e s t  paid on cap i­
ta l  as dividends. The in te r e s t  may simply account f o r  d i s p r o p o r t io n a l i -  
t i e s  in c a p i ta l  contr ibu t ions  among the associated f i rm s .  Also, even 
though patronage margins are seldom rebates as cooperators s t a te ,  on the 
other  hand they are o f ten  not dividends d i s t r ib u t e d  on a patronage basis  
as the NTEA claims. These o v e r s im p l i f i c a t io n s  w i l l  disappear as we In­
v e s t ig a te  the h i s t o r i c a l  e vo lu t ion  o f  f in a n c in g ,  c o n t r o l ,  and proceeds 
d is t r ib u t io n  p o l ic ie s  o f  farm cooperat ives.  Such an in v e s t ig a t io n  w i l l  
show th a t  cooperatives are  n o n - p r o f i t  economic un i ts  in the sense th a t  
any department, p la n t  or  subs id iary  does not make p r o f i t  fo r  i t s e l f  from 
other  departments or  business u n i t s ,  but ra th e r  obtains revenue from 
unrelated p a r t ie s  and by applying the aggregate costs o f  the in tegrated  
u n i ts ;  p r o f i t s  or  losses re s u l t .  Only in th is  sense Is a cooperat ive a 
n o n -p r o f i t  economic u n i t .  We now turn to a h i s t o r i c a l  and d e s c r ip t iv e  
study of cooperative n o n -p r o f i t  re la t io n s h ip s .
F i rtancTng sr.d Con t  ro I 
Throughout the e v o lu t ion  o f  cooperat ive  f in a n c ia l  s t ru c tu re s  and 
operations two major periods are d is t in g u is h a b le .  One might add periods  
by speaking of the contemporary scene and the per iod o f  informal c a p i ta l  
s tru c tu res  during the middle l800®s, but f o r  a n a ly t i c a l  purposes only  
two periods are s i g n i f i c a n t .  They are  the Rochdale Period and the Non-
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stock Period. Although many experiments w i th  cooperation had been t r i e d  
in American a g r ic u l tu r e  before 1875, th a t  year is the f i r s t  real bench­
mark. In 1875 the Grange or  Patrons o f  Husbandry adopted the English  
Rochdale P r in c ip le s  which were to re v o lu t io n iz e  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  farm 
producers.
1. Co-operat ive  associat ions to be organized as stock com­
panies with shares o f  $5 .00  each.
2. Shares t r a n s fe ra b le  only  to members o f  the associa t ion .
3 . Ownership o f  one share o r  more to c o n s t i tu te  membership 
in the associa t ion .
4. Each member required to sign the rules o f  the associa t ion .
5 . Each member required to purchase a t  le a s t  $20 worth o f
goods from the asso c ia t ion  each year.
6. A l l  members must be members a lso  in good standing o f  the 
Patrons of  Husbandry.
7 . No member allowed to hold more than 100 shares o f  c a p i ta l  
stock in the associa t ion .
8. A l l  sales to be made f o r  cash.
9 . Prices to be those p r e v a i l in g  in the community. (Note:
The p r e v a i l in g  p r ic e  concept o r i g i n a l l y  intended fo r  
consumer cooperatives was adapted to marketing operations  
also. )
10, In te r e s t  on c a p i ta l  l im i te d  to 8 percent.
11. P r o f i t s  to go, a f t e r  payment o f  in te r e s t  and deprec ia t ion  
e i t h e r  to increase the c a p i ta l  or  business o f  the associa­
t io n ,  or  f o r  any educational or  prov ident  purposes author­
ized by the a s s o c ia t io n ,  and the remainder sha l l  be d iv ided  
among those who have purchased goods from th is  associa t ion  
during the preceding q u a r te r  ( t o  non-members o n e -h a l f  o f  
the proport ion  o f  members), in proport ion to the amount o f  
purchases during the q u ar te r .
The Grange had l i t t l e  success wi th  cooperation; nevertheless
20Nourse, p. 8l
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these p r in c ip le s  were w idely  promulgated and served as a guide f o r  form­
ing farm cooperatives during the boom period fo l lo w in g  World War I .
Some of  the p r in c ip le s  were meant f o r  cooperat ive  stores but when adapt­
able  to cooperative marketing were so adapted. Four p r in c ip le s  stand 
out:
1. L im i ta t io n  o f  c a p i ta l  holdings.
2. Dividends on the basis o f  patronage.
3. Democrating vot ing.
4. P r e v a i l in g  p r ices .
Of these four major p r in c i p le s ,  two r e a l l y  created the d i s t i n c t i v e  Roch­
da le  pa t te rn  o f  cooperation:
1. P r e v a i l in g  p r ices .
2. Loose l im i t a t io n s  on c a p i ta l  holdings.
The Rochdale p a t te rn  o f  paying p r e v a i l in g  p r ices  was re la ted  to 
the fo l low ing  two assumptions:
1, Capita l  could more e a s i ly  be accumulated from current  
operations i f  p r e v a i l in g  pr ices  were paid.
2. Members could more e a s i l y  measure the gain from coopera­
t iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  i f  p r e v a i l in g  p r ic e s  were paid .
Both assumptions were unfounded. The b e n e f i ts  received from paying pre ­
v a i l i n g  pr ices were l i m i t e d ,  the disadvantages s i g n i f i c a n t .  I f  a coop­
e r a t i v e  associa t ion  was to pay p r e v a i l in g  pr ices  f o r  farm products, even 
in the simplest type o f  operat ion a spe c u la t iv e  element was introduced.  
Just as a p r iv a t e  company might pay too much f o r  products even though 
i t  bought a t  p r e v a i l in g  p r ic e s  so could cooperat ive  as so c ia t io n s ,  and 
they o f te n  did. When re s u l t in g  losses were incurred they were made up 
through a reduction in c a p i t a l .  As a r e s u l t  the w e a l th ie r  members would
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pay p a r t  o f  the lesser  members way. Of course th is  need not happen i f  
c a p i ta l  contr ibu t ions  and use o f  the a s so c ia t ion  were p ro p o r t io n a l .  
Under the Granger Rochdale formula such p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  was doubtfu l .  
The in ju s t ic e  o f  th is  p a t te rn  o f  cooperation is substant ia ted  by the 
fo l low ing  quotat ions:^!
. . . I t  is apparent th a t  n e i th e r  p r o f i t s  as such nor c a p i ta l  
as such were e l im ina ted .  N e i th e r  would negat ive  p r o f i t s ,  
th a t  is losses, be precluded, and the losses incurred on 
the transact ions with c e r ta in  members would be recouped 
from gains upon others or  be made good out o f  the c o n t r i ­
buted c a p i t a l .
C e r t a i n . . . (e le v a to rs )  were taken over by small groups of  
farmers and operated as farmers'  (coopera t ive )  companies, 
when In r e a l i t y  the m a jo r i ty  o f  the stock was owned by one 
or a few farmers. As in d ic a te d . . .s u c h  d i s t r i b u t i o n  is 
inconsistant  with the present-day  conception o f  farmers'  
cooperation.
Facing the above problem the la r g e r  and w e a l th ie r  growers demanded a
g re a te r  and more e q u i tab le  share in the revenue of  the associa t ion
than could be j u s t i f i e d  on the basis of  t h e i r  use o f  the a s s o c ia t io n 's
f a c i l i t i e s .  Paper rules prov id ing f o r  "democrat ic" control  (one man -
one vote) had l i t t l e  s ig n i f ic a n c e  when faced with  the economic fa c ts  o f
l i f e .  The w e a l th ie r  farm producers were o f te n  necessary in order  to
form a cooperat ive.^^
Sometimes large and i n f l u e n t i a l  growers, in l o c a l i t i e s  
where t h e i r  volume o f  f r u i t  is needed to insure the suc­
cess o f  a proposed o rg a n iz a t io n ,  decl ined to  support Such  
an o rgan izat ion  i f  the vot ing  is to be by in d iv id u a ls ,  
f o r  fe a r  o f  being overru led In important matters by a 
m a jo r i ty  composed of  the lesser  growers.
2 ' I b i d . . p .  5 1 .
Gerald M. Franc is ,  The F inanc ia l  Management o f  Farmer E le v a to r s . 
(a .  W. Shaw Co.,  1926 ) ,  p. 41.
W. Lloyd,  "Marketing o f  C a l i f o r n i a  A g r ic u l tu ra l  Products ,"  
U n iv e r s i t y  o f  I l l i n o i s  Studies in the Social  Sciences, ed. Ernest L. 
Bogart ,  Laurence M. Larsen and John A. F a i r l i e  (Urbana: U n iv e rs i ty  of  
I l l i n o i s  Press, 1919), Vol.  V I I I ,  p. 84.
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I f  they demanded returns on t h e i r  c a p i ta l  to compensate f o r  d ispropor­
t io n a te  bearing o f  r isks and supplying o f  funds who was to begrudge them? 
On the o ther  hand what rate  o f  in t e r e s t  o r  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  proceeds d i s ­
t r ib u t i o n  p o l ic y  would a l lo w  proport iona l  assumption o f  r is k s ,  f inancing  
and sharing of benef i ts?  Given th is  in e x t r ic a b le  s i t u a t io n  many coopera­
t iv e s  turned in to  j o i n t  stock companies. Farmers made p r o f i t s  from 
other  farmers, the p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  necessary to operate a common p la n t  
ra ther  than a f i rm  could come about on ly  by accident  under the Granger 
Rochdale plan o f  operat ion .  The fo l lo w in g  excerpts set  the tone f o r  
Granger Rochdale cooperation.^^
Throughout the Rochdale per iod membership was Id e n t i f i e d  
with the ownership o f  c a p i ta l  s tock,  and r e s t r i c t io n s  were 
placed on the t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y  o f  such stock c e r t i f i c a t e s .
This  p r a c t ic e  has the m e r i t  o f  emphasizing the c o -op era t ive  
p r i n c i p l e  th a t  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  permanently invested c a p i ta l  
is one of  the o b l ig a t io n s  o f  the member In the c o -op era t ive  
associa t ion .  I t  has, however, two d i s t i n c t i v e  drawbacks.
In the f i r s t  p lace ,  since i t  makes the amount o f  stock pur­
chased (between the minimum and maximum l i m i t s )  a m atter  o f  
personal choice, i t  has been responsible in no small degree 
f o r  the u n d e r -c a p i ta l i z a t io n  o f  farmers'  e le v a to rs  and s im i­
l a r  cooperative e n te rp r is es .  In the second p la c e ,  i t  has 
tended to perpetuate  the o rd in a ry  corporat ion idea tha t  cap­
i t a l  stock is the pr imary c la imant to b e n e f i ts  from the oper­
a t ion s  o f  the organ iza t ion  and to make the payment of  a ra te  
high enough to a t t r a c t  investors the c h ie f  concern o f  the 
business management.
The plan o f  the gra in  producers is simple. The farmers in 
a l o c a l i t y  form a buying and s e l l i n g  associa t ion  with  c a p i ta l  
stock vary ing from $2500 to $20,000. The shares o f  stock,  
varying from $10 to $100 each, are held e x c lu s iv e ly  by pro­
ducers, and the amount an in d iv id ua l  may own is usua l ly  
l im i te d  to  prevent the control o f  the associa t ion  incor­
porated under the j o i n t - s t o c k  company laws o f  the s ta te s .
The earnings are  g e n e ra l ly  d i s t r ib u t e d  on the basis o f  c a p i ­
t a l ,  the dividends sometimes running as high as one hundred
23̂ Nourse, p. 53; and G. Harold Powell,  Cooperation in A g r i ­
c u l t u r e . (New York: The Macmillan Co. ,  1913), p. 128
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percent.
In the above discussion of  Rochdale Cooperation a major d e f i c i ­
ency was found in the possib le  non-proport ional  sharing o f  costs ,  r isks  
and b e n e f i ts .  Although d i s p r o p o r t io n a l i t y  was possib le  i t s  s ig n i f ic a n c e  
should not be overemphasized, Rochdale Cooperation was centered in the 
Midwest where farm s ize  was ra th er  homogenous. Given members with homo­
genous amounts o f  farm production and w ea lth ,  c a p i ta l  c o n tr ib u t ion s  on 
a random basis might more o f ten  than not be maintained in proport ion to  
the use o f  the associa t ion f a c i l i t i e s .  However in C a l i f o r n i a  and the 
P a c i f ic  Northwest th is  homogeneity was la r g e ly  absent. There fore ,  i t  
should not come as a surpr ise  th a t  the non-stock associa t ion  was deve l ­
oped in the l a t t e r  regions. C a l i f o r n i a  was the leading s ta te  in th is  
development.
Non-stock associat ions were operated on the basis of the fo l lo w ­
ing three p r in c ip le s :
1. A l l  invested c a p i ta l  was on a loan basis.
2. A net returns se t t lem ent  was subs t i tu ted  f o r  the 
Rochdale competi t ive  p r ic e  r e la t io n s h ip .
3. Transactions were r e s t r i c t e d  to members with the 
assumption o f  d e f i n i t e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  as a con­
d i t io n  to c la iming the common b e n e f i ts  o f  the 
associa t ion.
The c ruc ia l  non-stock p r i n c i p l e  f rom  which the others n a t u r a l l y  fo l lo w  
is the net returns se t t lem ent .  Chapman and Lloyd ind ica te  the p iv o ta l  
ro le  o f  the net returns set t lement  as fo l low s:^^
24
J. M. Chapman, "Financing C o-opera t ive  Market ing ,"  P o l i t i c a l  
Science Q u a r t e r ly , XXXIX (D ec . ,  1929), p. 598; and J. W. Lloyd, p. 82.
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The upholders of  the C a l i f o r n i a  plan c la im tha t  i t  is the 
only  true cooperative. In the Rochdale System there is a 
specula t ive  element. The associa t ion  buys a t  the days 
p r ic e  and attempts to s e l l  f o r  a h igher  p r ic e  so tha t  d i v i ­
dends nay be declared f o r  the stockholders. In th is  manner 
the p r o f i t s  are  not returned to the producers unless he is 
a stockholder and shares in dividends. But in the C a l i ­
fo rn ia  Type Cooperat ive the asso c ia t ion  pays the producer  
a c e r ta in  amount when the commodity is d e l iv e r e d ,  paying 
the d i f fe re n c e  between the advance payment and the actual  
s e l l i n g  p r ic e  less the cost o f  handling when the commodity 
is sold. The advance payment enables the farmer to pay 
o f f  any l iens  made on his crop.
A common plan employed in operat ing  such associat ions is 
as fol lows: The expenses are  estimated as c lo s e ly  as
possib le  and a s u f f i c i e n t  amount per  package or  pound to  
create  a revenue which w i l l  su re ly  cover a l l  expenses is 
reta ined by the organ iza t ion  when making remittances to  
the growers. At the c lose o f  the season, when the to ta l  
expenses fo r  the year are d e f i n i t e l y  known, the actual  
average cost o f  handling each package or  pound of  product  
can be determined and any excess which may have been 
charged to the growers is returned to them in proport ion  
to the number o f  packages or  pounds handled f o r  each, 
unless the members vote to have th is  sum re ta ined in the 
organ iza t ion  as a reserve fund f o r  extending the equip­
ment or  defray ing  expenses a t  the beginning of  the next  
season. In e i t h e r  case, the grower has received benef i ts  
from the organ iza t ion  in propor t ion  to the value o f  his 
products, f o r  the cost o f  marketing has been upon a pack­
age or pound b a s i s . . .
I f  p r e v a i l in g  pr ices  are  not p a id ,  the commodities processed, purchased 
and sold can serve as adequate s e c u r i ty  to cover v a r ia b le  costs. At 
the end o f  the pooling per iod a p rop or t iona te  net returns sett lement  
w i l l  be made as Chapman and Lloyd ind icated .  In essence the commodities 
f lowing through the p la n t  provide the working c a p i ta l  f o r  the associa­
t i o n 's  operations.
However the demise of  c a p i ta l  stock f inanc ing  created an addi­
t io n a l  need, f u l f i l l e d  by the t h i r d  non-stock p r i n c i p l e .  Although work­
ing c a p i ta l  can be supplied from members volume, increasing and decreas­
ing in tandem with  i t s  usefulness, permanent c a p i ta l  needs cannot be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“ 32 -
s a t i s f a c t o r î ly  met in th is  fashion. B u i ld in gs ,  processing equipment and 
other  f ixed  assets require  i n i t i a l  amounts o f  c a p i ta l  o r  s e c u r i ty  fo r  
the borrowing of  such c a p i t a l .  To f u l f i l l  th is  need s t r i c t  membership 
agreements or marketing contracts were drawn up. The fo l low ing  quota­
t ions are re la ted  to the purpose of  marketing c o n t r a c ts ,^5
. . . T h e  C a l i f o r n i a  p lan ,  is tha t  in which there is no c a p i ta l  
stock. This is d i s t i n c t l y  a producers' o rgan iza t ion .  With 
th is  type i t  is necessary to sign up a large proport ion of  
the growers in the section before the asso c ia t ion  can begin 
i t s  work. The growers pay small membership fees. The con­
t r a c t  between the grower and the asso c ia t ion  is very  r ig id .
The grower pledges h imself  to  market through the associa t ion  
fo r  a c e r ta in  number of  years ,  the average is about f i v e ;  
in fa c t  he usua l ly  gives the associa t ion  t i t l e  to his pro­
duct.
Since a large number of  the cooperat ive  marketing associa­
t ions are organized on a pu re ly  cooperat ive  basis without  
c a p i ta l  and wi th  an es tab l ished  p o l ic y  aga ins t  p r o f i t -  
making, i t  is a b s o lu te ly  necessary to give the lending  
In s t i t u t io n s  f inancing  the cooperat ive  S'Ome form o f  secur­
i t y .  This situation has been met by the associa t ion  and 
i t s  members by p lac ing  in t h e i r  standard marketing con­
t r a c t  a prov is ion by which t i t l e  passes to the associa t ion  
on d e l iv e r y  of  the coromodi t  i e s . . • The commodities produced 
by the members and turned over to the a s so c ia t ion  become 
the s e c u r i ty  or  c o l l a t e r a l  which the associa t ion  may pledge  
to banks In securing funds to make advance payments or  
loans to growers.
As noted above the non-stock associat ions used a guaranteed volume of  
business as c o l l a t e r a l  in borrowing funds fo r  f ix e d  assets and f o r  mak­
ing advances to growers. Taken as a whole the three  non-stock p r in c ip le s  
created a method whereby heterogenous farm e n te rp r is es  could associate  
on an e q u i tab le  basis to process and market farm products and to pur­
chase farm supplies.
In measuring the c o n tr ib u t io n s  o f  Rochdale and non-stock ( C a l i -
M. Chafman, P o l i t i c a l  Science Q u a r t e r l y . XXXIX, p. 596; and 
Chapman, p. 602.
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fo r n îa )  cooperation i t  must be recognized th a t  these movements have s ig ­
n i f ic a n c e  only when put in to  a h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t in g .  Rochdale was the 
e a r l i e r  o f  the two p a t te rn s .  I t  was a p ioneer  e f f o r t  combining compete 
ing goals and fac ing an i n f l e x i b l e  business law. The concept or  p r i n ­
c ip l e  o f  democratic control borrowed from ideo log ica l  European Coopera­
t ion c o n f l ic te d  with proport iona l  sharing ivhich is necessary fo r  success­
fu l  cooperative operations. In fa c t  not u n t i l  the 1950's ,  100 years 
l a t e r ,  did the proportional  re la t io n s h ip  become recognized as the essence 
of  cooperative operat ions. Democratic contro l  and non-proport ional capi­
ta l  contr ibut ions  were the downfall  o f  many farm cooperat ives. In addi­
t ion  the sparseness o f  s ta tes  prov id ing  non-stock business charters  
l im i ted  attempts to break away from the Rochdale p a t te rn .  I t  took an 
economic environment which p l a i n l y  showed the in e q u i t ie s  o f  the Rochdale 
p a t te rn  before s i g n i f i c a n t  pressure was exerted upon various s ta tes  to 
adopt non-stock laws. This environment was found in C a l i f o r n i a  and the 
r e s u l t in g  non-stock p a t te rn  o f  cooperation was a major turn ing po in t .
I t s  success proved two major po ints .
1. Economic r e a l i t i e s  ra th e r  than ideology must determine 
cooperative s t ru c tu res  and operat ions.
2. Proport ional  sharing o f  costs and b e n e f i ts  is an i r r e ­
fu ta b le  p r i n c i p l e  which must be fo llowed i f  coopera­
t iv e  a c t i v i t y  is to f u l l y  succeed.
Once these two p r in c ip le s  were recognized the way was opened to contem­
porary  p ra c t ic es .
The e q u i tab le  methods o f  f inanc ing  cooperatives are near ly  unlim­
i te d .  There are as many e q u i ta b le  methods as there are d i f f e r i n g  eco­
nomic environments and business customs. Stock coopérât :ves may ra ise  
f ix e d  c a p i ta l  through proport iona l  stock subscr ipt ions and use a net
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returns settlement to obtain working c a p i t a l .  The same business might 
take t i t l e  to goods and pay p r e v a i l in g  p r ic e s ,  thereby using warehouse 
receipts  fo r  working c a p i t a l .  A non-stock cooperat ive  might not take  
t i t l e  and would use a r ig id  marketing contrac t  as s e c u r i ty  f o r  o b ta in ­
ing working c a p i t a l .  Jn some cases both types o f  cooperatives may use 
notes signed by o f f i c i a l s  o f  the associa t ion  in order  to obtain  c a p i t a l ;  
the previous success o f  the co-op serving as c o l l a t e r a l .  Proport ional  
sharing of  benef i ts  and costs is the important c h a r a c t e r is t i c  o f  success­
fu l  cooperatives; how th is  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  is obtained is an inc identa l  
problem.
However, one of  the in c identa l  d e t a i l s  o f  the o ld e r  cooperat ive  
structures  is s ig n i f i c a n t .  A l l  o f  the o ld e r  cooperatives were organ­
ized and operated on a permanent c a p i ta l  basis . In the words o f  Davis;^^
Stock or o ther  evidences o f  investment were issued w i th ­
out provid ing any plan f o r  re t i rem ent  except upon l iq u id a ­
t io n  of  the c o r p o r a t io n . , . Subsequent a dd i t ions  to  c a p i ta l  
were made through the f u r t h e r  s a le  of  stock or  c e r t i f i ­
cates and the re te n t io n  o f  savings which f r e q u e n t ly  were 
a ls o  reta ined with  no commitment fo r  re t i rem ent  except  
upon d is s o lu t io n ,  in which event they usua l ly  were to be 
prorated among patrons in proport ion to patronage.
Since the associat ions were obligated to return  net rece ip ts  back to 
patrons in proport ion to use, m o b i l i t y  o f  a c o o p era t ive 's  members posed 
a problem. The member who was r e t i r i n g  from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the asso­
c ia t io n  could obta in  only  par  value f o r  his stock or membership c e r t i f i ­
cate .  E qu it ies  accruing to him beyond the I n i t i a l  equ i ty  c o n t r ib u t io n ,  
were n o n - t ra n s fe ra b le .  E i th e r  the r e t i r i n g  farmer lo s t  a p a r t  o f  his 
e q u i ty  in the cooperat ive  or  i t  would have to be dissolved. Obviously
Z^Davis, p. 41.
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a t h i r d  a l t e r n a t i v e  was created.  This a l t e r n a t i v e  is commonly known as 
revolv ing fund f inancing .
Under the revolv ing fund p lan ,  new e q u i ty  c a p i ta l  is re ta ined  
from current  operat ions each year and o ld e r  e q u i ty  c a p i ta l  ( s e c u r i t i e s ,  
memberships, c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  e q u i ty ,  a l lo c a te d  c r e d i t s ,  e t c . )  a re  r e t i r e d  
sy s te m a t ic a l ly .  For example:^?
Assume a non-stock cooperat ive.
At the date o f  i t s  o rgan iza t ion  i t  obtained $100,000 of  
permanent c a p i ta l  from membership subscr ip t ions  (e q u i ty  
c a p i t a l )  and from borrowings, ( loan c a p i t a l )
Sn the fo l low ing  ten years the asso c ia t ion  reta ined  
$10,000 annual ly  from member proceeds wi th  which to  
r e t i r e  i t s  o r ig in a l  loan and e q u i ty  c a p i t a l .  At  the end 
o f  the e leventh year the i n i t i a l  c a p i ta ]  has been repaid ,  
the new $10,000 re ta ined is used to r e t i r e  the monies 
reta ined during the f i r s t  year o f  opera t ion .  This pro­
cedure continues as long as the co-op is a going concern.
The revolv ing fund plan which operates l i k e  the hypothet ica l  plan in the 
above example, meets the needs o f  a j o i n t l y  operated p la n t  in the fo l lo w ­
ing ways;
1. Investment c a p i ta l  is kept in proport ion to use.
2. Investment c a p i ta l  is kept in the hand o f  current  users,
3. I t  provides a dependable method o f  f inancing .
4. I t  is adapted to gradual expansion of  c a p i ta l  to  meet 
expanding volumes o f  business.
The present trend is to decrease the amount o f  permanent coopera­
t i v e  c a p i ta l  and to  u t i l i z e  the b e n e f i ts  o f  p roport iona l  sharing found 
in revo lv ing  fund operat ions.  Non-stock un i ts  have used small member­
ship fe e s ,  wh i le  stock un its  have g radua l ly  decreased the par  value o f
Z^Davis, p. 43. 
28[)avis, p. 43.
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t h e i r  common stock shares. Bpth p ra c t ic e s  tend to  e s ta b l is h  revo lv ing  
c a p i ta l  as the s i g n i f i c a n t  po r t ion  o f  a c o o p era t iv e 's  c a p i ta l  s t ru c tu re ;  
Hence the b e n e f i t  gained from d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between stock and non­
stock cooperatives is minimal.
In a recent repres e n ta t iv e  sample taken by the Farm Cooperative  
Service the r e l a t i v e  importance o f  the d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  e q u i ty  f in a n c ­
ing were ranked as f o l l o w s : ^9
(Percentage o f  Eaui tv  C ap ita l  Financed bv Various Instruments)
1. A l located c a p i ta l  c r e d i ts  w i thout  d e f i n i t e
m a tu r i ty  dates. 39.1%
2. Pre ferred  Stock. 21.9%
3. Common Stock. 19.2%
4. Unallocated Reserves. 10.1%
5. C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  Equity  w i th  D e f i n i t e
M a tu r i ty  Dates. 8*3%
6. Miscellaneous. 1.2%
7. Membership C e r t i f i c a t e s .  .2%
100%
A l lo ca te d  C ap i ta l  C red i ts  Without  
M a tu r i t v  Dates
These c r e d i ts  were e i t h e r  a l lo c a te d  on the books o f  the associa­
t i o n ,  a l lo c a te d  and n o t ic e  o f  such a l l o c a t i o n  given to patrons,  or  
a l lo c a te d  and c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  e q u i ty  issued as evidence o f  such a l l o ­
c a t io n .  Regardless o f  which one of  the above procedures was resorted  
to ,  these c r e d i ts  represent  temporary c a p i ta l  c o n tr ib u t io n s  which w i l l
^Helim H. H u lb e r t ,  Nelda G r i f f i n  and Kelsey B. Gardner, Methods 
o f  Financing Farmer Coopera t ives . U.S. Dept, o f  A g r ic u l tu re  FCS General 
Report No. 32 (Washington: U.S. Government P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1957), p. 9.
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be revolved back to the members a t  some l a t e r  date.
P re fe r re d  Stock
The second most popular  form o f  e q u i ty  f inanc ing  was p re fe r re d  
stock. The cooperat ive  may issue p re fe r re d  stock to non-producers tn 
order  to obtain outside funds. This category o f  p re fe r re d  stock w i l l  
not be revolved. P re fer red  stock may a lso  be used to evidence the 
equ i ty  in te re s ts  o f  non-member patrons,  in th is  case the shares w i l l  
probably be revolved. Such a procedure forces non-member patrons to  
ra ta b ly  furn ish c a p i ta l  on the same basis as members, ye t  keeps contro l  
in the hands of  the members.
Unallocated Reserves £■ C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  Equitv  
With D e f i n i t e  M a tu r i tv  Dates
These ca tegor ies  o f  eq u i ty  c a p i ta l  are  ranked four th  and f i f t h  
behind common stock. Some cooperat ives issue c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  equ i ty  
with d e f i n i t e  m a tu r i ty  dates. As a ru le  these m a tu r i ty  dates are  
advanced f a r  enough in to  the fu tu r e  to enable the cooperat ive  under 
normal condit ions to pay such o b l ig a t io n s  on time. I f  the m a tu r i ty  
date is passed, the unpaid c e r t i f i c a t e s  would more reasonably be c la s ­
s i f i e d  as l i a b i l i t i e s  ra th e r  than as net worth items. Genera l ly  they 
are  temporary revo lv ing e q u i ty  c a p i t a l .
F i f t h  in importance was unal located reserves. These reserves 
g e n e ra l ly  a r is e  from non-member business which the cooperat ive  has 
decided to pay tax  on ra th er  than l i m i t  i t s  non-member business and 
c r e d i t  those e q u i t ie s  to  non-member patrons. This choice is expla ined  
in more d e t a i l  In Chapter Three.
In summary, temporary revo lv ing fund c a p i ta l  bears the major  
burden o f  eq u i ty  f in an c ing  a t  present . Equity  funds may be f ix e d  date
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or  non“ f jx e d  date. As these funds increase in importance the opportun­
i t y  f o r  e q u i tab le  sharing o f  costs and b e n e f i ts  In the j o i n t  cooperat ive  
p la n t  a lso  increases. However, one kind o f  d i s p r o p o r t io n a l i t y  is s t i l l  
possib le  under present cooperat ive  operat ions and s t ru c tu re s .  This d i s ­
p ro p o r t io n a l i  ty  problem has resu lted in much discussion which w i l l  be 
expla ined in some d e t a i l  In Chapter Three. We w i l l  b r i e f l y  mention i t  
here.
In a 1958 FCS study 71% o f  a l l  revo lv ing  e q u i ty  c a p i ta l  was found 
to be n o n - in te re s t  b e a r in g .30 Funds l e f t  by past  members in the cooper­
a t i v e  operations u n t i l  t h e i r  revo lv ing dates were reached received no 
compensation f o r  th is  c o n t r ib u t io n .  Since these past members are  not 
using the associa t ion  i t  would seem to  be a more e q u i ta b le  p o l ic y  i f  the 
current  members paid in te r e s t  on th is  e q u i ty  c a p i ta l  which has now evo l­
ved in to  loan c a p i t a l .  However there  Is another s ide o f  the issue. The 
past member, to the ex ten t  th a t  h is  volume of  business was a n t ic ip a te d  
in acqu ir ing  associa t ion  f a c i l i t i e s ,  caused a d d i t io n a l  costs to be borne 
by the associa t ing  farmers. The s o lu t io n  to  the problem involves a 
weighing of  the l a t t e r  costs a ga ins t  the value o f  the loan funds to  the 
present members o f  the cooperat ive .  What ra te  o f  in t e r e s t  w i l l  e q u i t ­
a b ly  solve th is  dilemma Is d i f f i c u l t  to a s c e r ta in .  Consequently the  
rates o f  in te r e s t  pa id  f o r  such c a p i ta l  vary among associa t ions .  In the 
1958  FCS study i t  was found th a t  16% o f  the revo lv ing fund c a p i ta l  paid  
a ra te  o f  4%, T h i r te e n  percent paid rates vary ing from one to seven
3®Helim H. H u lb e r t ,  Nelda G r i f f i n ,  and Kelsey B. Gardner,  
Revolving Fund Method o f  Financing Farmer C oopera t ives . U.S. Dept, o f  
A g r ic u l tu r e  FCS General Report No. 4 l  (Washington: U.S. Government 
P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1958), p. 23.
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p e r c e n t . 3 1
From the above ana lys is  o f  e q u i ty  f in an c ing  operat ions i t  is e v i ­
dent th a t  contemporary cooperatives have more ne a r ly  approached a non­
p r o f i t  type o f  opera t ion  than th a t  o f  t h e i r  predecessors. The sharing  
of control and the f in an c ing  o f  operat ions has tended more and more to  
be based on the members use o f  the a s s o c ia t io n 's  f a c i l i t i e s ,  thus corres­
ponding to P h i l l i p s '  concept o f  the cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion .  When coop­
e r a t i v e  associat ions are  operated as P h i l l i p s  claims a " t ru e "  coopera­
t i v e  to be operated, i t  can be v a l i d l y  held from one p o in t  o f  view th a t  
they operate on a n o n -p r o f i t  basis .
Sett lement Operations32
A review of  the various types o f  cooperat ive  se t t lem ent  operat ions  
w i l l  enable two important questions to be answered.
1. How can income a t t r i b u t a b l e  to j o i n t  p la n t  operations  
be measured?
2. Are b e n e f i ts  d i s t r ib u t e d  in proport ion  to the member 
pa tron 's  use o f  the associat ion?
The f i r s t  question is important when various tax proposals are examined
in Chapter Four. The second question is re la te d  to the primary problem
a t  hand, the n o n - p r o f i t  operat ion o f  farm cooperat ives.
The previous discussion in th is  chapter  has concentrated on the 
sharing o f  control and the sharing o f  In tertemporal costs. For example,  
the problem of  determining an e q u i ta b le  in te r e s t  ra te  to pay past  members
31 bid. ,
3^This p o r t io n  o f  Chapter Two is based upon Cook's and Davis '  
d e s c r ip t io n  of se t t lem ent  operat ions.  Pages 23-25 In Davis' work and 
pages 64-68 in Cook's work.
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f o r  t h e i r  e q u i t ie s  l e f t  in the associa t ion  is a in tertemporal cost a l l o ­
ca t ion  problem. In a review o f  se t t lem ent  operat ions i t  can be seen 
th a t  many cooperatives pool costs in te rd e p a r tm e n ta l ly  as well  as i n t e r ­
temporal ly .  In f a c t  the l a t t e r  type o f  pooling or  averaging has always 
been common in cooperat ive  associa t ions .  Of course, pooling costs need 
not change the economic nature o f  a coopera t ive ,  but i t  does negate the 
agency re la t io n s h ip  which some co-op proponents vehemently support.  As 
we sha l l  see, only one p a r t i c u l a r  type o f  cooperat ive  set t lement  opera­
t io n  is compatable w i th  an agency re la t io n s h ip .  Not only  do associa t ions  
pool costs, they may a ls o  choose to  pool sales revenues. The degree to 
which costs and e s p e c ia l ly  revenues are  pooled have led some w r i t e r s ,  
erroneously in the view of  the au thor ,  to use th is  as a c r i t e r i a  f o r  
def in ing  the cooperat ive as a f i rm .  As long as contro l  o f  a coopera­
t i v e ' s  p o l ic ie s  is on a p ropor t iona l  bas is ,  the e x ten t  to which costs 
and revenues are pooled is re la ted  on ly  to  the convenience achieved  
thereby and the r e l a t i v e  des ira  o f  the members f o r  a more s tab le  income 
over t ime.
In th is  study o f  se t t lem ent  o p era t io n ,  revenues d is t r ib u t e d  to  
members w i l l  be termed margins. These revenues have been termed patron­
age refunds, patronage rebates,  patronage d iv idends,  e t c . ,  by d i f f e r e n t  
w r i t e r s .  However, using any one of  these terms implies a c e r ta in  legal  
or  economic nature. Since the economic nature ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  changes 
as d i f f e r e n t  types o f  se t t lem ent  methods are used, we w i l l  c a l l  a l l  such 
funds margins.
Purchase and Sale  
Marketing Cooperative
This  type of  se t t lem ent  operat ion  is used where the commodities 
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to  be processed and marketed a re  s ta p le s ;  f o r  exarrple, cotton and grains.  
Such commodities are  sold in well  es tab l ished  markets. Spot p r ic e s  are  
paid to patrons a t  the time tha t  t h e i r  products are de l iv e re d  to the asso­
c i a t i o n ’ s p la n t .  Q u a l i ty  d i f fe re n c e s  are taken in to  considerat ion in 
choosing the a p p l ic a b le  p r ices  to be paid f o r  the commodities. Like  
commodities are then co-mingled f o r  s torage,  processing and/or  marketing.  
Obviously the i n i t i a l  payments to the patrons are  not pooled, but sales  
reveneus are  pooled to the ex ten t  th a t  specu la t ive  gains are averaged on 
a Interdepartmental basis . As a general p r a c t ic e  costs from l i k e  pro-  
ducts o f  d i f f e r i n g  grades are  pooled. Costs a t t r i b u t a b l e  to p a r t i c u l a r  
types o f  products may or  may not be pooled. To the e x ten t  th a t  p r e v a i l -  
ing pr ices  are pa id ,  any margins accruing to patrons,  not including  
advances, are  p e r f e c t l y  analogous to p r o f i t s  in a non- in tegrated  f i rm .
Tabu lâ t  ion
1. Costs from l i k e  products of  d i f f e r i n g  q u a l i t i e s  are  
pooled. Costs from un l ik e  commodities may or  may not 
be pooled.
2. The ex ten t  to which sales revenue is pooled, depends 
upon the amount o f  specu la t ive  gain or  loss Involved 
and the degree to which in tardepartmental  pooling of  
sales revenue is c a r r ie d  out.
3. As long as p r e v a i l in g  p r ices  are  pa id ,  margins remitted  
to patrons are  p e r f e c t l y  analogous to p r o f i t s  In a non- 
in teg rated business.
Note; in genera l ,  in a l l  co-ops once pooling p o l i c ie s  have been
decided upon, patrons in the same category are  remitted margins 
in proport ion  to t h e i r  percentage o f  t o ta l  business fo r  the 
a p p l ic a b le  department o r  departments.
Purchase and Sale  
Supply Cooperative
1. Costs from d i f f e r e n t  departments are  g e n e ra l ly  pooled.
2. The ex ten t  o f  revenue pooling depends upon the amount
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of  specu la t ive  gain involved and the degree to which 
In terdepartmental revenues are  averaged.
3. As long as p r e v a i l in g  pr ices  are  p a id ,  margins remitted  
to patrons are p e r f e c t l y  analogous to  p r o f i t s  in a non­
in tegra ted  business.
Bargaining Associat ion  
Marketing Cooperative
These associa t ions  have l i t t l e  Investment, receive  no sales pro­
ceeds and oftent imes have no paid employees. Since the bargain ing is 
often accomplished during a short  per iod o f  t ime,  an unpaid bargain ing  
committee made up of  execut ives o f  the various p a r t i c i p a t i n g  finms may 
accomplish the a s s o c ia t io n ’ s purpose. However, ou ts ide  legal help may 
have to be paid and the bargained agreement w i l l  have to be drawn up. 
This kind o f  expense normally  exhausts the a s s o c ia t io n 's  need f o r  reve­
nue. M i lk  bargain ing cooperatives are the most common examples o f  th is  
type of  a sso c ia t ion .  Growers o f  c e r ta in  per ishab le  f r u i t s  and b e r r ie s  
a lso  use bargaining type associa t ions .  The asso c ia t ion  pays costs  
e i t h e r  through levying deductions before the bargain ing begins and 
d i s t r ib u t e s  the residual funds back in proport ion to the s ize  o f  the 
deductions, or  le v ie s  assessments in proport ion  to a n t ic ip a te d  b e n e f i ts  
a f t e r  the bargain ing has been accomplished. Obviously no revenue pool­
ing is poss ib le .  Costs are  pooled only  i f  cost accounting is not per ­
f e c t ,  a minor problem. Margins are  refunds o f  over-payments and In no 
way resemble p r o f i t s .  P r o f i t s  can be measured only  by comparing non­
bargained p r ices  w i th  bargained p r ic e s .  In a s t r i c t  economic sense the 
d i f fe r e n c e  In pr ices  probably could not be c l a s s i f i e d  as p r o f i t s .
Tabu la t  i on
1. No pool ing o f  revenues and no s i g n i f i c a n t  pool ing  
of costs.
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2 . I f  assessments are  made a f t e r  bargaining is completed,  
no margins e x is t .
3. I f  margins do e x i s t ,  they in no way resemble p r o f i t s .
4. This type of  cooperat ive operat ion resembles an agency 
re la t io n s h ip  more than the j o i n t  p la n t  operat ion of  
Phi 11ips.
Lot by Lot Commission Basis 
Marketing Cooperative
In th is  type o f  op era t ion ,  each p a t ro n 's  products are sold separ­
a t e l y  on a commission or  fee basis ;  hence there is no revenue pool ing.  
However in the event o f  commissions in excess o f  costs ,  costs are  p ro -  
rated on a pooling basis in computing refunds due patrons. This coop­
e r a t i v e  set t lement  method is analogous to the bargain ing method, except  
th a t  the associa t ion  does receive  the sales revenues and d i s t r ib u t e s  
them back to patrons a f t e r  p r o r a t in g  costs and deducting same. The lo t  
by lo t  method is used mostly by l iv e s to c k  shipping associa t ions .
Tabu l a t  i on
1. Sales revenue is not pooled.
2. Costs are  pooled on ly  to the ex ten t  tha t  commissions
charged more than cover cost o f  operat ion .
3. Margins are  not analogous to p r o f i t s .
M u l t i p le  Pooling With 
P rogress Î ve Payments 
Marketing Cooperative
in th is  type o f  asso c ia t ion  uniform pr ices  are paid throughout  
the pool ing per iod fo r  l i k e  products o f  s i m i l a r  grade and q u a l i t y .  In 
a l l  kinds o f  pooling associa t ions  the time per iod which the pool covers 
may vary. Some pools are  f o r  only  a few days, others where s ta p le  com­
modit ies  are warehoused may la s t  f o r  several years. A percentage o f  
a n t ic ip a te d  p r ic e  is advanced a t  t ime o f  d e l i v e r y .  Successive payments
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are  made as the products comprising the pool are  sold. in te r -poo l  costs  
may or  may not be pooled. To the ex ten t  th a t  d i f f e r e n t  port ions o f  the  
pooled commodities are  sold a t  d i f f e r e n t  times in d i f f e r e n t  markets,  
sales revenues are pooled. However revenues from u n l ik e  commodities 
are not mixed. Under th is  type o f  se t t lem ent  method, the f in a l  margin 
may represent the f i n a l  p a r t  o f  the sales revenues received, the f in a l  
p a r t  of  the sales revenues received plus the refund o f  an overcharge,  
or j u s t  a refund o f  an overcharge, depending upon the accounting proce­
dures used by the a sso c ia t ion .
Tabu la t ion
1. Costs may or  may not be pooled.
2. Revenues from u n l ik e  commodities are  not pooled.
3. Margins a re  not a measure o f  marketing p r o f i t s .
M u l t i p le  Pooling Without  
Progressive Payments 
Marketing Cooperative
Here an advance is made a t  the time o f  d e l i v e r y  and a f i n a l  pay­
ment is made a t  the end of  the pooling per iod .  Like the previous case 
the f i n a l  payment may be o f  three  d i f f e r e n t  natures. I f  the margin is 
the f i n a l  in sta l lm ent  of  to ta l  p r ic e  i t  is akin  to a progressive payment 
plan w i th  a l l  n o n - i n i t i a l  payments combined in to  one. The margin may 
be a refund of  an overcharge thus resembling margins found in a purchase 
and sa le  operat ion .  However since p r e v a i l in g  p r ices  are  not i n i t i a l l y  
p a id ,  the margin cannot measure p r o f i t .
T abu la t ion
1. Costs may or  may not be pooled.
2. Revenues from u n l ik e  commodities are  not pooled.
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3. Margins do not measure p r o f i t s .
In the examples f o r  progressive  and non-progressive payment pools 
we d e a l t  s o le ly  with  m u l t ip le  pooling operat ion .  S ingle  pool coopera­
t iv e s  mingle revenues derived from u n l ik e  commodities thus approaching 
the purchase-and-sale  arrangement. The degree to which a s in g le  pool 
co-op approaches a purchase-and-sale  co-op in averaging revenues is de­
pendent upon the ex ten t  o f  s p e c u la t iv e  margins in the l a t t e r  and the 
degree o f  aggregate pooling in the f i r s t .  Even where l i k e  products are  
kept together  (m u l t ip le  pool ing)  revenue may be pooled from u n l ike  pro­
ducts. In th is  s i t u a t i o n ,  whether or  not sales revenues are pooled is 
decided by the board o f  d i r e c to r s .  Thus in one year ,  revenues w i l l  be 
thoroughly pooled and in another year sales revenues w i l l  be pooled only  
f o r  l i k e  products o f  s i m i l a r  q u a l i t y  and grade. The above s i tu a t io n s  
are tabulated  under the fo l lo w in g  heading, S ingle  Pooling With Progres­
s ive  Payments, S ing le  Pooling Without Progressive Payments, and M u l t i p le  
Pooling with  D i r e c to rs '  D is c re t io n .




1. Costs a re  pooled,
2. Revenues from u n l ik e  commodities are  pooled.
3. Margins do not measure p r o f i t s .
S ing le  Pools Without  
Progressive Payments 
Marketing Cooperative
1. Costs are  pooled.
2. Revenues from u n l ik e  commodities are  pooled.
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3. Margins do not measure p r o f i t s .
M u l t i p le  Pooling With 
D ir e c t o r 's  D is c re t io n  
Marketing Cooperative
1. Costs are  pooled.
2. Revenues from un l ik e  commodities may or  may not be 
pooled.
3. Margins do not measure p r o f i t s .
Summa ry
In the preceedtng review o f  se t t lem ent  o p era t ion s ,  the fo l low ing  
proposit ions were substant ia ted .
1. Few cooperat ives operate  on an agency basis .
2. Seldom do margins measure p r o f i t s  derived from coopera­
t i v e  operat ions.
The above proposit ions  have been, but should not be, ignored i f  e q u i ta b le  
tax p o l ic y  is to be le g is la te d .
P r o f i t s  from cooperat ive  operations should be taxed, but tax ing  
margins from a l l  the various kinds o f  operat ions is extremely in e q u i t ­
ab le .  Only in the case o f  a purchase and sale  cooperat ive where p r e v a i l ­
ing pr ices  are paid would such a p o l ic y  be j u s t .  On the other  hand i t  
is obvious tha t  only  an i n s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of  cooperat ive  a c t i v i t y  can 
funct ion  on agency basis . Hence the co-op argument th a t  to tax coopera­
t iv e s  is to tax agents is not very re levan t .
Of course one should not make the mistake o f  Ignoring j o i n t  p la n t  
re la t io n s h ip s  and d e f in in g  a cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion  as a farm re la ted  
f i r m  on the basis o f  s u p e r f i c ia l  s i m i l a r i t i e s .  Granted products, reve­
nues and costs may be pooled in a cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion  but th is  does 
not a - p r i o r i  c rea te  a f i rm .  t t  Is a lso  obvious a f t e r  ana lyz ing coopera-
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t i v e  s t ruc tures  and operat ions th a t  associa t ions  have evolved cont inu­
ously toward one type o f  n o n -p r o f i t  operat ion .  When cooperat ive  spokes­
men cla im th a t  t h e i r  associa t ions  operate  on a n o n -p r o f i t  basis there  
can be no log ica l  disagreement, j u s t  semantical disagreement. However 
t h e i r  n o n -p r o f i t  opera t ion  is re la ted  on Iv  to the associated farmers.
That is ,  one patron does not p r o f i t  from another  p a t ro n 's  a c t i v i t i e s  in
the cooperative as so c ia t ion .  This is an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  idea, than
to say a cooperat ive  does not make p r o f i t s .  The fo l lo w in g  quotation  
from Chapman brings th is  important d i f fe r e n c e  out q u i te  d i s t i n c t l y .
Sn discussing the advantages and disadvantages o f  coopera­
t i v e  marketing, i t  should not be assumed th a t  the functions  
performed by the middlemen can be abol ished. In the past
the middlemen have been rendering a real  economic serv ice
by s to r in g ,  shipping and f inanc ing  goods in the process of  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  to the consumers. [ t  may be and, no doubt is 
t r u e ,  th a t  p r o f i t s  o f  some middlemen have o f te n  been too 
la rge in propor t ion  to the economic services rendered, but
th a t  is an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  th ing from saying th a t  they
perform no real  s e rv ic e .  I f  the producers fe e l  th a t  they 
are  not g e t t in g  t h e i r  proper share o f  the consumer's d o l l a r  
and they turn to cooperat ive  marketing f o r  l a r g e r  shares,  
they must r e a l i z e  th a t  they themselves a r e ,  to  a c e r ta in  
e x te n t ,  performing the funct ions o f  the middlemen.
And to the extent  th a t  marketing funct ions are performed by farmers, the
re la ted  r isks  and p r o f i t s  must n e c e ss a r i ly  accrue to farmers. The pro­
f i t s  from cooperat ive  operat ions a re  measured by the d i f fe r e n c e  between 
p re -a ss o c ia t io n  revenues and pc'St associa t ion  revenues. I t  was a l e g i ­
t imate  goal of  the e a r l y  associa t ions  to recover these p r o f i t s ,  most 
o f  which had been ex t ra c te d  through monopoly and monopsony powers, powers 
th a t  harmed farmers as well  as s o c ie ty  as a whole. However economic con­
d i t io n s  change and to the e x ten t  th a t  such changes have e l im ina ted  these 
market im perfect ions ,  tax  p o l ic y  toward cooperatives must a lso  change.
^^Chapman, p. 594-595.
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With two chapters devoted to cooperat ive  op era t ion s ,  s t ru c tu re s ,  and 
goals we now turn to the task o f  applying th is  knowledge to the problem 
of tax ing a g r ic u l tu r a l  cooperat ives.
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CHAPTER H I  
TAXATÎON OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
Exclusion o f  Patronage Margins
Without a doubt the most important Issue in the farm co-op tax
controversy is not the s t a tu t o r y  exemption of  Section (101) 12 o f  the
In terna l  Revenue Code.3^ Rather the major issue is the exclusion of
margins d i s t r ib u te d  on a patronage bas is ,  from the taxab le  income o f  the
cooperative corporate  e n t i t y .  Are patronage margins patronage refunds
o r  are they patronage dividends and hence a d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  corporate
p r o f i ts ?  I t  is obvious th a t  u n t i l  q u i te  re ce n t ly  the courts and the
Treasury Department have considered patronage margins to  be refunds,
tha t  is ,  rebates or  a d d i t io n s  to the p a t ro n 's  cost o f  goods sold and
hence not ta x a b le .35 ;  ̂ |s th is  assumption which led Bradley to  s ta te ;3 ^
. . . T h e  r ig h t  to  exclude patronage refunds from gross income 
in the determinat ion o f  the taxable  net income o f  the tax ­
a b le  e n t i t y  is not a m atte r  o f  s t a tu to r y  r ig h t  but ra ther  
solely one o f  contrac tua l  r ig h t  recognized by the courts  
whether the o rg a n iza t io n  be set up to  funct ion  as an a g r i ­
c u l tu r a l  cooperat ive  o r  to serve the needs o f  s t r i c t l y  pro­
p r i e t a r y  commercial o rga n iza t ions .
One may take issue with  Bradley f o r  using the term patronage refund and
3^Section (101) 12 o f  1939 In te rn a l  Revenue Code. Now changed to 
Section 521 o f  the 1954 In te rn a l  Revenue Code.
35g. C. M, 17895, 1937=1 C. B . , p. 56.
L. Bradley,  "Taxat ion  o f  C o -opera t ives ,"  Harvard Business 
Review. XXV (1 9 4 6 -4 7 ) ,  576-586.
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f o r  d is t in g u is h in g  between cooperat ive  and p r o p r ie ta r y  business but his  
statement does serve to po in t  up the o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n  regarding the 
exclusion of  patronage margins from the taxab le  income o f  the coopéra^ 
t i v e  corporat ion .  As long as margins are  considered rebates in the 
case of  a purchasing cooperat ive  or  add i t ion s  to the fa rm er -pa t ro n 's  
cost of  goods sold in a marketing coopera t ive ,  one cannot deny the 
contractual  r ig h t  o f  a cooperat ive  or  any o ther  form of  business to  
minimize i t s  tax  l i a b i l i t y  through refunds. Nowhere in the In terna l  
Revenue Code w i l l  one f in d  patronage margins mentioned as a deduct ib le  
expense. The basis f o r  excluding cooperat ive  margins are the ru l ings  
of the Treasury Department ( in te r n a l  Revenue Bureau), and court  de c i ­
sions. Treasury decis ions have recognized the p r o p r ie ty  o f  süch exclu ­
sions. For the most p a r t ,  the courts have fo l low ed ,  deciding only  upon 
the fac ts  in each case and not on the appropriateness o f  Treasury Deci­
sions. ^7
1. Farmers Co-operat ive  Co. v. Birmingham.
2. American Box Shook Export Associat ion v. Commissioner 
of  In te rn a l  Revenue.
3. People 's  Gin Co. v, Commissioner of  In te rna l  Revenue.
4. Midland Cooperative Wholesale v. Commissioner of  In t e r ­
nal Revenue.
Whe re T reasu ry Depa rtmer.t adm i n i s t  ra t  i ve p ract  I ces have gone ur.cha 11 enged
f o r  a long period o f  t ime they a re  considered to have Congressional sane-
^^Farmers Co-operat ive  Co. v. Birmingham. 86 F. Supp. 201 (D. C. 
1owa 19 4 9 ) ; '  American Box Shook Export Associat ion v. Commissioner of  
In te rn a l  Revenue. 156 F. (2d) 629 (9 th  C i r .  1946); People 's  Gin Co. v. 
Commissioner o f  in te rn a l  Revenue. 118 F. (Ed) 72 (5 th  C i r .  1941); and 
Midland Cooperative Wholesale v. Commissioner of In terna l  Revenue. 44 
B.T.A, 824 (1941) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 5 1 -
t io n  and w i Î 1 not be overturned except fo r  very cogent r e a s o n s . Far-  
mers Cooperative Co. v. BIrmingham. The only  f a c t  tha t  the courts have 
decided upon is whether o r  not the refunds were made pursuant to a p r i o r  
o b l ig a t io n  to pay such refunds and th e re fo re  are l e g a l l y  excludable.
1. American Box Shook Export Ass'n. v. Commissioner of  
In te rna l  Revenue.
2. People 's  Gin Co. v. Commissioner of  in te rna l  Revenue.
3. Fountain C i t y  Co-op Creamer Ass'n. v. Commissioner of  
In te rn a l  Revenue.
4. Druggists '  Supply Corp. v. Commissioner o f  In terna l  
Revenue.
5. Associated Grocers* o f  Alabama, Inc. v. Wi ll ingham,
6. United Butchers A b a to i r ,  Inc. v. Commissioner of in terna l  
Revenue,
The Treasury Department and courts  view a cooperat ive as a f i rm  
deal ing with  bonafide customers. P r io r  o b l ig a t io n  is required presum­
a b ly ,  to  d is a l lo w  the f i r m  from min imiz ing taxab le  income by the ju g ­
g l in g  of  brackets through s t r a t e g i c a l l y  timed r e b a t e s .
Another in te r e s t in g  aspect o f  the exclusion determinat ion a r is e s  
from the a d m in is t r a t iv e  decis ions by the Bureau o f  In terna l  Revenue, 
fo l lowed by most c our ts ,  th a t  co-op "rebates"  need not be made in cash.
^^Farmers Cooperat ive Co, v, Birmingham. 86 F. Supp, 201 (D.C,
Î owa 1949 ) .
^^American Box Shook Export Ass'n. v. Commissioner o f  In te rna l  
Revenue, 156 F (2d) 629 (9 th  C i r .  1946); People 's  Gin Co, v. Commissioner 
o f  in te rn a l  Revenue, 118 F. (2d) 72 (5 th  C i r .  1941); Fountain C i t y  Co-op 
Creamery Ass'n. v. Commissioner o f  In te rn a l  Revenue, 172 F. (2d) 666 (7 th  
C ir .  19 4 9 ) ;  Druggists '  Supply Corp. v. Commissioner o f  in terna l  Revenue,
8 T, C. 1343 ( 1947 ) ;  Associated Growers' o f  Alabama, Inc. v. Will ingham,  
77 F. Supp. 990 (1946 ) ;  and United Butchers A b a to i r ,  inc. v. Commissioner 
o f  In te rna l  Revenue. 5 T,C.M, 40 (1946) .
^Ooavis, p. 56.
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This  ru l in g  fo l lows l o g i c a l l y  from the o f f i c i a l  concept o f  a cooperat ive .  
I f  cash margins are  not d i s t r ib u t io n s  o f  corporate p r o f i t ,  then e q u i ty  
or l i a b i l i t y  instruments issued in l i e u  o f  cash a re  not d i s t r ib u t io n s  of  
corporate p r o f i t s  and th e re fo re  not taxab le .  This  l in e  of  reason ing  is 
c a l le d  " the  c o n s tru c t iv e  re ce ip t  and reinvestment theory". Since most 
cooperatives have in t h e i r  c h a r te rs ,  bylaws or  marketing agreements, a 
clause which contracts  w i th  the patron to  issue scr ip  in l i e u  o f  cash,  
there can be no argument w i th  the p o s i t io n  th a t  such funds are not tax­
able  provided one accepts the rebate or  cost adjustment theory. Apply­
ing the rebate concept, the exclusion o f  such " re in ves ted"  or  loaned 
funds from taxable  income, as Davis points  o u t ,  is compatible with the 
fo l low ing  three basic accounting and tax p r in c ip le s .
1. Funds received by a corporat ion  from the sa le  o f  stock  
or e q u i ty  c a p i ta l  do not c o n s t i tu te  income to the cor­
porate  e n t i t y .
2. Funds received by a corporat ion  through the process c f  
b o rro w in g . . .d o  not c o n s t i t u te  income to the corporate  
e n t i t y .
3. . . .E a r n in g s  by a corpora t ion  appl ied  to the payment of  
dividends on c a p i ta l  or  re ta ined by the corporat ion as 
c a p i ta l  reserves o r  surplus do c o n s t i tu te  income to the 
corporate  e n t i t y .
Given the above concept o f  patronage margins and these three  p r i n ­
c ip le s  o f  corporate accounting,  the e x c l u d a b i l i t y  o f  a l l  scr ip  and cash 
d is t r ib u t e d  on a contrac tua l  patronage basis n a t u r a l l y  fo l lows.  This  
philosophy was sanctioned completely  on November 23 ,  1943, when Deputy 
Commissioner T. C, Mooney s ta ted  the o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n  in answer to a 
request f o r  such a statement by the National Council  o f  Farmer Coopera-
^^Davis, p. 44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 53 -
t iv e s ,^ ^  The ru l in g  v a l id a te d  the whole spectrum of  cash and non-cash 
patronage margins as excludable  from gross corporate  income. The ru l ing  
stated th a t  c a p i ta l  stock when used as non-cash patronage margins Is 
excludable from the gross income of  the cooperat ive  whether or  not I t  
has re a d i ly  r e a l i z a b le  market value. In a d d i t io n  c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  equ i ty  
or indebtedness when d i s t r ib u t e d  on a patronage basis pursuant to a 
p r i o r  o b l ig a t io n  do not c o n s t i tu te  an a l lo c a t i o n  o f  corporate income and 
are not taxable .  Whether o r  not such c e r t i f i c a t e s  have a d e f i n i t e  due 
date or  r e a l i z a b le  market va lue was considered i r r e le v a n t  to t h e i r  ex-  
c lu d a b i1i t y .
In b r i e f ,  the o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n  has been th a t  non-cash patronage  
margins c o n s t i tu te  a d d i t io n a l  investment in the cooperat ive  corporat ion  
out of  patron "savings" not earnings and hence cannot c o n s t i tu te  taxable  
income to the cooperat ive .  Actual cash payment o f  the margins may be 
deferred u n t i l  the d is s o lu t io n  or  l i q u i d a t io n  o f  the associa t ion .  Even 
though no d e f i n i t e  plans have been made f o r  payment o f  the funds repre­
sented by the various types o f  s c r i p ,  as long as the in ten t ion  e x is ts  to  
redeem in cash, such funds are e i t h e r  loaned funds or  a d d i t io n a l  inves t ­
ments o f  the patrons . 43
1. l . T .  3 2 0 8 , 1 9 3 8 -2  C.B. 1271 .
2.  Farmer’ s Union Co-opera t ive  Associat ion v. Commissioner 
o f  In te rn a l  Revenue.
42 I b i d . . 8 5 “8 6 .
43  l . T .  3 2 0 8 , 1938-2 C.B. 1271 ; Farmers' Union Co-operat ive  Associ­
a t io n  V .  Commissioner o f  In te rn a l  Revenue, 42 B.T.A. 1200 (1940 ) ;  Home 
B uilders  Shipping Associat ion v. Commissioner o f  In te rn a l  Revenue, 8 B.T.A.  
903  (9 th  C i r .  1943) ;  San Joaquin V a l l e y  P o u l t r y  Producers' Ass’ n. v. Com­
missioner of  In terna l  Revenue. 136 F. (2d) 382 (9 th  C i r .  1943).
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3. Home Builders Shipping Associat ion v. Commissioner 
o f  In te rna l  Revenue.
4. San Joaquin V a l le y  P o u l t ry  Producers' Ass'n. v.
Commissioner o f  In te rn a l  Revenue.
In conclusion by paying patronage margins, cash or  s c r ip ,  the 
maximum tax  burden o f  any farm cooperat ive  Is as fo l lows;
1. Income tax  Is paid on amounts a v a i l a b le  f o r  the pay­
ment o f  dividends on outstanding s to c k .44
2. Income tax Is paid on non-member margins which are  not 
d is t r ib u t e d  to non-members.
Note: As a ru le  dividends on c a p i ta l  stock w i l l  be
paid from non-member margins.
As long as patronage margins a re  considered rebates or  a dd i t ions  to the  
p a t ro n 's  cost o f  goods sold there can be no quarre l  w ith  the p o s i t io n  of  
co-op spokesmen th a t  such funds or  scr ip  are  e i t h e r  l i a b i l i t i e s  of the  
corporat ion or  a d d i t io n a l  investment In the corpora t ion  by members and 
not corporate  Income. I f  patronage d i s t r ib u t io n s  are  d is t r ib u t io n s  of  
rebates,  co-op spokesmen can v a l i d l y  c la im tha t  non-exempt co-ops receive  
no p r e f e r e n t i a l  t reatment over o ther  kinds o f  business and can recommend 
the removal of  Section 101 (12) as the to ta l  s o lu t io n  to the co-op tax  
Issue. However to the ex ten t  th a t  patronage d i s t r ib u t io n s  are  d i s t r i ­
butions o f  corporate Income, removal o f  the exemption sect ion w i l l  do 
l i t t l e  to  s a t i s f y  non-cooperat ive business In te re s ts .
Exemption Section (101) 12
In the above review o f  exclusion ru l ings  and decisions we found 
th a t  any unal located non-member margins and in c iden ta l  income items of  
a non-exempt cooperat ive  are  taxab le .  Non-exempt cooperatives o r d i n a r i l y
^^Unlted Cooperat ives. Inc. v. Commissioner o f  In te rn a l  Revenue. 
4 T.C. 93 (1944) .
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use margins from non-member business, which are not "refunded" to the 
non-members on a patronage bas is ,  f o r  b u i ld in g  reserves and paying d i v i ­
dends on stock. To the ex ten t  th a t  non-members do not receive patronage  
margins a t t r i b u t a b l e  to t h e i r  volume of  business w i th  the as so c ia t ion ,  
the co-op is being used by ovmer-members as a f i rm  to make p r o f i t  from 
the serv ices performed f o r  non-members. According to the rebate concept,  
th is  is the ex ten t  o f  the non-exempt coop era t iv e 's  p r o f i t .
When Congress exempted c e r t a in  cooperatives i t  was the rebate con­
cept th a t  the exemption requirements were pred icated  upon. ! f  patronage 
"refunds" are  not d i s t r ib u t io n s  o f  p r o f i t s ,  the most d i r e c t  way to  
achieve " n o n - p r o f i t "  operat ion o f  a cooperat ive  is to require  tha t  a l l  
margins be d is t r ib u t e d  on a patronage basis pursuant to a p r i o r  con­
t r a c tu a l  o b l ig a t io n  to make such d i s t r i b u t i o n .  This  is e x a c t ly  what the 
Congress did require  f o r  exemption. The fo l low ing  requirements achieved 
" n o n - p r o f i t "  ope ra t  ion: ^5
1. Members and non-member patrons must be t rea ted  a l i k e  
in a l l  respects as to p r i c e ,  condit ions o f  the t rans ­
ac t ion  and patronage refunds.
2. The asso c ia t ion  must maintain  per:;ar,ent records o f  the 
volume o f  patronage and o f  the equ i ty  in te re s ts  o f  a l l  
patrons,  whether they be members or  non-members.
3. F inanc ia l  reserves which may be accumulated are  l im i te d  
to those which may be required by the cooperative s ta ­
tutes o f  the several s ta tes  or  to those which in the 
sole judgement o f  the Commissioner o f  In terna l  Revenue 
are  f o r  a purpose necessary to the business and are  
reasonable in amount in r e la t io n  to such necessity.
4. The dividend ra te  on c a p i ta l  shares must not exceed the 
legal ra te  o f  in te r e s t  in the S ta te  of  incorporat ion or  
e ig h t  percent per annum, based upon the value of  consi-
L. Bradley,  Harvard Business Review, XXV, 579“580.
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d era t ion  f o r  which the c a p i ta l  share was issued,  
whichever is g re a te r .
5. Vot ing contro l  o f  the asso c ia t ion  whether I t  be in 
the form o f  c a p i ta l  shares o r  memberships, must sub­
s t a n t i a l l y  be held by producers who are  c u r r e n t ly  
p a t ro n iz in g  the a sso c ia t ion .
Requirements one and two created an o b l ig a t io n  to the associa t ion  
whereby a l l  funds w i th  the exception o f  those ear  marked fo r  reasonable 
and necessary reserves,  must be d is t r ib u t e d  among the patrons on a p a t ­
ronage basis .  The need f o r  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  reserves may seem d o ubt fu l ,  
considering th a t  upon d iss o lu t io n  a c o o p era t ive 's  net worth is d i s t r i ­
buted on a patronage basis and hence a l l  a c t iv e  patrons would receive  
the " frozen "  margins in proport ion  to  t h e i r  patronage. However one must 
consider the p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  non-members may form a more mobile farm 
populat ion than members. Since co-op stock does not increase above book 
value one must be a patron o f  the cooperat ive  a t  time o f  I ts  l iq u id a t io n  
i f  a l l  investment in the associa t ion  is to be recouped. Therefore the 
reserve requirement did not completely  e l im in a te  th is  problem. Conse­
quent ly  a 1951 amendment requires th a t  an exempt coopera t ive 's  to ta l  
reserves must be a l l o c a t e d ,  and hence no m atte r  how long i t  is before  
these margins are  turned back the patron responsible f o r  the margins 
receives his margins.
Requirements fo u r  and f i v e  a ls o  are  aimed a t  c rea t in g  mandatory 
n o n -p r o f i t  opera t ion .  However, in th is  case the p r o f i t  re la t io n s h ip  
which is e l im in a ted  is not th a t  between members and non-members but 
ra th er  between farm and non-farm members. By a l lo w in g  vot ing stock to  
be held only  by farmers, the a s so c ia t ion  stands a b e t t e r  chance o f  being 
operated to reduce costs and increase p r o f i t s  o f  members as farmers,
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ra th er  than being operated by non-farmers to earn income fo r  performing  
farm-connected serv ices .  The e ig h t  percent  l i m i t a t i o n  on dividends on 
c a p i ta l  stock serves a l i k e  purpose. I t  keeps the w e a l th ie r  farm mem­
bers in the cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion  from making p r o f i t  from fe l lo w  f a r ­
mers, w h i le  i t  a l lows a return  to compensate f o r  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l i t îes 
between investments made and serv ices  received by such members.
In a d d i t io n  to  the f i v e  i n i t i a l  requirements a l re ad y  mentioned 
one other  exemption requirement has econcartic s ig n i f ic a n c e .  This is the  
business r e s t r i c t i o n  requirement:^^
The value o f  business done w i th  non-members must not exceed
the value o f  business with  members whether the business be
marketing or  purchasing, w i th  the f u r t h e r  prov is ion  th a t  in 
the instance o f  a purchasing cooperat ive  the value o f  pur­
chases o f  supplies and equipment f o r  persons who are  n e i th e r  
members nor producers s h a l l  not exceed 15% o f  the value o f  
purchases made f o r  a l l  patrons.
This requirement simply does not f i t  the rebate concept o f  cooperative
o pera t ion .  In f a c t  i t  seems to in d ic a te  th a t  the Congress thought the
rebat ing of  a l l  margins might not c o n s t i tu te  n o n -p r o f i t  operat ion .  I f  
i t  was required th a t  a l l  margins be a l lo c a te d  except those used in es­
ta b l i s h in g  reasonable and necessary reserves,  and i f  patronage margins 
are  not d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r o f i t ,  why should there  be any l i m i t a t i o n  on 
non-member and non-producer business? This is an analogy d i f f i c u l t  to  
comprehend. In any event these s ix  requirements and the amendment of  
1951 are  the important condit ions  which must be met to  q u a l i f y  f o r  exemp­
t io n  under Section (101) 12 (redèsignated Section 521 of  the In te rn a l  
Revenue Code of 1954).
We now turn to the aggregate o f  p r iv i l e g e s  allowed under Section
L. Brad ley ,  Harvard Business Review, XXV, p. 579.
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521. The p r iv i l e g e s  allowed to  q u a l i f i e d  cooperat ives under th is  sec­
tion are;47
1. Employment taxes need not be paid on any employee 
whose t o ta l  remuneration does not exceed $45 in any 
qua r t e r .
2. The cooperat ive  is exempt from paying c a p i ta l  stock 
t r a n s fe r  o r  issuance taxes.
3. Capita l  gains are  exempt provided the transact ions  
involved are  inc identa l  to the p r in c ip a l  a c t i v i t y  
of the cooperat ive .
4. Extraneous income is exempt i f  paid out sn the form 
of patronage dividends.
5. Income paid  out in the form o f  l im i te d  dividends on 
c a p i ta l  stock is exempt.
The advantages o f  exempt cooperat ive  a c t i v i t y  over the non-exempt method 
o f  operat ion would seem to be ra th e r  p a l t r y .  The stamp tax  and employ­
ment tax exemptions are  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  Exemptions three and four  pro­
bably are  not important except in those cases where a co-op does consi­
derable  business with  the government and pays no tax on such business.  
Exemption f i v e  is the p r i v i l e g e  most o f ten  discussed. However the p r i ­
v i le g e  o f  paying t a x - f r e e  income in the fonr; o f  dividends on c a p i ta l  
stock is not as grea t  an advantage as is o f ten  supposed. Since the major  
proport ion  o f  e q u i ty  f in an c ing  is accomplished on a revolv ing fund basis  
the need f o r  a non-exempt asso c ia t io n  to  d i s t r i b u t e  returns openly is 
ra th e r  minimal. In a d d i t io n  the value of  a l l  the p r iv i l e g e s  must be 
weighed aga inst  the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on non-member business. This r e s t r i c ­
t io n  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  important f o r  purchasing cooperat ives ,  where i t  may 
be d i f f i c u l t  to ob ta in  an economical volume o f  purchases from only  pro­
ducers and members. Sn summary, the advantages received fo r  complying 
with  the requirements o f  Section 521 are  l im i te d  when balanced aga ins t
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the non-exempt method o f  o p e r a t i o n .  T h is  i s  t e s t i f i e d  t o  by the  f a c t  
t h a t  n e a r l y  h a l f  o f  o u r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e ra t i v e s  a re  opera ted  on a non- 
exempt b a s i s . i f  fa rm c o o p e r a t i v e s  have any im p o r ta n t  ta x  advantage 
i t  i s  in the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o r p o r a te  income on a t a x - f r e e  b a s is  and to  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  degree t h i s  p r i v i l e g e  is  a v a i l a b l e  t o  bo th  exempt and non- 
exempt co-ops th rough  con tem pora ry  e x c lu s io n  r u l i n g s  and d e c is io n s .
T a x a t io n  A t  The I n d i v i d u a l  Level 
As was p o in te d  o u t  in the  p re c e d in g  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i t  
has been the i n t e n t  o f  Congress t o  c r e a te  comple te  n o n - p r o f i t  o p e r a t i o n  
o f  c o o p e ra t i v e s  by r e q u i r i n g  comple te  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  a l l  pa t ronage mar­
g in s .  Only  i n c i d e n t a l  income d e v ia te s  from t h i s  concep t  o f  " n o n - p r o f i t ”  
o p e ra t i o n .  The amounts o f  i n c i d e n t a l  income a re  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  enough 
to  be ignored .  In the  case o f  non-exempt c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  the o n l y  k ind  
hav ing n o n - i n c id e n t a l  u n a l l o c a t e d  m a rg in s ,  such margins a re  taxed a t  the 
a p p l i c a b l e  c o r p o r a te  r a te .  Exempt c o o p e ra t i v e s  must a l l o c a t e  a l l  o f  
t h e i r  marg ins .  T h is  was re q u i re d  by the  1951 amendment. From a p r a c t i ­
ca l  s t a n d p o in t  the  amendment a l s o  guaranteed t h a t  a l l  co-op margins 
would be e i t h e r  u n a l l o c a t e d  t o  the  p a t ro n s  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  such margins 
and hence would be t a x a b le  a t  the  c o r p o r a te  le v e l  o r  margins would be 
a l l o c a t e d  t o  the  re s p o n s ib le  p a t r o n s  and would  be taxed a t  the  persona l  
l e v e l .  T h is  a t  l e a s t  was th e  i n t e n t  o f  the  1951 l e g i s l a t i o n .  However 
a change in  j u d i c i a l  a t t i t u d e  has made the  i n t e n t  n o n - o p e r a t i o r a l .
^^Albert  W. Adcock, The Taxat ion o f  C o -o p e ra t iv e s . (A paper 
de l iv e re d  a t  the 1951 Summer I n s t i t u t e ,  U n iv e r s i ty  of Michigan Law 
School) p. 13. W r i t e r ' s  copy was received frorri the National Tax 
E q u a l i ty  A ssocia t ion ,  208 LaSa l le  S t r e e t ,  Chicago 4 ,  I l l i n o i s .
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Following a s e r ies  o f  court  decis ions in which the construct ive  
receipt  port ion  of  the reinvestment theory was chal lenged,  the In terna l  
Revenue Service announced on February 14, I 958  th a t  i t  would no longer  
attempt to assess an income tax on patrons with respect to non-cash p a t ­
ronage refunds having no market v a l u e . T h e  two most s ig n i f i c a n t  dec i ­
sions bearing upon the reinvestment theory were the Long P o u l t ry  Case 
and the Carpenter Case decided in 1957 and 1955 re s p e c t iv e ly .^ ^  Whether 
or not one agrees with the courts '  emphasis on the need fo r  market value  
regarding non-cash patronage refunds, these decis ions have led to a s i t u ­
a t ion  a p t ly  described by the A ss is ta n t  to the Secretary  of  Treasury,
Jay W. Classman. 51
. . .U n d e r  e x is t in g  law i t  is poss ib le  fo r  a cooperative to  
exclude from i t s  taxab le  income c e r t a in  non-cash patronage  
dividends paid  to i t s  members which, a t  the same t ime, are  
not taxable  to the members who receive  them.
In the a u th o r 's  judgement the aforementioned tax  evasion on the 
personal l e v e l ,  although important in understanding the extent  of  the 
co-op tax Issue, is not the major problem. The real issue always has 
been and s t i l l  i s ,  should a l lo c a te d  margins ( regard less o f  form) be 
subject  to the corporate  income tax. This question would be a p p l ic a b le  
even i f  a l l  patronage margins were d i s t r ib u t e d  in cash, thus avoiding  
the problem tha t  the courts are  p r e s e n t ly  w re s t l in g  w i th .  This very  
important question r e a l l y  asks, what is the in c ident  o f  cooperat ive
^^House Committee on Ways and Means, Hear ings, I 9 6 O, 10.
^^Lonq P o u l t r y  Farms. Inc. v. Commissioner o f  In terna l  Revenue. 
249  F. (2d) 726  (5 th  C i r .  1957); and Commissioner v. Carpenter , 219 F. 
(2d) 265 (5th C i r .  1955).
S^House Committee on Ways and Means, Hear ings , I 9 6 O, 5*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
“ 6 l  “
i n c o m e ? 5 2  \ s cooperat ive  n o n- inc iden ta l  income corporate income or  is 
i t  income not a t t r i b u t a b l e  to the corporate  e n t i t y  but ra ther  s o le ly  to  
the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  associated firms? I t  is to th is  question th a t  we now 
turn.
Co-op Corporate Income
Co-op in te re s ts  base t h e i r  arguments f o r  not tax ing margins upon 
what they consider to be the inc ident  o f  a coopera t ive 's  incorr;e. Whether 
they support the present  tax p o l ic y  v ia  rebate,  agency or  depar tm enta l i ­
za t ion  po s i t ion s  a l l  such arguments choose to ignore the corporate en­
t i t y .  Yet there can be no doubt th a t  the advantages gained through 
cooperat ive a c t i v i t y  would be unobtainable  on a non- incorporated basis.  
However co-op spokesmen c la im th a t  the income tax should be lev ied on 
the f i n a l  re c ip ie n t  o f  co-op income on ly ,  tha t  is ,  the patron.  There is 
l i t t l e  legal precedent and no economic reasoning a v a i l a b le  to v a l id a te  
the co-op p o s i t io n .  A more lo g ic a l  and precedented p o s i t io n  is tha t  
taken by the decis ion in Commissioner o f  {R v. Francis E. Tower, where 
the Commissioner c i te d  the Supreme Court Case, Lucas v. E a r l . 53
"A person may be taxed on p r o f i t  earned from property  
where he n e i t h e r  owns nor contro ls  i t . "
"The issue is who earned the Income."
Where an incorporated cooperat ive  is operat ing as a going concern, the 
a r t i f i c i a l  person, th a t  is the corp o ra t io n ,  earns the income. In fa c t  
no o ther  e n t i t y  is capable o f  earning such income. This is p re c is e ly
5^Cl Ive  Harston and Edward H. Ward, Mimeo C i rcula r 8 5 . Jan. 1955, 
Montana S ta te  College A g r ic u l t u r a l  Experiment S ta t io n ,
^^Commissioner o f  In terna l  Revenue v. Francis E. Tower, 327 U.S. 
280 (1946);  and Lucas V. E a r l . 281 U.S. I l l  (1930) .
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why cooperat ives are  incorporated.  To speak o f  an Incorporated coopera­
t i v e  as a conduit through which income f lows,  but which is not responsi­
b le  f o r  the income is to ignore r e a l i t y .  In any corporate  e n te r p r is e ,  
cooperat ive  or o therw ise ,  p r o f i t s  e v e n tu a l ly  accrue to the owner"inves­
to r s ,  but th is  conduit  o f  p r o f i t s  is ignored in non-co-op corporat ions.  
From the standpoint o f  eq u i ty  there is no reason why the conduit r e la ­
t io nsh ip  should not be ignored in the case o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperatives  
a lso .  This  po in t  was made very e x p l i c i t  in the Wisconsin Cooperative
M i lk  Pool Case, where the court  o f  appeals held ;5^
Such corporat ions d i f f e r  from others not in corporate  
funct ion  but only  in th a t  the p r o f i t s  instead o f  being 
d i s t r ib u t e d  to stockholders are  a l lo c a te d  to patrons  
r a ta b ly  in proport ion  to the amount o f  business t ra n s ­
acted with  the l a t t e r .
The court  could haVe reasonably added, since investment in the coopera­
t i v e  e n te rp r is e  tends to be held in proport ion  to ones volume o f  busi­
ness in the same, the method o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  p r o f i t s  does not d i f f e r
from o ther  corporate d i s t r ib u t io n s  o f  p r o f i t s .  Note the c o u r t 's  empha­
s is  on corporate  func t ion .  Cooperative corporations e x is t  to c rea te  
income f o r  t h e i r  fa rm e r - in v e s to rs .  Whether or not the entrepreneurship  
is farm or  farm connected has no e f f e c t  upon the exis tence o f  such pro­
f i t s ,  as P h i l l i p s  would have one b e l ie v e .  Patterson emphasizes the 
p r o f i t  o r i e n t a t io n  o f  a g r ic u l t u r a l  cooperatives in the fo l low ing  words.55 
"The usual source o f  a c o o p era t ive 's  gain Is i t s  transact ions w i th  out­
s iders  whose in te re s ts  are  adverse to those o f  the owner-patrons. L ike ­
wise i t  is through transact ions  of  th is  kind th a t  most o f  the income o f
^^WI scons in Co-operat ive  M i lk  Poo l . 119 F (2d) 999 a t  1000 (7 t l  
C ir .  1941).
55houS6 Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings. I960 ,  98.
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p r o p r i e t a r y  corporat ions is achieved."
In b r i e f ,  cooperat ives do make p r o f i t s  and l i k e  other  p r o f i t  cor­
porat ions  income flows through the corporate e n t i t y  (conduit )  to  i t s  
investors .  A l l  o ther  p r o f i t  making e n te rpr ises  must be taxed a t  the cor­
porate  le v e l .  The Treasury Department and courts now r e a l i z e  th is  in­
e q u i ta b le  f a c t .  The rebate,  agency and d epar tm en ta l iza t ion  arguments 
have been "vetoed" f o r  years where a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperatives were not  
involved. Since an a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ive  is p e r f e c t l y  analagous to  
other  p r o f i t -m a k in g  e n te r p r is e  from the standpoint  o f  economic goals,  
ample precedent e x is ts  fo r  tax ing  such cooperatives in an equal degree.
We now turn to the co-op arguments and the body o f  legal precedent which 
refuses to recognize these arguments.
The most i n f l u e n t i a l  argument used by cooperat ive  in te re s ts  is 
the p r ic e  adjustment or  rebate argument. The co-op in te re s ts  argue th a t  
patronage margins being in the nature of  p r ic e  rebates cannot be consi­
dered income w i th in  the meaning of  the s ix te en th  amendment. One co-op­
e r a t i v e  a t to rn e y  s ta ted  the rebate p o s i t io n  as f o l l o w s ; ^ ^
. . . I n  order  f o r  a cooperat ive  or  anyone e ls e  to q u a l i f y  
f o r  an exc lus ion ,  the contrac t  r e l ie d  upon must meet 
two te s ts ,  namely:
1. The c o n tra c t  must be a l e g a l l y  binding contrac t  a t  the 
time of  the t ran s ac t io n  from which the margin a r is es .
2. The c o n tra c t  must be between the p a r t ie s  to the t ra n s ­
act ion from which the margin a r is e s .
Although these two te s ts  c o r r e c t ly  assess the present  requirements fo r
excluding patronage margins from cooperat ive  income they do not apply
5&P. j .  G i l  f e a th e r ,  A Study and Review on Taxes, p. 9- Presented 
a t  the 1959 convention of  Montana Farmers Union.
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to non-cooperative businesses as we sha l l  soon see. In order fo r  non- 
cooperat ive  e n te rpr ises  to q u a l i f y  f o r  the exclusion o f  income from i t s  
corporate  tax l i a b i l i t y  a t h i r d  and c ru c ia l  t e s t  must a lso  be met:
3* The p a r t ie s  to the c o n tra c t  must have adverse in te re s ts .  Or 
in o ther  words a rebate Is a bonafide rebate on ly  i f  paid  to a person 
whose in te r e s t  is adverse to th a t  o f  the business paying i t .  The need 
f o r  the t h i r d  requirement is obvious. Without i t  businesses could d i s ­
t r i b u t e  p r o f i t s  in the form o f  rebates,  bargain sales and various sundry 
ways thus escaping a proper tax l i a b i l i t y .  The accepted p r i n c i p l e  is 
th a t  when p a r t ie s  are  not dea l ing  with  each o th e r  a t  arms length the 
names attached to such d i s t r ib u t io n s  sha l l  not be accepted a t  face va lue.  
The tax court  has long recognized the p e c u l i a r  nature o f  t ransac­
t ions between corporat ions and shareholders. The courts have s t e a d f a s t ly  
( farm co-ops excepted) refused to ignore the p o s s i b i l i t y  tha t  the id en t ­
i t y  o f  in te r e s t  between a corporat ion  and i t s  stockholders may obscure 
the t r u e  income o f  the corpora t ion .  Hence in the case o f  Eastern Carbon 
Black Co. V ,  B ra s t . a bargain purchase ( i . e . ,  fo r  less than f u l l  value)  
by a stockholder from the corporat ion  was t rea te d  as a d iv id e n d ,57 Nor 
have the courts allowed income to be excluded from the gross income of  
the corporat ion  merely because the business e n t i t y  was ob l ig a te d  to d is ­
t r i b u t e  net margins to a class of s tockho ld ers ,5^ In a d d i t io n  the courts  
have not allowed income t o  be excluded f rom a c o rp o ra t io n 's  tax l i a b i l i t y  
merely  because the revenues were o b l ig a ted  to t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  p a r t i e s  who
57Eastern Carbon Black Co, v, B r a s t , 104 F. (2d) 460 (C.C.A. 4 ,
1939).
5^ F l d e l i t v  Savings & Loan Ass'n,  v. Burnet . 65 F. (2d) 477 
(C ,A ,D ,C .  1933).
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were not stockholders in the corpora t ion .  Such was the s i t u a t io n  in 
Fontana Power Ccwnpanv v. Commissioner o f  in te rn a l  Revenue, where the cor ­
pora t ion  was required to  pay taxes on i t s  income, even though under a 
p r e e x is t in g  agreement i t  was o b l ig a ted  to  t r a n s fe r  such funds in payment 
f o r  purchased p r o p e r t i e s , 59 Again the issue was, who earned the income? 
in the above c i t a t i o n s  a p r e e x is t in g  contrac tua l  o b l ig a t i o n ,  or  the d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s  c a l le d  by the corpora t ion  some type o f  n o n - p r o f i t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  did not reduce the tax  l i a b i l i t y  o f  the respect ive  corpor­
a t io n s .
Not only  have the courts recognized the importance o f  adverse  
in te re s ts  in non-cooperative business, they have a ls o  recognized i t s  
importance in non-farm cooperat ive  businesses. The three  cases c i te d  
below are  a p p l ic a b le  to  the coopera t ive  form o f  business operat ion .^®
1. Cleveland Shopping News v. Routzahn
2. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner o f  In terna l  
Revenue.
3. Druggists* Supply Corp. v. Commissioner o f  In te rna l  
Revenue.
in a l l  o f  the above cases exclusion requirements f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  coop­
e r a t i v e s  were met, y e t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  patronage margins was taxed a t  
the corporate le v e l .
1. in each case the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f irms were associated to
59Fontana Power Company v. Commissioner of  in te rna l  Revenue. 
127 F. (2d) 193 (9 th  C i r .  1942).
^®Cle v e l  and Shopping News v. Routzahn, 89 F (2d) 902 (6 th  C i r ,  
1937);  R a i lway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner o f  in te rna l  Reve­
nue. 169 F. (2d) 710 a t  713 (C .A .D .C . 1936); Druggists" Supply Corp. 
V .  Commissioner o f  in te rn a l  Revenue. 8 T.C. 1343 (1947) .
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reduce the cost o f  goods reeded in t h e i r  business 
a c t i v i t i e s  or  to increase the s a l e a b i l i t y  o f  serv ices  
performed by t h e i r  businesses.
2. The cooperat ive  was o b l ig a ted  c o n t r a c tu a l ly  in a l l  
cases to turn back to the p a r t i c i p a t i n g  f irms a l l  mar- 
gins a f t e r  the cost of  operat ion was deducted,
3. Stock in the cooperat ive  asso c ia t ion  was owned only  
by the patrons o f  the associa t ion .
4. Margins were d is t r ib u t e d  on the basis o f  patronage  
not on the basis o f  stockholdings.
In hold ing the revenues d i s t r ib u te d  by the D ru g g is ts ’ Supply Corporation
on a patronage basis to be taxab le  the Tax Court sa id:  "The c i rc u i to u s
method adopted f o r  d i s t r i b u t i n g  what is in f a c t  taxab le  income o f  the
p e t i t i o n e r  does not permit  i t  to  escape i t s  Federal Tax L i a b i l i t y , "
Co“ op spokesmen in defending the present t reatment of  a g r i c u l t u r a l
cooperat ive  earnings choose to ignore the cases p re v io u s ly  c i t e d .  They
argue instead from o s te n s ib ly  analogous cases, such as the Ford Motor  
6lCase, ‘ Here revenues d i s t r ib u t e d  to the c o r p o r a t io n ’ s customers under 
a p r e e x is t in g  c o n tra c t  were excluded from the f i r m ’ s corporate earnings.  
However such an example is not analogous to the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  pa tron-  
age margins by a g r i c u l t u r a l  cooperat ives .  True ,  a f i r m  may choose dur-  
ing i t s  l i f e  to give rebates to  some or  a l l  o f  i t s  customers, some or  
a l l  o f  the time but such a p r a c t ic e  e x is ts  to maximize p r o f i t s  not to 
d i s t r i b u t e  or  assign p r o f i t s .  Likewise i t  is a common p r a c t ic e  f o r  busi­
nesses to give t rad e  discounts f o r  prompt payment o f  receivables .  Re­
bates may be made on the assumption th a t  a lower p r ic e  w i l l  increase  
to t a l  p r o f i t s .  Trade discounts help to  mainta in  l i q u i d i t y  a t  a low cost 
through in te rn a l  ra th e r  than ex terna l  f inanc ing .  However both p ra c t ic es
61 Revenue R e v is io n s  o f  1947-48. P a r t  iV ,  2130.
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vary  in importance wi th  the changing economic environment and serve to  
maximize p r o f i t s  not to  d i s t r i b u t e  p r o f i t s .
Only cooperat ives purport  to turn back year a f t e r  year a l l  o f  
t h e i r  net revenues, i f  a cooperat ive  is a f i r m  dea l ing  a t  arms length  
w ith  customers (not  investor-customers) i t  is extremely  doubtful  th a t  a 
perpetual  p r a c t ic e  o f  turn ing  back a l l  p r o f i t  to  i t s  customers would con­
t r i b u t e  to the growth and success o f  the e n te r p r is e .  I t s  investors would 
not stand f o r  a p o l ic y  whereby no re turn  was paid f o r  the assumption of  
r is k s .  The on ly  s o lu t io n  to  t h is  hypothet ica l  s i t u a t i o n  is the conclu­
sion th a t  i t  cannot and does not e x i s t .  The p r ic e  adjustment,  rebate  
p o s i t io n  or  con trac t  theory and the l i k e  which envisage revenues d i s t r i ­
buted to a c o o p e ra t iv e 's  patrons to be analogous to rebates simply w i l l  
not stand up. I t  is on ly  because a c o o p e ra t iv e 's  "customers” a re  a ls o  
i t s  investors and th a t  residual revenues ( p r o f i t s  and p r ic e  adjustments)  
are  d i s t r ib u t e d  In propor t ion  to the p a t ro n 's  investment in the e n te r ­
p r is e  t h a t  p r o f i t  exhausting " rebates"  e x is t  only  among cooperat ives.
The conclusion must be th a t  patronage refunds are  not s o le ly  rebates and 
a coopera t ive  is not a f i rm  dea l ing  w i th  bonafide customers.
Patronage margins are  in p a r t  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s .  P r o f i t s  
are  measurable as expla ined in chapter two. I f  no corporate income tax  
is lev ied  upon the p r o f i t  p o r t io n  o f  the d i s t r ib u t e d  margins, the coop­
e r a t i v e  e n te r p r is e  is being subsid ized to the e x ten t  o f  such tax advan­
tage, Cooperative spokesmen have chosen to  emphasize the ro le  of  the  
patron as "customer" out of  proport ion  to his  ro le  as an in ves tor ,  a l l  
in the i n t e r e s t  o f  maximizing a f t e r - t a x  corporate cooperat ive  p r o f i t s .
I t  is only  because as an owner he is not dea l ing  with  h imself  a t  arms
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length as a patron;  th a t  a patron is ab le  to  r e a l i z e  p r o f i t  in the form 
o f  a p r ic e  adjustment. Therefore  the moot f a c t  th a t  cooperat ive  gains  
are  d i s t r ib u t e d  according to patronage pursuant to  a p r i o r  contractua l  is 
not in i t s e l f  a reason f o r  concluding th a t  such gains are  not p r o f i t s ,  
thus excluding them from a corporate income tax l i a b i l i t y ,
A second argument used by co-op in t e r e s t s ,  is tha t  the coopera­
t i v e  is an agent f o r  p a t r o n -p r in c ip le s .  Here patronage margins are  viewed 
as the f i n a l  se t t lement  po rt ion  of  a f i rm  p r ic e  in which the agent accounts
to i t s  p r in c ip a l -p a t r o n s  f o r  t ransact ions  which i t  has undertaken. There
can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  some cooperat ives operate  as agencies, as was
pointed out in chapter  two. However i t  is extremely  doubtful  th a t  the 
more s i g n i f i c a n t  cooperat ives operate  in th is  manner. The demands o f  com­
mercia l e f f i c i e n c y  seem to require  th a t  several o f  the p r in c ip a l  tenets  
o f  agency are  v io la te d .
As Magi 11 po in ts  out ,  the essence o f  agency to s e l l : ^ ^
. . . i s  the d e l i v e r y  o f  the goods to a person who is to s e l l
them, not as h is  own property  but as the property  o f  the 
p r i n c i p a l ,  who remains the owner o f  the goods and who th e re ­
fo re  has the r ig h t  to contro l  the s a le ,  to  f i x  the p r ic e  and 
terms, to re c a l l  the goods and to demand and receive t h e i r  
proceeds when s o l d . , . but who has no r ig h t  to a p r ic e  fo r  
them before sa le  or  unless sold by the agent.
Accepting the above d e f i n i t i o n  of  agency we f in d  the fo l lo w in g  p r in c ip le s
necessary f o r  a v a l id  p r i n c i p a 1-agent  re la t io n s h ip .
1. The goods remain the property  o f  the p r in c ip a l  u n t i l  
sold.
^^Roswel1 Magi 11 and A l la n  H. M e r r i l l ,  "The Taxable income of  
C ooperat ives,"  Michigan Law Review. (Dec. 1950), p. .185, " c i t e d  by" 
Lome D. Cook, "An Economic Analysis  o f  the Federal Taxation o f  Income 
from Cooperative E n te rpr ise"  (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n .  Dept, o f  
Economics, U n iv e r s i ty  of  Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1954), p. 186.
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2. The p r in c ip a l  has the r ig h t  to control  the d isp os i t io n  
o f  the goods.
3. The p r in c ip a l  has the r ig h t  to a l l  the proceeds from
his  goods sold by the agent.
4 . The p r in c ip a l  has no r ig h t  to a p r ic e  f o r  the goods
before they leave the agent 's  hands.
None o f  the above e s s e n t ia ls  o f  agency are adhered to by most coopera­
t iv e s .
Genera l ly  the farmers'  products do not remain the property  o f  
the p r in c i p a l - p a t r o n .  True ,  an agent could take legal t i t l e  to such 
goods as t ru s tee  w h i le  the member-patron re ta ined a b e n e f ic ia l  In t e r e s t  
but th is  does not happen in most cooperat ives. What is more s i g n i f i c a n t  
is the v i o l a t i o n  o f  the p r ic in g  p r i n c i p l e  which is i n t e g r a l l y  re la te d  to  
the f i r s t  and t h i r d  p r in c i p le s .  I f  ac tua l  p r ic e s  a re  paid in e i t h e r  a 
marketing or  purchasing cooperat ive  the re la t io n s h ip  is d e f i n i t e l y  one 
of  buyer and s e l l e r  not of  p r in c ip a l - a g e n t .  The co-op in te re s ts  argue 
th a t  such pr ices  are  on ly  t e n t a t i v e  p r ic e s  and th a t  the patronage margins 
c o n s t i tu te  the f i n a l  p o r t ion  o f  a t rue  f i r m  p r ic e .  This is simply not  
t rue .  I f  patronage margins are  t rue  p r ic e  adjustments, overpayments or  
undercharges would require  r e t r o a c t iv e  assessments on the p a r t  o f  the 
a s s o c ia t io n .  Few associa t ions  make such assessments. Instead they 
choose to charge o f f  such costs to surplus accounts. They s ta te  tha t  
such charges, by c re a t in g  a reduction in member e q u i ty  In proport ion to  
patronage,  p e r f e c t l y  a d ju s t  p r ices  to agency p r ic e s .  However th is  argu­
ment is untenable. F i r s t ,  because not a l l  monies o f  a l l  co-ops are  a l l o ­
cated and secondly because revenues and costs are  o f ten  pooled in te rd e ­
p a r tm e n ta l ly ,  In summary, the fo l lo w in g  p r in c ip le s  are  a p p l ic a b le  to  
t y p ic a l  cooperat ive  operat ions.
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1. The goods do not remain the property  o f  the p r in c ip a l  
u n t i l  sold.
2. The p r in c ip a l  o f ten  does receive a f i rm  p r ic e  in the  
form of  a minimum or  maximum p r ic e  before the goods 
leave the a s s o c ia t io n 's  hands.
3. The p r in c ip a l  does not ne c e s s a r i ly  receive a l l  the 
proceeds from the goods sold by the cooperat ive .
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  requirement of  agency from a s t ru c tu ra l  
standpoint  is the second requirement:
The p r in c ip a l  has the r ig h t  to contro l  the d is p o s i t io n  of
the goods.
This requirement implies th a t  an agent must have as his foremost duty  
the g e t t in g  of  the best p r ic e  f o r  his p r i n c i p a l ' s  products o r  the secur­
ing o f  goods f o r  the p r in c ip a l  a t  the lowest poss ib le  cost .  The p r i n c i ­
p a l ,  through c o n t r o l l i n g  the d is p o s i t io n  o f  h is  products or  the purchas­
ing o f  products, serves as a check upon the i n t e g r i t y  o f  the agent.  The 
agent cannot l e g a l l y  perform acts  which a re  incompatible  w i th  the i n t e r ­
es t  o f  h is  p r i n c i p a l .  For example, he cannot be an agent f o r  a buyer o f  
item A and a t  the same time serve as an agent f o r  the s e l l e r  o f  the same 
item. From an economic standpoint  th is  means th a t  a s e l l i n g  agent f o r  
an e n te r p r is e  must have no economic in te r e s ts  outs ide his  employment 
which a re  incompatible with  his  du t ie s .
A cooperat ive  asso c ia t io n  does not a c t  as an agent from an eco­
nomic standpoint .  I t  c a r r ie s  on operations re la ted  to hundreds o f  com­
p e t in g  f i rm s,  i t  pools revenues and costs over i t s  t o ta l  operat ions or  
a t  le a s t  over the m u l t i p le  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  each separate  department. Far­
mer A may want to s e l l  eggs in May y e t  the cooperat ive  may not p lace  his  
eggs on the market u n t i l  June, A q u a r te r  o f  the associated farmers may 
not choose to go in to  petroleum r e f in in g  but m a jo r i ty  rul'es and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 7 1 “
asso c ia t îo n  adds another operat ion .  Such fa c ts  o f  cooperat ive  operat ions  
serve to  emphasize th a t  co-ops e x is t  to minimize the competi t ion among 
i t s  patrons. U n c e r ta in t ie s  are  reduced and h ighe r ,  more s tab le  p r o f i t s  
are  created in the long run. In o ther  words, g e n e ra l ly  a cooperat ive  is 
not an agent f o r  m u l t ip le  farm p r in c i p a ls .  The in te re s ts  o f  the associa­
ted are  incompatible in the market per iod .  The In te r e s ts  are  compatible  
only  when the a s so c ia t ion  serves to reduce com pet i t ion ,  and u n c e r ta in ty  
thereby ra is in g  the in d iv id ua l  p a t ro n 's  p r o f i t s  in the long run. The 
fa c ts  o f  cooperat ive  opera t ion  f i t  b e t t e r  in to  P h i l l i p ' s  mold o f  a 
j o i n t l y  operated p la n t  than in the normally conceived concept o f  agency.  
Cooperatives e x is t  to  reduce competi t ion among t h e i r  patrons; agency 
e x is ts  to c a rry  out competit ion among competing p r i n c i p a l s ,  whose i n t e r ­
ests must coincide w i th  the in te r e s ts  o f  t h e i r  respect ive  agents.
Few cooperat ive  a t to rneys  r e ly  upon the agency theory to support  
the present ta x - t re a tm e n t  o f  cooperat ive  margins. Some cases have been 
argued on the agency basis but f o r  the most p a r t  the rebate arguments 
have p re v a i le d .  In the two cases c i t e d  below the courts did not accept  
the agency theory.
Lake Region Packing Associat ion v. United S ta tes .
Maryland & V i r g i n i a  M i l k  Producers' Associa t ion ,  inc. v.
D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia.
The comment d e l iv e re d  in the l a t t e r  case is q u i te  s i g n i f i c a n t .  In th is  
case u n d is t r ib u te d  earnings had been placed in a revolv ing fund. The 
court  decided th a t :
Lake Region Packing Associat ion v. United S ta te s ,  146 F (2d)
157 (5 th  C i r .  1944) and Maryland & V i r g i n i a  M i lk  Producers' Associa t ion ,  
V .  D i s t r i c t  of Columbia. 119 F (2d) 787 (D. C. C i r .  1941).
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. . . T h e  fund is the corpora t ions '  p ro p er ty ,  and the member's 
in t e r e s t  In i t  is much l i k e  the s tockho lder 's  in te r e s t  in
the surplus of  a stock corpora t ion .
This  dec is ion  serves to p o in t  out th a t  a p a t ro n 's  control over a cooper** 
a t i v e ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  is not s i g n i f i c a n t  enough to q u a l i f y  as a p r in c i p a l "  
agent re la t io n s h ip .
The f i n a l  argument used by co-op spokesmen is the depar tm enta l i ­
za t io n  or  p a r tnersh ip  argument. This concept o f  a cooperat ive  associa­
t io n  has c e r t a in  tax  im pl ica t ions  which vary in importance over t ime.
I t  claims th a t  a cooperat ive  is a j o i n t l y  operated department o f  p a r t i ­
c ip a t in g  farm f i rm s .  The Incorporated cooperat ive  has no income o f  i t s  
own, since i t  is a department o f  many farm f i rm s.  The only  en trepreneur­
ship is farm entrepreneurship and hence the on ly  income is farm income.
Therefore  any tax  should be lev ied  a t  the farm leve l  which is responsib le  
f o r  th a t  income. In b r i e f  the incorporated a s so c ia t ion  is assumed to be 
responsib le  f o r  l i t t l e  o r  none of  the income accruing to  the farm f i rm s.
The cooperat ive  department Is presumed to be analogous to the 
unincorporated departments o f  large in d u s t r ia l  f i rm s .  Since such depart ­
ments do not pay taxes why should the departments o f  farm f irms pay in ­
come taxes? An unsophist icated answer is th a t  one department is incor­
pora ted ,  the o ther  is not. However th is  answer f a l l s  sh o r t ,  f o r  i t  can­
not be denied th a t  a l l  incorporated e n t i t i e s  do not receive the same 
b e n e f i ts  o r  e x ten t  th e re o f  from incorporat ion .  Some incorporated con­
cerns do operate  as departments and the b e n e f i t  o f  incorporat ion in such 
instances is not n e a r ly  as grea t  as when a f i rm  is incorporated. This  
f a c t  is recognized by the Bureau of  In te rn a l  Revenue through provid ing  
f o r  the f i l i n g  o f  consol idated re turns .  Incorporated subs id ia r ie s  whose
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parent  f î rm  h o lds  a t  l e a s t  an e ig h ty  p e rc e n t  c o n t r o l l i n g  In te r e s t  are
presumed to be opera te d  as depar tments  o f  the parent .  A c o n s o l i d a te d
return  can be f i l e d  by p a y in g  a nominal two p e rc e n t  pena lty  charge.
Thus th e  depa r tm e n ta l  n a tu re  o f  such s u b s i d i a r i e s  is  recogn ized.
A c o o p e r a t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n  c o u ld  l o g i c a l l y  be t r e a t e d  in a s i m i l a r
manner thus t a x i n g  p r o f i t s  a t  the  f a r m ^ f 5rm l e v e l .  T h i s  i s  p r e c is e ly
what th e  c o o p e r a t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  b e l i e v e  shou ld  be done. The fo l low ing
comment o f  a c o o p e r a t i v e  a t t o r n e y  Is in t h is  v e i n : ^ ^
You take  an o i l  company o r  a s te e l  company^ those  o i l  com- 
pan ies  and s te e l  companies t r y  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e i r  opera t ions ,  
do th e y  not?  They t r y  t o  be a b le  t o  s u p p ly  t h e i r  own needs 
by e s t a b l i s h i n g  v a r io u s  ch a in s  in  the  l i n k  so th e y  can supply  
themselves w i t h  raw m a t e r i a l s  down t o  the  f i n i s h e d  p ro d u c t .
When th e y  do t h a t ,  nobody com p la ins  because i t  Is  a n o n p r o f i t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f rom  one depar tm en t  o f  t h a t  g r e a t  c o r p o r a t i o n  t o  
th e  o t h e r .  You do n o t  say someth ing  u n f a i r  has been done be­
cause the  U n i te d  S ta te s  S te e l  C o rp o ra t i o n  does n o t  pay Income 
taxes  on what  i t  may have charged f o r  I t s  i r o n  o re  to  i t s  
s m e l t e r s .  You take  i t  f o r  g ra n te d  t h a t  w i l l  be a n o n p r o f i t  
l i n e  of d e a l i n g s .  Here i s  a bunch o f  fa rm ers  o v e r  here who 
a re  c a r r y i n g  on a g r i c u l t u r e  and who need t r a c t o r  f u e l  t o  do 
th e  j o b .  Now they  have s t a r t e d  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  g a s o l i n e  t o  
themselves and t r a c t o r  f u e l  and they  f i n d  o u t  th e y  cou ld  n o t  
g e t  i t .  Then th e y  e s t a b l i s h e d  r e f i n e r i e s .  They found o u t  
t h a t  th e y  c o u ld  no t  g e t  c rude  o i l  f o r  t h e i r  r e f i n e r i e s .  They 
went  back and owned soma o i l  w e l l s .  A l l  in  the  w o r ld  they  
have done i s  e x a c t l y  the  same as eve ry  b ig  c o r p o r a t i o n  in  t h i s  
c o u n t r y  has done. They have t r i e d  to  i n t e g r a t e  t h e i r  a g r i c u l ­
t u r a l  o p e r a t i o n s  and p r o t e c t  t h e i r  economic p o s i t i o n .
There i s  l i t t l e  doub t  t h a t  i n c o rp o r a te d  e n t i t i e s  d e r i v e  d i f f e r i n g  bene­
f i t s  from i n c o r p o r a t i o n .  T h is  f a c t  has been recogn ized by o u r  ta x  p o l i ­
c ies  as mentioned b e fo re .  However t h e r e  a re  two good reasons why coop­
e r a t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  a re  n o t  co n s id e re d  in c o rp o ra te d  depar tments  o f  
t h e i r  p a t r o n ' s  fa rm  f i r m s .  F i r s t ,  t h e re  i s  no a - p r i o r i  reason fo r  assumr 
ing  t h a t  a cooperat ive  o p e ra te s  as a depar tm en t .  Second, th e re  is  much
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evidence t h a t  c o o p e r a t i v e s  do n o t  o p e ra te  as departr ;e r; tSo
A n ç n - c o o p e r a t Î ve p a r e n t  f i r m  t h a t  c o n t r o i s  a t  l e a s t  e i g h t y  p e r -  
ce n t  o f  a s u b s i d i a r y  is  much more l i a b l e  t o  have i n t e g r a te d  ^ c ' a o r d c  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  i t s  s u b s i d i a r y  than a fa rm e r  w i l l  have w i t h  h i c  a s s i e -  
t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  s e p a ra t i o n  o f  ownersh ip  and c o n t r o l .  A 
d i v i s i o n  manager o r  s u b s i d i a r y  p r e s id e n t  w i l l  q u i t e  p r o b a b ly  have g oa ls  
f o r  h i s  u n i t  come down from above. In the  case o f  a c o o p e r a t i v e  a s s o c i ­
a t i o n  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  and ownersh ip  i s  much more p o s s ib l e .  in  the  
l a t t e r  case one i s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s to c k h o ld e r s  and p r o f e s s io n a l  managers, 
in  the  f i r s t  s i t u a t i o n  we a re  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c o n t r o l l i n g  managers and sub­
s e r v i e n t  managers. Granted s e p a r a t i o n  o f  ownersh ip  and c o n t r o l  e x i s t s  
in  the  n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  b u t  t h i s  i s  a n t i c i p a t e d  by the  l e v y in g  o f  
a c o r p o r a te  t a x  upon the  p a r e n t  co rpora t ions .  In b r i e f ,  a c o o p e r a t i v e ’ s 
p a t r o n s  a re  more a k in  t o  s to c k h o ld e r s  o f  a c o r p o r a t i o n  than th e y  a re  t o  
a p a r e n t  c o r p o r a t i o n .  Such s t r u c t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  need no t  e l i m i n a t e  a 
c o o p e r a t i v e  from o p e r a t i n g  on a d e pa r tm en ta l  b a s i s ,  however i t  does 
negate  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  an a - p r i o r i  assumpt ion  t h a t  such o p e r a t i o n  does 
ex i  S t.
The second reason f o r  n o t  r e c o g n iz in g  I n te g r a te d  f s n o - c o o p e r a t i v e  
o p e r a t i o n s  Is t h a t  t h e r e  i s  good reason t o  suspec t  t h a t  such o p e r a t i o n s  
do n o t  e x i s t .  C o n t r a r y  t o  P h i l l i p ’ s b e l i e f ,  a c o q r e n a t i v e ’ s e n t r e p r e ­
n e u rs h ip  need n o t  end a t  the  farm. in  the  beginning, fa rm erc  a s s o c ia te d  
n o t  t o  ta k e  on a d d i t io n a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  bu t  r a t h e r  poo led  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
and thus  inc reased  the  s t a b i l i t y  and l e v e l s  o f  t h e i r  farm incomes. How­
e v e r ,  due t o  the  v e r y  n a tu re  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  i f  th e y  a re  
s u c c e s s fu l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  decrease and the  need t o  " g d '  ccooperat ive t o
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achieve a com pet i t ive  share o f  the n a t io n 's  to ta l  product decreases.
Once non-associated adjusted returns are  equal to associated adjusted  
re tu rn s ,  f u r t h e r  attempts a t  In te g ra t io n  c rea te  a f i r m  out o f  the former 
cooperat ive  department. From th is  po in t  forward farmers decide to mar­
ket and purchase c oo p e ra t iv e ly  not on the basis o f  in tegrated operat ions.  
Instead they trade with  the concern th a t  gives them t h e i r  best re turn  on 
investment, not j u s t  on farm investment. !n the words o f  Cook such re­
turns are  best described as farm-connected re tu rns ,  not as farm returns.  ^5
Once the incorporated cooperat ive  ceases to operate as a m u l t i ­
f i r m  department o r  p la n t  there can be no e q u i ta b le  reason f o r  not tax ing  
f o r  the p r i v i l e g e  o f  in corporat ion  a t  the usual ra tes .  In the l a t t e r  
stages o f  a c o o p era t iv e 's  e vo lu t ion  the advantages o f  incorporat ion  be­
come very important . No longer does the incorporated cooperat ive  d i f f e r  
in corporate  funct ion  from o ther  incorporated f i rm s .  The p r iv i l e g e s  o f  
a l low ing  the a r t i f i c i a l  person to own p ro p er ty ,  e n te r  in to  c o n t ra c t ,  incur  
debt ,  l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  and ease o f  c a p i ta l  a t t r a c t i o n  are j u s t  as impor­
ta n t  to the cooperat ive  as they are  to any incorporated f i rm .
A v a r i a t i o n  o f  the depar tm en ta l iza t io n  argument is the p a r tn e r ­
ship concept. Like the f i r s t  argument i t  s ta tes  th a t  not a l l  incorpor­
ated e n t i t i e s  are a l i k e  in corporate funct ion  or  a t  le a s t  in the degree 
o f  corporate  func t ion .  Here the cooperat ive  Is compared to l im i te d  p a r t ­
nerships. Limited par tnersh ips  are  those In which a s i l e n t  p a r tn e r  en­
jo y s  l im i te d  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  the debts o f  the par tnersh ip .  With the excep­
t io n  o f  th is  one b e n e f i t  of  in corpora t ion ,  a l im i te d  partnersh ip  Is per ­
f e c t l y  analogous to o ther  par tnersh ips .  The ownership and control are
^^Cook, p. 5 6 .
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are  not separated. The incorporated f i rm  does not e x is t  a r t i f i c i a l l y .
In such a par tnersh ip  a general p a r tn e r  who has un l im ited  l i a b i l i t y  must 
manage i t s  operat ions.  This hedges aga ins t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  turn ing  
contro l  o f  the operat ions over to p ro fess iona l  managers, incorporat ion  
serves merely as the a l t e r  ego of  the p a r tn e rs .  I t  is obvious th a t  the 
economic s t ru c tu re  o f  a l im i te d  par tnersh ip  is not analogous to  the eco­
nomic s t ru c tu re  o f  a cooperat ive  a s so c ia t io n .  Hence i t s  a p p l ic a t io n  to  
the development o f  tax p o l ic y  is not a pprop r ia te .
N e i th e r  the d e p a r tm e n ta l iza t io n  or  par tnersh ip  arguments are  a p p l i ­
cable  to contemporary cooperat ives .  In the inception period of  coopera­
t io n  one could speak o f  the cooperat ive  as a department or  p la n t .  Only 
members who would f i t  in to  the departmental scheme o f  operat ions were 
allowed to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the associated a c t i v i t y .  Today anyone can 
t rade  w i th  a cooperat ive .  Membership is a mere f o r m a l i t y .  Any patron  
who trades to any e x te n t  w i th  a cooperat ive  a u to m a t ic a l ly  becomes a mem­
ber,  In f a c t  in some instances he may become a member aga ins t  his  w i l l .
In a d d i t io n ,  pro fess iona l  managers have taken over from p a r t - t im e  farm 
managers. In the in t e r e s t  o f  p ro te c t in g  t h e i r  jobs  they attempt to s a t ­
i s f y  a l l  patrons. Both costs and revenues are pooled, the goal being to  
achieve successful operat ion  on an aggregate not departmental basis .  
Although the la s t  operat ion  is not p er -se  incompatible w i th  departmental  
o p e r a t io n ,  taken to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  degree i t  does become incompatible.
The one-man, one-vote ru le  serves to water  down the importance o f  p a t ro n s ’ 
s p e c i f i c  in te r e s ts  and allows contro l  to  rest  in the hands of profess iona l  
managers. And most important ,  co-op patrons t rade  w i th  a cooperat ive  
w ith  the goal o f  maximizing gross returns not ju s t  farm re turns . They
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ta ke  r . o n - f a m  r i s k s  t o  make non- fa rm  p r o f i t s .
In c o n c lu s io n  P h i l l i p ' s  concep t  o f  a c o o p e r a t i v e  a s s o c ia t i o n  is  
S t a t i c  f rom  a h i s t o r i c a l  s t a n d p o in t .  I f  the  econ>omic env i ronm ent  which 
h i s  t h e o r y  was p r e d i c a te d  upon e x i s t e d  today  t h e r e  would be some b a s is  
in  e q u i t y  f o r  t a x i n g  c o o p e ra t i v e s  as departments; thus l e v y in g  a ta x  on 
the  f a r m - f i r m  l e v e l .  Today th e  v e r y  success o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  
has changed the  economic env i ronm en t .  C onsequen t ly  i t  has a l s o  changed 
a p p l i c a b l e  t a x  p o l i c y  toward  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o o p e ra t i v e s .
No m a t t e r  w h ich  o f  th e  t h r e e  b a s ic  arguments a re  used none o f  
them s u c c e s s f u l l y  e l i m i n a t e  th e  c o r p o r a te  income o f  c o o p e r a t i v e s .  The 
agency argument when a p p l i c a b l e ,  wh ich  i s  se ldom, does e l i m i n a t e  a c o r ­
p o r a te  t a x  l i a b i l i t y ,  Hov^ever, l i t t l e  c o o p e r a t i v e  bus iness  i s  pe r fo rmed  
on a t r u e  agency b a s is .  The reba te  p o i n t  o f  v iew  ( p r i c e  a d ju s tm e n t  o r  
c o n t r a c t  th e o ry )  w h ich  env isages  an arms le n g th  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p a t ­
ron and th e  c o r p o r a te  e n t i t y  is  n o t  v a l i d  and does no t  e l i m i n a t e  c o r p o r ­
a te  p r o f i t s .  F i n a l l y  th e  d e p a r tm e n ta l i z a t î o n  p o s i t i o n  which c o r r e c t l y  
d e s c r ib e s  the  economic s t r u c t u r e  o f  c o o p e ra t i v e s  ( m u l t i - f i n e  p l a n t )  d u r ­
ing  t h e i r  i n c e p t i o n  p e r io d  i s  o f  moot s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  d e v e lo p in g  e q u i t ­
a b le  t a x  p o l i c y  in  th e  c o n te c p o ra r y  s e t t i n g .
i f  non- fa rm  in c o r p o r a t e d  f i r m s  pay f o r  the  p r i v i l e g e  o f  i n c o r ­
p o r a t i o n  th e re  would  seem to  be no reason in  e q u i t y  f o r  exempt ing i n c o r ­
p o ra te d  c o o p e r a t i v e  f i r m s  f rom  p a y in g  th e  same c o s t  f o r  th e  same p r i v i ­
lege ,  In c o n c lu s io n  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  arguments used by c o o p e r a t i v e  i n t e r ­
e s t s  t o  j u s t i f y  the  e x c lu s io n  o f  p a t ronage  marg ins  from c o r p o r a te  ta x a ­
t i o n  do n o t  accomo1 ish  th e  t a s k  s e t  b e fo re  them.
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CHAPTER IV 
PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS
Evaluat ion o f  Proposals
Before the b e n e f i ts  and d e f ic ie n c ie s  o f  any proposed change in 
p u b l ic  p o l ic y  can be evaluated one must show a need f o r  change. The 
need becomes an end w h i le  various proposals serve as means of  d i f f e r i n g  
competence. A need can be demonstrated in two basic  ways.
1. One can show th a t  the o r ig in a l  p o l ic y  was inappropr ia te .
2. One can show th a t  new condit ions have outdated once
a p prop r ia te  p o l i cy.
I t  is the l a t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  which is most a p p l ic a b le  to the problem a t  
hand. However since i t  is a changing economic environment which requires  
a change in p u b l ic  p o l ic y  toward farm cooperat ives ,  economists are  faced
with  a very  thorny perennia l  problem. That  is to say, they are faced
with the problem o f  measurement. Not only  is i t  d i f f i c u l t  to measure 
cooperat ive  p r o f i t s ,  i t  is even more d i f f i c u l t  to  measure changes in mar­
ket  s t ru c tu re s .  St is th is  two pronged problem o f  measurement which has 
led to much confusion in the cooperat ive  tax issue.
The problem of measuring cooperat ive  p r o f i t s  was examined in Chap­
t e r  Two, Likewise the measurement o f  b e n e f i ts  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to incorpor­
a t io n  has bean discussed. The one measurement problem which has not been 
emphasized is the measurement o f  resource a l lo c a t i o n .  Before examining 
the various proposals a word on optimal resource a l lo c a t i o n  seems appro-
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p r i a t e ,
in a ser ies  o f  a r t i c l e s  appearing in the 1952 Journal o f  Farm 
Economics the l a t t e r  problem was a t tacked by two economists, C lark  and 
A iz s i In ie k s .  C la rk  examined four  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  markets to d e te r ­
mine whether on an a - p r i o r i  basis coopera t ives ,  in contras t  to p r iv a t e  
f i r m s ,  led to optimal resource a l lo c a t i o n .  C la r k 's  score sheet fo r  
cooperat ive  operat ions is reproduced below.
Case 1. Pure Competit ion in Buying and S e l l in g .
Punch: P r iv a t e  Firm:
Mkt; P r iv a te  Fi rm:
Case 2. Monopol is t ic  S e l l i n g ,  Competit ive Buying.
Punch: Indeterminate:
Mkt: Indeterminate:
(More probable  th a t  f i r m  leads 
to optimum a l l o c a t i o n . )
Case 3. Competit ive S e l l i n g ,  Monopsonistic Purchasing.
Purch: P r iv a te  Firm:
Mkt: Indeterminate:
(More probable th a t  co-op leads 
to optimum a l l o c a t i o n . )




(More probable th a t  f i rm  leads 
to optimum a l l o c a t i o n . )
Indeterminate:
(Same as above.)
Eugene C la r k ,  "Farmer Cooperatives 6- Economic W e l fa re ,  Jcurna 1 
o f  Farm Economics. XXXIV (F e b . ,  1952), 35-51;  and Arnolds P. A i z s i l n i e k s ,  
"Farmer Cooperatives S- Economic W e l fa re ,  Journal of  Farm Economics.
XXXIV (Aug.,  1952), 400-403.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 8 0 -
A iz s M n e ik s  challenged C la r k 's  assumptions regarding ra t io n a l  coopera­
t i v e  operat ions and market s t ru c tu re s ,  concluding th a t  none of  C la r k 's  
conclusions were v a l id .  In the w r i t e r s  opinion A iz s i ln e ik s  made some 
serious mistakes and C la rk  won the debate. However, regard less o f  who 
won, C la rk  did r e a l i z e  the l i m i t a t i o n s  of  his armchair a n a ly s is .  He 
po in ts  out th a t  one must assume tha t  contemporary cooperatives operate  
to  maximize farm re tu rn s ,  i f  h is  ana ly s is  is to be usefu l .  Secondly,  
even I f  th is  assumption is v a l i d ,  not a l l  cooperatives operate  in s im i­
l a r  market environments. Therefore  C la r k 's  t a l l y  sheet o f  f i rm  and co-op 
operat ions  has d i f f e r i n g  meaning depending upon the assumed d ispers ion  
o f  co-op operat ions among d i f f e r i n g  market s i t u a t io n s .  Since th is  ser ies  
o f  a r t i c l e s  c o n s t i tu te s  a large p o r t io n  o f  published works on coopera­
t iv e s  and w e l fa re  economics, I t  would seem th a t  the l i t e r a t u r e  c o n t r i ­
butes l i t t l e  in a form which is adaptable  to p o l ic y  form ula t ion .  Coop­
e r a t i v e s  may or may not operate in a manner cons is tent  with optimal  
a l l o c a t i o n  of  resources. The markets in which they operate  determine  
the degree to which cooperat ive  operat ion  is consis tent  with  optimal 
a l l o c a t i o n  of  resources.
But C lark  does touch upon an assumption which is p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  to the w r i t e r .  He po ints  out tha t  contemporary cooperatives  
need not operate  in a manner d i f f e r i n g  from the operations o f  p r iv a t e  
f i rm s .  To the e x ten t  th a t  th is  p r a c t ic e  p e r s is ts  there can be no reason 
on soc ia l  grounds f o r  tax ing  cooperatives a t  a lower rate  than tha t  a p p l i ­
cable  to incorporated f i rms.  In s h o r t ,  he h i ts  upon the idea which has 
been emphasized and extended in th is  thes is .
I f  the very success of  cooperat ive  operat ions over the la s t  h a l f
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century  has changed the goals o f  cooperators from bonafide co-op goals  
to  non-co-op goals ,  there  is good reason to adopt tax  p o l ic y  toward coop­
e r a t i v e s  which is more ak in  to non-co-op tax p o l ic y .  The w r i t e r ' s  thes is  
is th a t  the very success o f  co-op operat ions has changed t h e i r  o r ig in a l  
fu n c t io n .  In the p a s t ,  cooperatives maximized farm p r o f i t s ;  today th is  
need not be t rue .  Probably many coopera t ives ,  depending upon market 
environments, operate  as f i rms maximizing farm-connected ra th e r  than farm 
p r o f i t s .  The degree to which th is  change has swamped bonafide coopera­
t i v e  goals is unknown. Adequate data is not a v a i l a b le .  However, in ob­
serving general t rends,  f a i r  minded men must admit th a t  two s i g n i f i c a n t  
changes a f f e c t i n g  cooperat ives have taken place  in the la s t  h a l f  century.  
F i r s t ,  cooperat ives have experienced success and th e re fo re  have expanded 
the ex ten t  o f  t h e i r  operat ions.  Second, much of  the monopsonistic and 
monopoly power p re v io u s ly  faced by farmers has been m it ig a te d  through 
the expanded ro le  o f  government regu la t io n .  Given the assumptions o f  
th is  the s is  regarding adjusted returns re la t io n s h ip s  in f irms and non- 
f i rms i t  would appear th a t  tax  p o l ic y  toward cooperatives should be 
a l t e r e d .  The proper degree o f  change depends upon data not p re s en t ly  
a v a i l a b le .  I t  is w i th  th is  important f a c t  in mind th a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  tax  
proposals should be examined. The present  tax  treatment o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
cooperat ives*  earnings is u n fa i r .  The p r e c is e ly  proper tax p o l ic y  toward 
farm cooperat ives is n e c e s s a r i ly  an unknown fa c to r .  But on an a - p r i o r i  
basis the economic f a c t  o f  a changing economy s tro ng ly  suggests the need 
f o r  p o l i c y  changes. The attempts th a t  have been made to c rea te  a more 
e q u i ta b le  tax p o l ic y  w i l l  now be appraised.
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Analysis  o f  Proposals
None o f  the more p r a c t ic a l  proposals ,  the removal o f  Section 521 
excepted,  are  completely  cons is tent  w i th  the economic nature o f  the  coop­
e r a t i v e  a s s o c ia t io n .  N e i th e r  do such proposals guarantee a complete 
s o l u t i o n , t o  the present  in eq u i ta b le  t a x  s u b s id iza t io n  o f  farm coopera­
t iv e s .  Frcxn a ra th e r  negat ive  approach, the e l im in a t io n  o f  the corpor­
a te  income tax would be cons is ten t  w i th  the c o o p era t ive 's  economic s t ru c ­
tu re  and would end the present  d is c r im in a t io n  toward non-cooperative cor­
pora t ions .  However the w r i t e r  is o f  the opinion th a t  corporat ions w i l l  
continue to  be taxed. C e r t a in ly  pu b l ic  opinion is a force  o f  no mean 
importance when considering p o l ic y  problems; th e re fo re  the e l im in a t io n  
o f  the corporate  income tax  w i l l  be considered a moot p o s s i b i l i t y .  For  
two reasons, only  p o s i t i v e  approaches w i l l  receive  a t t e n t io n .  F i r s t ,  
they w i l l  c rea te  a more e q u i ta b le  s i t u a t io n  than th a t  p re s en t ly  e x i s t i n g .  
Second, i t  is more f e a s ib le  p o l i t i c a l l y  th a t  such proposals may be 
adopted.
A card ina l  p r in c ip a l  o f  e q u i ty  is th a t  l ik e s  be t rea te d  a l i k e .
T h e re fo re ,  since the value o f  incorporat ion appears to be equal between
cooperat ives and o th e r  corpora t ion s ,  both types o f  e n te rp r is e  should be
taxed a t  the same rates on p r o f i t s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to th is  p r i v i l e g e .  The
p r in c ip a l  is c l e a r  c u t ,  i t s  a p p l ic a t io n  d i f f i c u l t .  Cook recognizes the
problem o f  a p p l ic a t io n  thus.^7
Because o f  the methods of  o rgan izat ion  and operat ion inherent  
in the cooperat ive  way o f  doing business, i t  must be conceded 
t h a t  i t  V'jould be a d m in i s t r a t iv e ly  impract icable  to attempt to  
tax  e f f e c t i v e l y  cooperatives in such a way as to make taxa t ion
&7cook, p. 264.
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o f  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  e q u i v a le n t  t o  the  t a x a t i o n  o f  th e  p r o f i t s  
o f  an o r d i n a r y  c o r p o r a t i o n .
S in ce  a c o o p e r a t i v e ' s  s to c k h o ld e r s  a re  a l s o  i t s  " c u s to m e rs "  i t  is  n e a r l y  
im p o s s ib le  and c e r t a i n l y  im p r a c t i c a b le  t o  de te rm in e  where p r i c e  a d j u s t ­
ments end and c o r p o r a te  p r o f i t  beg ins .  C onsequen t ly  the  two types  o f  
p o s i t i v e  p ro p o s a ls  t h a t  w i l l  be d iscussed  do n o t  a t te m p t  to  p r e c i s e l y  
tax a c o o p e r a t i v e ' s  incarne. One type  wC'uld t a x  a l l  m a rg in s ,  r e ta in e d  
and d i s t r i b u t e d ,  as i f  th e y  were a k in  t o  c o r p o r a te  p r o f i t s .  The o th e r  
t yp e  ViTOuld t a x  o n l y  u n d i s t r i b u t e d  m arg ins .  The l a t t e r  p roposa l  i s  based 
on th e  assumpt ion  t h a t  r e ta i n e d  marg ins  a re  more a k in  t o  c o r p o r a te  p r o ­
f i t s  than n o n - r e ta i n e d  m arg ins ,^®
Both groups o f  p ro p o s a ls  do n o t  a t  temp: t  t o  c o m p le te l y  seg rega te  
p r o f i t s  f rom p r i c e  a d ju s tm e n ts .  However, bo th  s e ts  o f  p ro p o s a ls  a re  
aimed a t  s q u e lc h in g  th e  p r e s e n t  expans ion  o f  fa rm c o o p e ra t i v e s  on t a x -  
f r e e  p r o f i t s .
In o r d e r  t o  a c q u i r e  an adequate  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  the  problems 
in h e r e n t  in  f i n d i n g  a p r o p e r  c o o p e r a t i v e  ta x  base, the  proposed e l i m i ­
n a t i o n  o f  S e c t io n  521 w i l l  be th e  i n i t i a l  p roposa l  examined. T h is  is  
the  only  proposed change which has any b i l a t e r a l  s u p p o r t .  The coopera­
t i v e  I n t e r e s t s  have f r e q u e n t l y  recommended i t s  removal in  o rd e r  t o  s t e e r  
c o n t r o v e r s y  away f rom  th e  main i s s u e ,  pa t ronage  marg ins .  The " a n t i - c o - o p "  
i n t e r e s t s  have recomo-jrided i t s  remova l ,  s in c e  S e c t io n  521 c l e a r l y  p r o v id e s  
a t a x  lo o p h o le .  Ex traneous revenues a re  c l e a r l y  income t o  the  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  
n o t  reba tes  o r  cc-st a d ju s tm e n ts  t o  member-patrsns. Consequent ly  such 
revenues shou ld  be taxed in  a manner analogous t o  the  t a x a t i o n  o f  o r d i ­
n a r y  c o r p o r a te  income. A ls o  d iv id e n d s  p a id  on c a p i t a l  s to c k  more c l o s e l y
68cook,  p, 271,
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resemble a d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  p r o f i t  than in t e r e s t  payments, an opera t ing  
expense. Genera l ly  such payments are  d i s t r ib u t e d  only  upon the decis ion  
o f  e i t h e r  the board o f  d i re c to r s  o r  the cooperat ive  m a n a g e r . H e n c e  
they a re  not analogous to  f ix e d  in t e r e s t  payments which r i g h t f u l l y  are  a 
de du ct ib le  item f o r  a l l  businesses. Co“op spokesmen o f ten  cla im such 
payments are  merely d i s t r i b u t i o n s  to  minimize d i s p r o p o r t io n a l i t i e s  in 
c a p i ta l  c o n t r ib u t io n s  o f  co-op patrons. I f  th is  is so, a - p r i o r i ,  the 
payments would have to be made on a cont inuing bas is .  This  p r a c t ic e  is 
not notab le  in many cooperat ive  operat ions.  In b r i e f ,  both dividends on 
stock and extraneous income are cooperat ive  corporate income. In both 
examples the income is measurable on a card ina l  s c a le ,  th e re fo re  no pro­
blem a r is e s  in applying our basic  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u i ty ;  l ik e s  must be 
t re a te d  a l i k e .  However, i t  ts obvious to anyone who has studied the 
co-op tax controversy th a t  the s p e c i f i c  exemption is but a minute por­
t io n  o f  the tax  issue. Once one moves in to  the world o f  non-adverse i n t ­
e r e s t ,  a ca rd ina l  tax  base no longer e x is ts  and e q u i ta b le  proposals be­
come extremely  d i f f i c u l t  to  d r a f t .
Although patronage margins do not ne c e ss a r i ly  measure p r o f i t s ,  
some lobbies have suggested th a t  patronage margins be taxed a t  the cor­
p o ra te ,  o r  corporate and personal le v e ls .  Such proposals are made on the  
assumption tha t  tax ing  cooperat ives is more a m atter  o f  strengthening com­
p e t i t i o n  than o f  e n la rg ing  the sources o f  federa l  revenue. The important  
g o a l ,  here ,  is to separate  from the coop era t iv e 's  contro l  (manager and/or
Lyman S. H u lb e r t ,  Legal Phases o f  Cooperative A ss o c ia t io n s . U.S. 
Dept, o f  A g r ic u l tu re  FCA B u l l e t i n  No. 50 (Washington: U,S.Government 
P r in t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1942), p. 404,
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board o f  d i re c to r s )  corporate t a x - f r e e  margins. The Nat ional Associa­
t io n  o f  Manufacturers, the Nat ional Tax E q u a l i ty  Associat ion and Pro­
fessor  Guthmann are  adherents o f  th is  p o s i t io n .  I t  is the c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  
o f  t a x - f r e e  p r o f i t s  ra th e r  than the actual  earning o f  cooperat ive  p r o f i t s  
t h a t  these people o b je c t  strenuously  t o . 70 Looked a t  from the goal of  
maximizing federa l  revenues, tax ing  patronage margins is a second ra te  
proposal as Bradley has e m p h a s i z e d . 71 There can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t  
farm cooperatives faced with  the proposed taxa t ion  o f  patronage margins 
could and would p r ic e  away these margins to a large ex ten t .  I f  a pur­
chasing cooperat ive  p r e c is e ly  est imates i t s  inventory and operat ing  
costs the patron would receive his  p r o f i t  through a reduced cost of  goods 
purchased. On the o ther  hand the marketing associa t ion  could pay higher  
than p r e v a i l in g  p r ices  thus d i s t r i b u t i n g  p r o f i t  through i n i t i a l  ra th er  
than f i n a l  payments. By adopting such ta c t i c s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of  
margins would appear and the p a t ro n 's  corporate p r o f i t  would be dove­
t a i l e d  in to  personal income to be taxed at presumably lower personal rates.
On the Surface such a ta x a t io n  p o l ic y  would seem to be s e l f  d e fe a t ­
ing. By a t tempting to tax margins, the margins are  e l im inated  and conSe^ 
quent ly  the cooperat ive  s t i l l  has t a x - f r e e  income to expand on. But as 
p re v io u s ly  implied there is a major f a l l a c y  in th is  conclusion. Under 
the cons truc t iv e  re c e ip t  and reinvestment theory farm-patrons were pre ­
sumed to v o l u n t a r i l y  associa te  and agree to the p o l ic ie s  o f  t h e i r  e lected  
board o f  d i r e c to r s  and manager. I f  ownership and control are  separated,
7^House Ways and Means Committee, H e a r in g s . May 25,  1961, 
7*Brad1ey ,  Harvard Business Review. XXV, 1947, p. 578.
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whîch is undoubtedly the case In some cooperat ives ,  voluntarism is a f i c ­
t io n .  Consequently i f  the cooperat ive  is forced by the th r e a t  o f  corpor­
a te  ta x a t io n  to minimize margins, the patron has increased his control  
over h is  corporate earnings. In economic markets where the cooperat ive  
has powers associated w i th  imperfect com pet i t ion ,  i t  would no longer be 
a b le  to fo rce  patrons to  pay personal taxes on funds which remained in­
v o l u n t a r i l y  in the a s s o c ia t io n 's  hands. More important,  those responsi­
b le  f o r  the a s s o c ia t io n 's  p o l i c ie s  would have to go before the members
and secure approval o f  assessments i f  growth was des ired .  A l l  members
would a c t u a l l y  have the choice o f  decid ing where the return  on such funds 
was the highest  -  a t  the farm, in the cooperat ive  or  in non-farm in ve s t ­
ments. I t  is p r e c is e ly  th is  choice which is e s se n t ia l  to  P h i l l i p s '  the­
ory o f  cooperat ive  operat ions.  He assumed a non-monopsonistic coopera­
t i v e  where the des ires  o f  patrons were a u to m a t ic a l ly  t ransm it ted  to and 
made opera t iona l  by co-op d i r e c to r s  and managers. C e r ta in ly  many cooper­
a t iv e s  have evolved in to  a stage less in d ic a t iv e  o f  th is  "pure democracy" 
than was presumed by the Treasury previous to I960. in summary, the 
above proposal would tend to  force  cooperatives to operate on a more
e q u i ta b le  bas is ,  and to  the e x ten t  th a t  the t a i l  wags the dog, growth
on t a x - f r e e  earnings would be slowed down.
Contrary to Cook, Guthmann views the above proposal as an e q u i t ­
ab le  s o lu t io n  to  the present d i s c r i m i n â t icn in favor  o f  cooperatives.
To the ex ten t  th a t  cooperat ives succeeded In p r ic in g  out margins, mem­
bers would gain d i r e c t  control  over t h e i r  co-op's  operat ions.  In add i­
t i o n ,  i n i t i a l  p r ices  would become f i n a l  p r ices  and Competit ion would be 
less d is c r e e t  than a t  present.  In sum, competit ion is a t  the corporate
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l e v e l ,  not a t  the personal l e v e l .  Taxat ion o f  margins would more e f f e c ­
t i v e l y  e l im in a te  subsid ized competi t ion than any more complex proposal.  
Guthmann presents th is  p o s i t io n  as f o l l o w s : ? ^
The d i r e c t  lowering o f  the cooperat ive s e l l i n g  p r ic e  ra ther  than 
the payment o f  patronage dividends would, as a matter  o f  f a c t ,  
make f o r  f a i r e r  and more s t ra ig h t - fo r w a r d  competit ion and a 
c l e a r e r  demonstration o f  the r e l a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the coopera­
t i v e  and o th e r  competing business u n i ts .  Consumers would make 
d i r e c t  comparisons o f  the pr ices  paid when dea l ing  with  the two 
types o f  o rg a n iza t io n .  Under the present system, the cooperat ive  
member never knows the exact p r ic e  he is paying a t  the time of  
purchase because the patronage dividend is in the fu tu re  and, of  
course, i t  may never a c t u a l l y  m a te r ia l i z e .  This element o f  doubt 
comes very c lose to an u n fa i r  t rade p r a c t ic e  in th a t  i t  holds out  
uncerta in  fu tu r e  patronage dividends as a lure  f o r  business.
D i r e c t  p r ic e  reduct ions by cooperat ives w i l l  make f o r  c le a rc u t  
ccxnpeti t io n .
Guthmann is one o f  few who is w i l l i n g  to  face the p r ic in g  out problem.
He does not b e l ie v e  th a t  i n i t i a l l y  adjusted cooperat ive  p r ices  w i l l  be 
ruinous to  competing e n te r p r is e .  On the con tra ry  he be l ieves  th a t  p r i c ­
ing out o f  margins w i l l  e l im in a te  the present  u n f a i r  "product d i f f e r e n t i ­
a t io n "  used by cooperat ives.  However, there e x is ts  a much more dominant 
opinion t h a t  the p r ic in g  out phenomena should be avoided. In order to 
bypass th is  problem, a corporate tax would be lev ied on ly  on u n d i s t r i ­
buted margins. This type o f  p o l ic y  has been proposed by the United States  
Treasury Department and by Cook.
The Treasury Department 's H. R. 78/5  is the most recent proposal  
f o r  changing the ta x  s ta tus  o f  farm cooperat ives.  The b i l l  has three  
o b je c t iv e s .
1. Decrease the ex ten t  o f  cooperat ive  expansion on corporate  
t a x - f r e e  earnings.
2. Guarantee the r e l a t i v e l y  c urren t  tax a t io n  of  margins e i t h e r
Commer c ia l  and F inanc ia l  C h ro n ic le . January 11, 1951, p. 37. 
"Competi t ion From Tax Exempt Business".
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a t  the personal or  corporate  le v e l .
3. Avoid the p r ic in g  out t a c t i c  by taxing only u n d i s t r i ­
buted margins.
The t reasury  proposal is obviously  a compromise. I t  attempts to weaken 
the d is c r im in a t io n  aga ins t  non-cooperatives but goes only  f a r  enough to  
tone down the controversy. I t  is e s s e n t i a l l y  an attempt to make the 1951 
law e f f e c t i v e .  The In te n t io n  o f  compromise is c l e a r l y  brought out by the 
fo l lo w in g  statement o f  the A ss is ta n t  Secretary  o f  Treasury ,  Jay W. Glass-  
mann.
The Treasury proposal seeks to s t r i k e  a f a i r  balance by 
imposing one s in g le  tax on cooperat ive  earnings and by 
p e rm it t in g  cooperatives to r e ta in  earnings f o r  3 years 
with  no tax a t  the cooperat ive  or  patron l e v e l . . . . W e  be­
l i e v e  tha t  i t  provides s u f f i c i e n t  opportun i ty  to accumu­
la t e  a reasonable reserve out o f  t a x - f r e e  earnings. Thus,  
i f  a cooperat ive  earns 10 percent  per  year on i t s  e q u i ty ,  
before taxes and patronage refunds, i t  could c o n t in u a l ly  
r e ta in  as much as 30 percent o f  i t s  beginning e q u i ty  by a 
3 -y e a r  ro ta t io n  o f  i t s  noncash patronage refunds.
Not only  is a three year revo lv ing  per iod o f  t a x - f r e e  funds a l lowed,  but 
in a d d i t io n  the s p e c i f i c  exemption is only  i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  amended. Div­
idends on stock and extraneous Income when d is t r ib u t e d  to patrons w i th in  
three years are not taxab le  to the cooperat ive.
Under the t reasury  provis ions margins are  excluded from the coop­
e r a t i v e s '  income i f  paid in cash a t  the end of  the f i s c a l  year; or  i f  
paid in scr ip  conta in ing  an unconditional promise to redeem in three  
years or  less a t  face value with in te r e s t  a t  no less than four  percent.  
This  requirement allows a cooperative three years to expand on t a x - f r e e  
earnings ra th er  than the e ig h t  to ten years found in many cooperatives  
a t  present .  I t  is d e f i n i t e l y  a step in the r ig h t  d i re c t io n .  I t  is a lso
73houS0 Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings, I 9 6 O, p. 14.
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more e q u i ta b le  toward the farm-patron than the present system Is . The 
"c a p t iv e "  patron must receive his  margins immediately or  be paid in te r e s t  
on such revenue, which in t e r e s t  and p r in c ip a l  w i l l  be returned w i th in  
three years. Patrons pay tax only upon cash d i s t r ib u t io n s .  When "nego-  
t i a b l e "  scr ip  is issued the personal tax l i a b i l i t y  is suspended u n t i l  
the scr ip  is redeemed. 5f not redeemed w i th in  three years ,  the coopera** 
t i v e  must pay a corporate  tax  on such re ta ined revenues. Consequently 
the patron pays a tax  on ly  on funds completely  under his  c o n t r o l ,  and 
the problem of  determining market value is avoided.
F i n a l l y ,  a t  the expense of  a l low ing  the cooperat ive  to use ta x -  
f r e e  funds f o r  three years ,  the p r ic in g  out problem is avoided. There  
can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  th is  proposal would insure the approximate cur­
rent  tax a t io n  o f  cooperat ive  margins e i t h e r  a t  the personal o r  coopera­
t i v e  le v e l .  The ex ten t  to  which t h i s  proposal Is super ior  or  i n f e r i o r  to 
a d i r e c t  tax  on a l l  patronage margins depends upon the degree o f  separa­
t io n  o f  contro l  and ownership in cooperatives and the a b i l i t y  o f  coop­
e r a t iv e s  to p r ic e  out t h e i r  margins.
Cook's proposal is a p ioneer  work preceding H. R, 7875 and is not 
as e x t e r n a l l y  o r ie n te d  as the Treasury B i l l .  That i s ,  more leeway is 
allowed f o r  cooperatives and t h e i r  patrons to e q u i ta b ly  work out t h e i r  
owt so lu t ions  to the problem of  c o n t ro l .  But, in essent ia l  goals i t  does 
not d i f f e r  s u b s t a n t ia l l y  from the Treasury Proposal.
In contras t  to H. R. 7875 i t  would l e v y  a personal income tax  on 
m arg ins  on an absolute curren t  basis . A l l  negot iab le  scr ip  would be 
taxed dur sr.g the year  in  which earned. Bonafide p r e f e r r e d  stock would 
a l s o  be taxed when issued. D is p a r i t i e s  between face value and redemption
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value would be picked up through c a p i ta l  gains or  losses. Unl ike  the 
Treasury Proposal,  margins would not have to  be recognized by a 4 percent ,  
3 year debt instrument. Debt instruments negot iab le  w i th in  the meaning 
of  the In terna l  Revenue Code 118, Sec 39. 4 2 - 1 - 2 - 3 -  would be excluded 
from gross corporate income. jn a d d i t io n ,  i f  the option to receive cash 
or  bonafide p re fe r re d  stock Is g iven,  the issuance o f  such s e c u r i t ie s  
w i l l  exclude the represented margins from a corporate tax l i a b i l i t y ,  pro­
vided a l i k e  amount o f  s e c u r i t i e s  Is r e t i r e d .  The la s t  d i f fe re n c e  be­
tween the Cook and Treasury Proposals is th a t  Cook would repeal Section  
521.
L ike  H. R. 7875> Cook's proposal would give the patrons more con­
t r o l  over the a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  funds. In con tra s t  to the Treasury  
B i l l  no a r b i t r a r y  f l o o r  is se t  f o r  in te r e s t  rates o r  m a tu r i ty  dates.  
However, cooperat ives could exclude revenues from t h e i r  gross i n “.ome 
on ly  i f  bonafide debt and e q u i ty  instruments are issued in l ieu  of  those 
revenues. Since the revolv ing per iod is l e f t  to  the pa tron 's  d i s c r e t io n .  
Cook's proposal is more a p p l ic a b le  to the economic nature o f  a coopera­
t i v e  than H. R. 7875* Of course th is  v i r t u e  is somewhat weakened by a 
poss ib le  la rg e r  evasion of  corporate taxes than would be possib le  under 
the Treasury Plan. In some instances the removal o f  the s p e c i f ic  exemp­
t io n  sect ion might decrease to a substan t ia l  degree the importance o f  
th is  p o s s i b i l i t y .  However, to the ex ten t  th a t  separat ion o f  control and 
ownership is a major issue.  Cook's plan would reduce by a s im i l a r  amount 
the expansion on t a x - f r e e  earnings which H. R. 7875 attempts to stymie.
Faced with  the problem of  an u n s a t is fa c to ry  income tax base sev­
e ra l  non-income bases have been suggested. Two such bases have l i t t l e
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to  recommend them. Both a gross rece ip ts  tax and a tax  on investment  
would c re a te  serious in e q u i t ie s .  Gross rece ip ts  o f  a cooperat ive  are  
not eq u iva len t  to sales in o ther  e n te rp r is e s .  Hence the tax would c l e a r -  
l y  be in eq u i tab le  toward cooperat ives.  In a d d i t io n  i t  would c rea te  ineq­
u i t i e s  among d i f f e r e n t  types o f  farm cooperat ives.  Likewise a tax on 
cooperat ive  investment In con tra s t  to a tax on o rd inary  corporat ion  in­
come would be in e q u i ta b le .  For example c i t r u s  cooperatives w i th  high 
investment per d o l l a r  o f  p r o f i t  would bear a tax  load d isp ro p o r t io n a te  
to  th a t  o f  a 1 ivestock as so c ia t ion .  Needless to say, such proposals  
have not been taken s e r io u s ly .  No b i l l  in Congress has ever been d r a f te d  
along the above l ines .  The fo l low ing  statement expresses the ineptness 
of such proposa Is .  7^
I t  w o u ld . . .  be impossible to s e le c t  any one ra te  o f  tax  
on gross sales which would be approximately  equ iva len t  
to a corporate income tax on the economic income earned 
by cooperat ives .  The amount o f  net income earned on a 
d o l l a r  o f  gross sales v a r ies  w ide ly  among manufacturers,  
wholesa lers ,  and r e t a i l e r s  in d i f f e r e n t  l ines  and among 
f i rms in the same l i n e .  Attempts to s e le c t  d i f f e r e n t  
rates f o r  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  cooperatives would re su l t  
in great  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and would s t i l l  leave the equ i ty  
problem unsolved in b o rd e r l in e  cases. Moreover, i t  is 
g e n e r a l ly  agreed th a t  a gross rece ip ts  tax is more l i k e l y  
to  be passed on to  consumers than is a net income tax ,  
and, a t  le a s t  in the case o f  la r g e r  marketing asso c ia t ions ,  
the tax might f a i l  to  achieve i t s  o b je c t iv e .
Another a l t e r n a t i v e  tax  is one based on invested c a p i t a l .
As in the case o f  a gross receip ts  ta x ,  the s e lec t ion  of  
a r a te  th a t  would approximate a tax on net income would be 
d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not impossible. Moreover, a tax on invested  
c a p i ta l  would bear more h e a v i ly  on weak cooperatives than 
on strong and successful associa t ions .  Such a tax would 
give  r is e  to serious a d m in is t r a t iv e  and legal problems in
7^ h e  Taxation o f  Farmers' Cooperative A sso c ia t ions . U. S, Trea­
sury Department, D iv is io n  o f  Tax Research, Mimeographed October 1947, 
p. 7. "C i ted  by" P a t te rson ,  The Tax Exemption o f  Cooperat ives, p. 99.
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co n n e c t io n  w i t h  the  d e f i n i t i o n  and v a l u a t i o n  o f  inves ted  
ca p i  t a l .
No method seems to  e x i s t  whereby the  p r o f i t s  o f  a c o o p e ra t i v e  c o r ­
p o r a t i o n  c o u ld  be p r e c i s e l y  measured. S ince  o n ly  some c o o p e ra t i v e s  charge 
and buy a t  p r e v a i l i n g  p r i c e s ,  marg ins  a re  n o t  a lways p e r f e c t l y  analogous 
t o  c o r p o r a te  p r o f i t s .  However a p o r t i o n  o f  such marg ins  do re p re se n t  p r o ­
f i t s ,  To seg rega te  such p r o f i t s  from p r i c e  a d ju s tm e n ts  is  im poss ib le .  
T ax ing  a l l  marg ins  as i f  th e y  a re  p r o f i t s  leads t o  the  p r i c i n g  ou t  pheno­
mena, On the  o t h e r  hand by t a x i n g  o n l y  n o n - q u a H f i e d  re ta in e d  marg ins  
c o o p e r a t i v e s  a re  d i r e c t l y  a l lo w e d  t o  expand on the  t a x - f r e e  inccf te i n t e ­
g ra te d  in  such r e t a i n s ,  A p e r f e c t  method o f  t a x i n g  c o o p e ra t i v e  income 
canno t  e x i s t .  However, a l l  o f  th e  p r a c t i c a l  p ro p o s a ls  d iscussed  would 
decrease the  p re s e n t  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  o p e r a t i o n s .  Which 
method is  b e s t  is  an open q u e s t io n  which the  w r i t e r  i s  no t  p repa red  t o  
answer.
Thes is  Summary S ta tement  
W i th o u t  q u e s t io n  fa  mi c o o p e ra t i v e s  a re  n o n - p r o f i t  bus inesses o n l y  
in  a v e r y  l i m i t e d  sense. Fo r  the  most p a r t  th e y  were n o t  o rgan ized  t o  
p r o f i t  f rom p a t ro n  b u s in e ss .  The v a r io u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  on ownersh ip  o f  
s t o c k ,  w i t h d r a w a l ,  and d i v id e n d s  on s to c k  t e s t i f y  t o  t h i s  s ta tem en t .
Farm c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  however, were o rg a n ize d  t o  make p r o f i t . I n i t i a l l y  
such p r o f i t s  were e x t r a c t e d  by fa rm -p a t ro r .s  from the  non- fa rm  m o n o p o l is t s  
and monopson is ts .  S ince  t h i s  e x t r a c t i v e  p rocess  r e s u l t e d  in  a h e a l t h i e r  
fa rm  economy p lu s  a b e t t e r  and cheaper  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  foods ,  the  coop­
e r a t i v e  movement was encouraged. C o o p e ra t ives  were a l lo w ed  t o  o p e ra te  
under  a un ique  s e t  o f  t a x  r e g u l a t i o n s  n o t  because they  were n o n - p r o f i t
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e n te rp r is es  but because they seemed to  c o n t r ib u te  more to the n a t io n 's  
w e l fa r e  than non-farm e n te r p r is e  opera t ing  in the same sector  o f  the 
economy. Tax s u b s id iza t io n  was considered to be in the pub l ic  in te r e s t .  
Today th is  o r ig in a l  funct ion  has g r e a t ly  diminished, the associat ion is 
no longer a m u l t i - f i r m  p la n t  opera t ing  to e l im in a te  market imperfect ions.  
Instead i t  has evolved in to  a farm-connected e n te rp r is e  no d i f f e r e n t  in 
goals from any o th e r  e n te r p r is e .
Like the p u b l ic  in t e r e s t  and depar tm en ta l iza t io n  arguments which 
are  i n t e g r a l l y  t i e d  toge the r ,  o ther  co-op arguments have becorrse outdated.  
F a m  cooperat ives can but seldom do funct ion  on an agency basis. The 
expansion o f  cooperat ives in to  every l in e  o f  a c t i v i t y  conceivably connec­
ted to a g r ic u l t u r e  has confronted a basic diseconomy of  scale. Manage­
ment can be extended on ly  so f a r ,  and more important a t rue  agency r e la ­
t io ns h ip  has s ize  l i m i t a t i o n s .  Consequently the separat ion of  ownership 
and contro l  which c h a rac te r ize s  large  corporate e n te rp r is e  is found in 
l i k e  degree in the la r g e r  cooperat ive  s t ru c tu re s .
F i n a l l y  the co-op in te re s ts  have resorted to a specious l e g a l i s ­
t i c  argument c a l le d  p r ic e  adjustment to j u s t i f y  t h e i r  present tax po s i ­
t io n .  Again the economic fa c ts  do not support the v a l i d i t y  o f  the co-op 
p o s i t io n .  Here the coopera t ive  is viewed as a f i rm  which d is t r ib u te s  
a l l  p r o f i t s  to i t s  "customers."  However, th is  argument ignores the im­
p o r ta n t  f a c t  th a t  a c o o p era t iv e 's  "customers" are  a lso i t s  investors.  
Hence the d i s t r i b u t i v e  process is more l i k e  a t a x - f r e e  p r o f i t  d i s t r i b u ­
t io n  to  investors than a rebate or  cost adjustment to customers. No 
bonafide f i r m  adopts a permanent p o l ic y  o f  p r o f i t  exhausting rebates or  
cost adjustments. Obviously the co-op 's  investors must obtain a return
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on t h e i r  inves tment  i f  the  bus iness  i s  t o  succeed. The f a c t  t h a t  such 
r e tu r n s  a re  d is g u is e d  as p r i c e  a d ju s tm e n ts  in  no way reduces th e  ta x  l i a ­
b i l i t y  o f  such re tu r n s .
In b r i e f ,  c o o p e ra t i v e s  a re  p r e s e n t l y  s u b s id i z e d  th rough  c o r p o r a te  
t a x - f r e e  p r o f i t s .  T h is  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  canno t  be j u s t i f i e d  on the  grounds 
o f  p u b l i c  I n t e r e s t ,  Of the  p r a c t i c a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  In ta x  p o l i c y  which 
have been suggested none a re  f r e e  o f  i m p e r fe c t i o n s .  None o f  the  p ropo ­
s a ls  would le v y  a ta x  which f a l l s  d i r e c t l y  on o n l y  co-op c o r p o r a te  i n -  
come. None a f f e c t  th e  coop era t iv e 's  a b i l i t y  t o  accum ula te  funds in the  
same way the  c o r p o r a te  Income t a x  a f f e c t s  n o n -c o o p e ra t i v e  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  
B u t ,  th e y  would a i d  in  end ing  th e  p r e s e n t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a g a in s t  non- 
co-op e n t e r p r i s e  o p e r a t i n g  in  th e  r u r a l  economy. I t  i s  suggested t h a t  
any one o f  these p ro p o s a ls  would be s u p e r i o r  t o  the  p re s e n t  t a x  r e g u la ­
t i o n s  under  which c o o p e r a t i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  a re  c a r r i e d  on. Na one can deny 
t h a t  fa rm c o o p e ra t i v e s  have per fo rmed a rea l  s e r v i c e  f o r  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  
However, the  econ>omic w o r ld  does n o t  s tand s t i l l .  i t  i s  no more inappro ­
p r i a t e  t o  end th e  s u b s i d i z a t i o n  o f  c o o p e ra t i v e s  once th e y  have matured 
than t o  remove t a r i f f s  once i n f a n t  i n d u s t r i e s  have come o f  age. In both  
cases the  p u b l i c  i n te r e s t  can be b e s t  served by the  a l t e r a t i o n  o f  once 
a p p r o p r i a t e  p o l i c y .  New ta x  p o l i c y  toward c o o p e ra t i v e s  is  a must i f  they  
a re  t o  p e r fo rm  t h e i r  p ro p e r  r o l e  in  the  economy. C oopera t ives  as w e l l  as 
n o n- fa rm  e n t e r p r i s e  must bn forced t o  compete in  a f r e e  e n t e r p r i s e  econ­
omy. T h is  has been recogn ized  by economists  re g a rd le ss  o f  t h e i r  p o s i ­
t i o n s  in  t h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y . 75
75e. Frwd K o l l e r ,  "C o o p e ra t i v e s  in  a C a p i t a l i s t i c  Economy 
J o u rn a l  o f  Farm; Economics, XXIX (Nov. 1947), P* 1144.
I ID
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To perform t h e t r  ro le  in the econonrsy most e f f e c t i v e l y ,  
cooperatives themselves need the s t im u la t io n  o f  p r iv a te  
competit ion. Successful cooperat ives owe a grea t  deal 
to t h e i r  competitors. E f f i c i e n t  competitors present a 
continuous chal lenge to cooperat ive  management to t r y  to 
render a b e t t e r  s e rv ice  a t  lower cost .  The rec iproca l  
com pet i t ive  a c t io n  o f  e f f i c i e n t  cooperat ive  and e f f i c i e n t  
p r iv a t e  business f irms is a most d e s i r a b le  goal f o r  the  
economy. I t  is a means of  assuring to  farmers and others  
a more e f f e c t i v e  and product ive  economic system than one 
in which government p lays a la r g e r  p a r t .
Or, in o th e r  words, the cooperat ive  economy serves as a measuring s t i c k
f o r  the p r iv a t e  e n te r p r is e  economy and v ice  versa. The only  problem is ,
th a t  w i th  s u b s id iza t io n  the measuring s t i c k  no longer measures.
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